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 Executive Summary 
It is commonly assumed that a person’s face gives evidence of emotions because there is 
a reliable one-to-one mapping between a certain configuration of facial movements, called a 
“facial expression,” and the specific emotional state that is supposedly signals. This common 
view of facial expressions remains entrenched in consumers of emotion research, as well as in 
some scientists, despite an emerging consensus among affective scientists that emotional 
expressions are considerably more context-dependent and variable. Nonetheless, this common 
view continues to fuel commercial applications in industry and government (e.g., automated 
detection of emotions from faces), guide how children are taught (e.g., with posters and books 
showing stereotyped facial expressions), and impact clinical and legal applications (e.g., 
diagnoses of psychiatric illnesses and courtroom decisions). In this paper, we evaluate the 
common view of facial expressions against a review of the evidence and conclude that its rest on 
a number of flawed assumptions and incorrect interpretations of research findings. Our review is 
the most comprehensive and systematic to date, encompassing studies of healthy adults across 
cultures, newborns and young children, as well as people who are congenitally blind, and 
confirms that specific emotion categories -- anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise 
– are each expressed with a particular configuration of facial movements, more reliably than 
would be expected by mere chance, but contrary to the common view, instances of these emotion 
categories are NOT expressed with facial movements that are sufficiently reliable and specific 
across contexts, individuals, and cultures to be considered diagnostic displays of any emotional 
state. Nor do human perceivers, in fact, infer emotions from particular configurations of muscle 
movements in a sufficiently reliable and specific way that similarly generalizes. Studies of 
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expression production and perception both demonstrate multiple sources of variability that 
contradict the common view that smiles, scowls, frowns, and the like, are reliable and specific 
“expressions of emotion.” We conclude the paper with specific recommendations for both 
scientists and consumers of science. 
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Abstract 
It is commonly assumed that a person’s emotional state can be readily inferred from the 
person’s facial movements, typically called “emotional expressions” or “facial expressions.” 
This assumption influences legal judgments, policy decisions, national security protocols, and 
educational practices, guides the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric illness, as well as the 
development of commercial applications, and pervades everyday social interactions as well as 
research in other scientific fields such as artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and computer 
vision. In this paper, we survey examples of this widespread assumption, which we refer to as 
the “common view”, and then examine the scientific evidence for this view with a focus on the 
six most popular emotion categories used by consumers of emotion research: anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness, sadness and surprise. The available scientific evidence suggests that people do 
sometimes smile when happy, frown when sad, scowl when angry, and so on, more than what 
would be expected by chance. Yet there is substantial variation in how people communicate 
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise, across cultures, situations, and even within 
a single situation. Furthermore, similar configurations of facial movements variably express 
instances of more than one emotion category. In fact, a given configuration of facial movements, 
such as a scowl, often communicates something other than an emotional state. Scientists agree 
that facial movements convey a range of social information and are important for social 
communication, emotional or otherwise. But our review suggests there is an urgent need for 
research that examines how people actually move their faces to express emotions and other 
social information in the variety of contexts that make up everyday life, as well as careful study 
of the mechanisms by which people perceive instances of emotion in one another. We make 
specific research recommendations that will yield a more valid picture of how people move their 
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faces to express emotions, and how they infer emotional meaning from facial movements, as 
situations of everyday life.  This research is crucial to provide consumers of emotion research 
with the translational information they require.  
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Introduction 
Faces are a ubiquitous part of everyday life for humans. We greet each other with smiles 
or nods. We have face-to-face conversations on a daily basis, whether in person or via 
computers. We capture faces with smartphones and tablets, exchanging photos of ourselves and 
of each other on Instagram, Snapchat, and other social media platforms. The ability to perceive 
faces is one of the first capacities to emerge after birth: an infant begins to perceive faces within 
the first few days of life, equipped with a preference for face-like arrangements that allows the 
brain to wire itself, with experience, to become expert at perceiving faces (Arcaro et al., 2017; 
Cassia et al., 2004; Grossmann, 2015; Ghandi et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2018; Turati, 2004; but 
see Young & Burton (2018) for a more qualified claim). 1 Faces offer a rich, salient source of 
information for navigating the social world: they play a role in deciding who to love, who to 
trust, who to help, and who is found guilty of a crime (Todorov, 2017; Zebrowitz, 1997, 2017; 
Zhang, Chen & Yang, 2018). Dating back to the ancient Greeks (Aristotle, in 4th century BCE) 
and Romans (Cicero), various cultures have viewed the human face as a window on the mind. 
But to what extent can a raised eyebrow, a curled lip, or a narrowed eye reveal what someone is 
thinking or feeling, allowing a perceiver’s brain to guess what that someone will do next?2 The 
answers to these questions have major consequences for human outcomes as they unfold in the 
living room, the classroom, the courtroom and even on the battlefield. They also powerfully 
shape the direction of research in a broad array of scientific fields, from basic neuroscience to 
psychiatry research.   
Understanding what facial movements might reveal about a person’s emotions is made 
more urgent by the fact that many people believe we already know. Specific configurations of 
facial muscle movements appear as if they summarily broadcast or display a person’s 
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emotions, which is why they are routinely referred to as “emotional expressions” and “facial 
expressions.”3 A simple Google search using the phrase “emotional facial expressions” [see 
Box 1, in supplementary on-line materials (SOM)] reveals the ubiquity with which, at least in 
certain parts of the world, people believe that certain emotion categories are reliably signaled or 
revealed by certain facial muscle movement configurations – a set of beliefs were refer to as the 
common view (also called the classical view; Barrett, 2017a). Similarly, many cultural products 
testify to the common view. Here are several examples: 
• Technology companies are investing tremendous resources to figure out how to objectively “read” 
emotions in people by detecting their presumed facial expressions, such as scowling faces , frowning faces 
and smiling faces in an automated fashion.  Several companies claim to have already done it (e.g., 
https://www.affectiva.com/what/products/ ; https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-
services/emotion/). For example, Microsoft’s Emotion API promises to take video images of a person’s 
face to detect what that individual is feeling. The application states: “The emotions detected are anger, 
contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, neutral, sadness, and surprise. These emotions are understood to be 
cross-culturally and universally communicated with particular facial 
expressions”(https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/cognitive-services/emotion/). 
 
• Countless electronic messages are annotated with emojis or emoticons that are schematized versions of the 
proposed facial expressions for various emotion categories 
(https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/07/apple-celebrates-world-emoji-day/ ).  
 
• Putative emotional expressions are taught to preschool children by displaying scowling faces, frowning 
faces, smiling faces and so on, in posters (e.g., use “feeling chart for children” in a Google image search), 
games (https://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss_2?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-
keywords=miniland+emotion )and books (e.g., Cain, 2000; Parr, 2005), and on episodes of Sesame Street 
(among many examples, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZxfJicfyCdg , 
https://vimeo.com/108524970 , or https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y28GH2GoIyc ).4  
 
• Television shows (e.g., Lie to Me), movies (e.g., Inside Out) and documentaries (e.g., The Human Face, 
produced by the British Broadcasting Company) customarily depict certain facial configurations as 
universal expressions of emotions.  
 
• Magazine and newspaper articles routinely feature stories in kind: facial configurations depicting a scowl 
are referred to as “expressions of anger,” facial configurations depicting a smile are referred to as 
“expressions of happiness,” facial configurations depicting a frown are referred to as “expressions of 
sadness,” and so on.  
 
• Agents of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) were trained to detect emotions and other intentions using these facial configurations, with the goal 
of identifying and thwarting terrorists (Rhonda Heilig, special agent with the FBI, personal 
Facial Expressions of Emotion  7 
 
communication, December 15, 2014, 11:20 am; https://how-emotions-are-
made.com/notes/Screening_of_Passengers_by_Observation_Techniques).5  
 
• The facial configurations that supposedly diagnose emotional states also figure prominently in the 
diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric disorders. One of the most widely used task in autism research, the 
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test”, asks patients to match photos of the upper (eye) region of a posed 
facial configuration with specific mental state words, including emotion words (Baron-Cohen t al., 2001). 
Treatment plans for people living with autism and other brain disorders often include learning to recognize 
these facial configurations as emotional expressions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2004; Kouo & Egel, 2016). This 
training does not generalize well to real-world skills, however (Bergren et al., 2018; Kouo & Egel, 2016). 
 
• “Reading” the emotions of a defendant (in the words of Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy -- to 
“know the heart and mind of the offender”) is one pillar of a fair trial in the U.S. legal system and in many 
legal systems in the Western world (see Riggins v. Nevada, 1992). Legal actors like jurors and judges 
routinely rely on facial movements to determine the guilt and remorse of a defendant (e.g., Bandes, 2014; 
Zebrowitz, 1997). For example, defendants who are perceived as untrustworthy receive harsher sentences 
than they otherwise would (Wilson & Rule, 2015, 2016), and such perceptions are more likely when a 
person appears to be angry (i.e., facial structure is similar to the hypothesized facial expression of anger, 
which is a scowl (Todorov, 2017). An incorrect inference about a defendant’s emotional state can cost 
someone her children, her freedom, or even her life (for recent examples, see Barrett, 2017, beginning on 
page 183). 
 
But can a person’s emotional state be reasonably inferred from that person’s facial 
movements? In this paper, we offer a systematic review of the evidence, testing the common 
view that instances of emotion are signaled with a distinctive configuration of facial movements 
with enough consistently that it can serve as a diagnostic marker of those instances. We focus 
our review on evidence pertaining to six emotion categories that have received the lion’s share of 
attention in the scientific literature -- anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise – and 
that, correspondingly, are the focus of common view (as evidenced by our Google search, 
summarized in Box 1, SOM), but our conclusions apply to all emotion categories that have thus 
far been scientifically studied. We open the paper with a brief discussion of its scope, approach, 
and intended audience. We then summarize evidence on how people actually move their faces 
during episodes of emotion, referred to as studies of expression production studies, following 
which we examine evidence for which emotions are actually inferred from looking at facial 
movements, referred to as studies of emotion perception. We identify three key shortcomings in 
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the scientific research that have contributed to a general misunderstanding about how emotions 
are expressed and perceived in facial movements, and that limit the translation of this scientific 
evidence for other uses:  
(1) limited reliability (instances of the same emotion category are neither reliably expressed 
with or perceived from a common set of facial movements); 
(2) lack of specificity (there is no one-to-one mapping between a single configuration of 
facial movements and instances of the same emotion category); and, 
(3) limited generalizability (the effects of context and culture have not been sufficiently 
documented and accounted for).  
We then discuss our conclusions, followed by proposals for consumers on how they might use 
the existing scientific literature. We also provide recommendations for future research with 
consumers of emotion research in mind. We have included additional detail on some topics of 
import or interest in the supplementary on-line materials (SOM).  
Scope, Approach and Intended Audience of Paper 
The Common View: Reading an Inner Emotional State of Mind From A Set of Unique 
Facial Movements 
In common English parlance, people refer to “emotions” or “an emotion” as if anger, 
happiness, or any emotion word refers to an object that is highly similar on every occurrence.  
But an emotion word refers not to a unitary entity, but to a category of instances that vary from 
one another in their physical features, such as facial expressions and bodily changes, and 
mental features. Few scientists who study emotion, if any, take the view that every instance of 
an emotion category, such as anger, is identical to every other instance, sharing a set of 
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necessary and sufficient features across situations, people and cultures. For example, Keltner 
and Cordaro (2017) recently wrote, “there is no one-to-one correspondence between a specific 
set of facial muscle actions or vocal cues and any and every experience of emotion” (p. 62). Yet 
there is considerable scientific debate about the amount of the within-category variation, the 
specific features that vary, the causes of the within-category variation, and implications of this 
variation for the nature of emotion (see Figure 1).  
One popular scientific framework, referred to as the basic emotion approach, 
hypothesizes that instances of an emotion category are expressed with facial movements that 
vary, to some degree, around a typical set of movements (called a prototype) (for example, see 
Table 1). For example, it is hypothesized that in one instance, anger might be expressed with the 
expressive prototype (e.g., brows furrowed, eyes wide, lips tightened) plus additional facial 
movements, such as a widened mouth, whereas on other occasions, a facial movement in the 
prototype might be missing (e.g., anger might be expressed with narrowed eyes or without 
movement in the eyebrow region; for a discussion, see Box 2, in SOM). Nonetheless, the basic 
emotion approach still assumes that the core facial configuration – the prototype -- can be used 
to diagnose a person’s inner emotional state in much the same way that a fingerprint can be 
used to uniquely recognize a person. More substantial variation in expressions (e.g., smiling in 
anger, gasping with widened eyes in anger, and scowling not in anger, but in confusion or 
concentration) is typically explained as the result of some process that is independent of an 
emotion itself, such as display rules, emotion regulation strategies such as suppressing the 
expression, or culture-specific dialects (as proposed by various scientists, including Elfenbein, 
2013, 2017; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Matsumoto, 1990; Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, Frank, & 
O’Sullivan, 2008; Tracy & Randles, 2011).  
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By contrast, other scientific frameworks propose that expressions of the same emotion 
category, such as anger, substantially vary by design, in a way that is tied to the immediate 
context, which includes the internal context (e.g., the person’s metabolic condition, the past 
experiences that come to mind, etc.) and the outward context (e.g., whether a person is at work, 
at school, or at home, who else is present the broader cultural conditions, etc.), both of which 
vary in dynamic ways over time (see Box 2, SOM). These debates, while useful to scientists, 
provide little clear guidance for consumers of emotion research who are focused on the practical 
issue of whether various emotion categories are expressed with facial configurations of 
sufficient regularity and distinctiveness so that it is possible to read emotion in a person’s face.  
The common view of emotional expressions persist, too, because scientists’ actions often 
don’t follow their claims. Many scientists continue to design experiments, use stimuli and 
publish review papers that, ironically, leave readers with the impression that certain emotion 
categories each have a single, unique facial expression, even as those same scientists 
acknowledge that every emotion category can be expressed with a variable set of facial 
movements. Published studies typically test a one-to-one emotion-expression link (for 
examples, see the reference lists in Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, 
O’Sullivan & Frank, 2008; Keltner, Sauter, Tracy & Cowen, in press; also see most of the 
studies cited in this paper, e.g., Cordaro, Sun, Keltner, Kamble, Huddar, & McNeil, 2017). The 
exact facial configuration tested varies slightly from study to study, but a core facial 
configuration is still assumed (see Table 1 for examples), reinforcing rather than dispelling the 
common view that each emotion category is consistently and uniquely expressed with its own 
distinctive configuration of facial movements, which therefore can be used to diagnose its 
presence. Review articles reinforce this impression of a one-to-one mapping by including tables 
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and figures that display a single, unique facial configuration for each emotion category, referred 
to as the expression, signal or display for that emotion (Figure 2 presents two recent examples).6  
The common view of emotional expressions has also been imported into other scientific 
disciplines with an interest in understanding emotions, such as neuroscience and artificial 
intelligence (AI). For example, from a published paper on AI: 
“American psychologist Ekman noticed that some facial expressions corresponding to 
certain emotions are common for all the people independently of their gender, race, 
education, ethnicity, etc. He proposed the discrete emotional model using six universal 
emotions: happiness, surprise, anger, disgust, sadness and fear.” (Brodny, Kolakowska, 
Landowska, Szwoch, Szwoch, & Wróbel, 2016, p. 1, italics in the original) 
 
Similar examples come from our own papers. One paper series of papers focused on the 
brain structures involved in perceiving emotions from facial configurations (Adolphs, 2002; 
Adolphs et al., 1994) and the other focused on early life experiences (Pollak et al., 2000; Pollak 
& Kistler, 2002). These papers were framed in terms of “recognizing facial expressions of 
emotion” and exclusively presented participants with specific, posed photographs of scowling 
faces (the presumed facial expression for anger), wide-eyed gasping faces (the presumed facial 
expression for fear), and so on. Participants were shown faces of different individuals all posing 
the same facial configuration for each emotion category, ignoring the importance of context. One 
reason for this flawed approach to investigating the perception of emotion from faces was that 
then -- at the time these studies were conducted – as now, published experiments, review articles, 
and stimulus sets were dominated by the common view that certain emotion categories were 
signaled with an invariant set of facial configurations, referred to as “facial expressions of basic 
emotions.”   
In this paper, we review the scientific evidence that directly tests two beliefs that form the 
common view of emotional expressions: that certain emotion categories are each routinely 
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expressed by a unique facial configuration and, correspondingly, that people can reliably infer 
someone else’s emotional state from a set of facial movements. Our discussion is written for 
consumers of emotion research, whether they be scientists in other fields or non-scientists, who 
need not have deep knowledge of the various theories, debates, and broad range of findings in 
the science of emotion, with sufficient pointers to those discussions if they are of interest (see 
Box 2, SOM).  
In discussing what this paper is about – the common view that a person’s inner emotional 
state is revealed in facial movements -- it bears mentioning what this paper is not about: This 
paper is not a referendum on “basic emotion” view we briefly mentioned earlier in this section, 
proposed by the psychologist Paul Ekman and his colleagues, or any other research program or 
psychologist’s view. Ekman’s theoretical approach has been highly influential in research on 
emotion for much of the past 50 years. We often cite studies inspired by the basic emotion 
approach for this reason. In addition, the common view of emotional expressions is also most 
readily associated with a simplified version of basic emotion approach, as exemplified by the 
quotes above. Critiques of Ekman’s basic emotion view (and related views) are numerous (e.g., 
Barrett, 2006a, 2007, 2011; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, 1991, 1994, 1995), as are rejoinders 
that defend it (e.g., Ekman, 1992, 1994; Izard, 2007). Our paper steps back from this dialogue. 
We instead take as our focus the existing research on emotional expression and emotion 
perception and ask whether it is sufficiently strong to justify the way it is increasingly being used 
by those who consume it.  
A Systematic Approach for Evaluating the Scientific Evidence 
 When you see someone smile and infer that the person is happy, you are making what is 
known as a reverse inference: you are assuming that the smile reveals something about the 
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person’s emotional state that you cannot access directly (see Figure 3). Reverse inference 
requires calculating a conditional probability: the probability that a person is in a particular 
emotion episode (such as happiness) given the observation of a unique set of facial muscle 
movements (such as a smile). The conditional probability is written as: 
p[emotion category|a unique facial configuration]) 
for example, 
p[happiness| a smiling facial configuration]) 
Reverse inferences about emotion are ubiquitous in everyday life – whenever you experience 
someone as emotional, your brain has performed a reverse inference, guessing at the cause of a 
facial movement when only having access to the movement itself. Every time an app on a phone 
or computer measures someone’s facial muscle movements, identifies a facial configuration such 
as a frowning facial configuration, and proclaims that the target person is sad, that app has 
engaged in reverse inference, such as: 
p[sadness| a frowning facial configuration]) 
Whenever a security agent infers anger from a scowl, the agent has assumed a strong likelihood 
for  
p[anger| a scowling facial configuration]) 
 Four criteria must be met to justify a reverse inference that a particular facial 
configuration expresses and therefore reveals a specific emotional state: reliability, specificity, 
generalizability and validity (explained in Table 2 and Figure 3).  These criteria are commonly 
encountered in the field of psychological measurement and over the last several decades there 
has been an ongoing dialogue about thresholds for these criteria as they apply in production and 
perception studies, with some consensus emerging for the first three criteria (see Haidt & 
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Keltner, 1999). Only when a pattern of facial muscle movements strongly satisfies these four 
criteria can we justify calling it an “emotional expression.” If any of these criteria are not met, 
then we should instead refer to a facial configuration with more neutral, descriptive terms 
without making unwarranted inferences, simply calling it a smile (rather than an expression of 
happiness), a frown (rather than an expression of sadness), a scowl (rather than an expression of 
anger), and so on.7  
The Null Hypothesis and the Role of Context 
Tests of reliability, specificity, generalizability and validity are almost always compared 
to what would be expected by sheer chance, if facial configurations (in studies of expression 
production) and inferences about facial configurations (in studies of emotion perception) 
occurred randomly with no relation to particular emotional states. In most studies, chance levels 
constitute the null hypothesis. An example of the null hypothesis for reliability is that people do 
not scowl when angry more frequently than would be expected by chance.8 If people are 
observed to scowl more frequently when angry than they would by chance, then the null 
hypothesis can be rejected based on the reliability of the findings. We can also test the null 
hypothesis for specificity: If people scowl more frequently than they would by chance not only 
when angry but also when fearful, sad, confused, hungry, etc., then the null hypothesis for 
specificity is retained.9  
In addition to testing hypotheses about reliability and specificity, tests of generalizability 
are becoming more common in the research literature, again using the null hypothesis. Questions 
about generalizability test whether a finding in one experiment is reproduced in other 
experiments in different contexts, using different experimental methods or sampling people from 
different populations.  There are two crucial questions about generalizability when it comes to 
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the production and perception of emotional expressions: Do the findings from a laboratory 
experiment generalize to observations in the real world? And, do the findings from studies that 
sample participants from Westernized, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD; 
Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) populations generalize to people who live in small-scale, 
remote communities?   
Questions of validity are almost never addressed in production and perception studies.  
Even if reliable and specific facial movements are observed across generalizable circumstances, 
it is a difficult and unresolved question as to whether these facial movements can justify an 
inference about a person’s emotion state.  We have more to say about this later.  In this paper, we 
evaluate the common view by reviewing evidence pertaining to the reliability, specificity, and 
generalizability of research findings from production and perception studies. 
A focus on rejecting the null hypothesis, defined by what would be expected by chance 
alone, provides necessary but not sufficient support for the common view of emotional 
expressions. A slightly above chance co-occurrence of a facial configuration and instances of an 
emotion category, such as scowling in anger – for example, a correlation coefficient around r = 
.20 to .39 (adapted from Haidt & Keltner, 1999) -- suggests that a person sometimes scowls in 
anger, but not most or even much of the time. Weak evidence for reliability suggests that other 
factors not measured in the experiment are likely causing people to scowl during an instance of 
anger. It also suggests that people may express anger with facial configurations other than a 
scowl, possibly in reliable and predictable ways. Following common usage, we refer to these 
unmeasured factors collectively as context. A similar situation can be described for studies of 
emotion perception: when participants label a scowling facial configuration as “anger” in a 
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weakly reliable way (between .20 and .39 percent of the time; Haidt & Keltner, 1999), then this 
suggests the possibility of unmeasured context effects. 
In principle, context effects make it possible to test the common view by comparing it 
directly to an alternative hypothesis that a person’s brain will be influenced by other causal 
factors (as opposed to comparing the findings to random chance). It is possible, for example, that 
a state of anger is expressed differently depending on various factors that can be studied, 
including the situational context (such as whether a person is at work, at school, or at home), 
social factors (such as who else is present in the situation and the relationship between the 
expresser and the perceiver), the person’s internal physical context (based on how much sleep 
they had, how hungry they are, etc.), a person’s internal mental context (such as the past 
experiences that come to mind or the evaluations they make), the temporal context (what just 
occurred a moment ago), differences between people (such as whether someone is male or 
female, warm or distant), and the cultural context, such as whether the expression is occurring in 
a culture that values the rights of individuals (vs. group cohesion), is open and allows for a 
variety of behaviors in a situation (vs. closed, having more rigid rules of conduct). Other 
theoretical approaches offer some of these specific alternative hypotheses (see Box 2 in SOM). 
In practice, however, experiments almost always test the common view against the null 
hypothesis for reliability and specificity and rarely test specific alternative hypotheses.  When 
context is acknowledged and studied, it is usually examined as a factor that might moderate a 
common and universal emotional expression, preserving the core assumptions of the common 
view (e.g., Cordaro et al., 2017; for more discussion, see Box 3, SOM).  
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A Focus on Six Emotion Categories: Anger, Disgust, Fear, Happiness, Sadness and 
Surprise  
 Our critical examination of the research literature in this paper focuses primarily on 
testing the common view of facial expressions for six emotion categories -- anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness, sadness and surprise. We do not include a discussion of every emotion category ever 
studied in the science of emotion. We do not discuss the many emotion categories that exist in 
non-English speaking cultures, such as gigil, the irresistible urge to pinch or squeeze something 
cute, or liget, exuberant, collective aggression (for discussion of non-English emotion 
categories, see Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Pavlenko, 2014; Russell, 1991). We do not discuss the 
various emotion categories that have been documented throughout history (e.g., Smith, 2016). 
Nor do we discuss every English emotion category for which a prototypical facial expression 
has been suggested. For example, recent studies motivated primarily by the basic emotion 
approach have suggested that there are “more than six distinct facial expressions …in fact, 
upwards of 20 multimodal expressions” (Keltner et al., in press, pg. 4), meaning that scientists 
have proposed a prototypic facial configuration as the facial expression for each of twenty or so 
emotion categories, including confusion, embarrassment, pride, sympathy, awe, and so on.   
The reasons for our focus on six emotion categories are twofold. First, anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, sadness and surprise categories anchor common beliefs about emotions and their 
expressions (as is evident from Box 4, in SOM) and therefore represent the clearest, strongest 
test of the common view. Second, these six emotion categories have been the primary focus of 
systematic research for almost a century and therefore provide the largest corpus of scientific 
evidence that can be evaluated. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for any of other emotion 
categories in question. This is a particularly important point when considering the twenty plus 
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emotion categories that are now the focus of research attention. A PsycInfo search for the term 
“facial expression” combined with “anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise” produced 
over 700 entries, but a similar search including “love, shame, contempt, hate, interest, distress, 
guilt” returned less than 70 entries (Duran & Fernandez-Dols, 2018). Almost all cross-cultural 
studies of emotion perception have focused on just anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and 
surprise (plus or minus a few) and experiments that measure how people spontaneously move 
their faces to express instances of emotion categories other than these six remain rare. In 
particular, there are too few studies that measure spontaneous facial movements during episodes 
of other emotion categories (i.e., production studies) to conclude anything about reliability and 
specificity, and there are too few studies of how these additional emotion categories are 
perceived in small-scale, remote cultures to conclude anything about generalizability. In an era 
where the generalizability and robustness of psychological findings are under close scrutiny, it 
seemed prudent to focus on the emotion categories for which there are, by a factor of ten, the 
largest number of published experiments. Our discussion, which is based on a sample of six 
emotion categories, generalizes to emotion categories that have been studied, however.10  
The proposed expressive facial configurations for each emotion category are presented in 
Figure 4, and the origin of these facial configurations is discussed in Box 4 in SOM. They 
originated with Charles Darwin, who stipulated (rather than discovered) that certain facial 
configurations are expressions of certain emotion categories, inspired by photographs taken by 
Duchenne and drawings made by the Scottish anatomist Charles Bell (Darwin, 1872). These 
stipulations largely form the basis of the common view of emotional expressions.  
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Producing Facial Expressions of Emotion: A Review of the Scientific Evidence 
In this section, we first review the design of a typical experiment where emotions are 
induced and facial movements are measured. This review highlights several observations to keep 
in mind as we review the reliability, specificity and generalizability for expressions of anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise in a variety of populations, including adults in both 
urban and small-scale remote cultures, infants and children, and congenitally blind individuals. 
Our review is the most comprehensive to date and allows us to comment on whether the 
scientific findings generalize across different populations of individuals. The value of doing so 
becomes apparent when we observe how similar conclusions emerge from these research 
domains. 
The Anatomy of a Typical Experiment Designed to Observe People’s Facial Movements 
During Episodes of Emotion 
In the typical expression production experiment, scientists expose participants to objects, 
images or events that they (the scientists) believe will evoke an instance of emotion. It’s 
possible, in principle, to evoke a wide variety of instances for a given emotion category (e.g., 
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2015), but in practice, published studies evoke the most typical 
instances of each category, often elicited with a stimulus that is presented without context (e.g., a 
photograph, a short movie clip separated from the rest of the film, etc.). Scientists usually 
include some measure to verify that participants are in the expected emotional state (such as 
asking participants to describe how they feel by rating their experience against a set of emotion 
adjectives). They then observe participants’ facial movements during the emotional episode and 
then quantify how well the measure of emotion predicts the observed facial movements. When 
done properly, this yields estimates of reliability and specificity, and in principle provides data to 
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assess generalizability. There are limitations to assessing the validity of a facial configuration as 
an expression of emotion, as we explain below.  
Measuring facial movements. Healthy humans have a common set of 17 facial muscle 
groups on each side of the face that contract and relax in patterns.11 To create facial movements 
that are visible to the naked eye, facial muscles contract, changing the distance between facial 
features (Neth & Martinez, 2009) and shaping skin into folds and wrinkles on an underlying 
skeletal structure. Even when facial movements look the same to the naked eye, there may be 
differences in their execution under the skin. There are individual differences in mechanics of 
making a facial movement, including variation in the anatomical details (e.g., everyone has a 
slightly different configuration and relative size of the muscles, some people lack certain muscle 
components, etc.), in the neural control of those muscles (Cattaneo & Pavesi, 2014; Hutto & 
Vattoth, 2015; Muri, 2015), and in the underlying skeletal structure of the face (discussed in Box 
5, in SOM).  
There are three common procedures for measuring facial movements in a scientific 
experiment. The most sensitive, objective measure of facial movements detects the electrical 
activity from actual muscular contractions, called facial electromyography (again, see Box 5, in 
SOM). This is a perceiver-independent way of assessing facial movements that detects muscle 
contractions that are not necessarily visible to the naked eye (Tassinary & Cacioppo 1992). 
Facial EMG’s utility is unfortunately offset by its impracticality: facial EMG requires placing 
electrodes on a participant’s face, which can cause skin abrasions. In addition, a person can 
typically tolerate only a few electrodes on the face at a time. At the writing of this paper, there 
were relatively few published papers using facial EMG (we identified 123 studies), the 
overwhelming majority of which sparsely sampled the face, measuring the electrical signals for 
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only a small number of muscles (between one to six); none of the studies measured naturalistic 
facial movements as they occur outside the lab, in everyday life. As a consequence, we focus our 
discussion on two other measurement methods: a perceiver-dependent method that describes 
visible facial movements, called facial actions, which uses human coders who indicate the 
presence or absence of a facial movement while viewing video recordings of participants, and 
automated methods for detecting of facial actions from photographs or videos.  
Measuring facial movements with human coders. The Facial Action Coding System, or 
FACS (Ekman et al., 2002), is a systematic approach to describe what a face looks like when 
facial movements have occurred. FACS codes describe the presence and intensity of facial 
movements. Importantly, FACS is purely descriptive and is therefore agnostic about whether 
those movements might express emotions or any other mental event.12 Human coders train for 
many weeks to reliably identify specific movements called “action units” or AUs. Each AU is 
hypothesized to correspond to the contraction of a distinct facial muscle or a distinct grouping of 
muscles that is visible as a specific facial movement. For example, the raising of the inner 
corners of the eyebrows (contracting the frontalis muscle pars medialis) corresponds to AU 1. 
Lowering of the inner corners of the brows (activation of the corrugator supercilii, depressor 
glabellae and depressor supercilii) corresponds to AU 4. AUs are scored and analyzed as 
independent elements, but the underlying anatomy of many facial muscles constrains them so 
they cannot move independently of one another, generating dependencies between AUs (e.g., see 
Hao, Wang, Peng, & Ji, 2018). Facial action units (AU) and their corresponding list of facial 
muscles can be found in Table 3. Expert FACS coders approach inter-rater reliabilities of .80 for 
individual AUs (Jeni, Cohn, & De la Torre, 2013). The first version of FACS (Ekman & Friesen, 
1978) was largely based on the work of Swedish anatomist Carl-Herman Hjortsjö who 
Facial Expressions of Emotion  22 
 
catalogued the facial configurations described by Duchenne (Hjortsjö, 1969). In addition to the 
updated versions of FACS (Ekman et al., 2002), other facial coding systems have been devised 
for human infants (Izard et al., 1995; Oster, 2003), chimpanzees (Vick et al., 2007), and macaque 
monkeys (Parr et al., 2010).13 Figure 4 displays the common FACS codes for the configurations 
of facial movements that have been proposed as the expression of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness and surprise. 
Measuring facial movements with automated algorithms. Human coders require time-
consuming, intensive training and practice before they can reliably assign AU codes. After 
training, it is a slow process to code photographs or videos frame by frame making human FACS 
coding impractical to use on facial movements as they occur in everyday life. Large inventories 
of naturalistic photographs and videos, which have been curated only fairly recently (Benitez-
Quiroz et al., 2016), would require decades to manually code. This problem is addressed by 
automated FACS coding systems using computer vision algorithms (Martinez & Du, 2012; 
Martinez, 2017; Valstar et al., 2017).14 Recently developed computer vision systems have 
automated the coding of some (but not all) facial AUs (e.g., Benitez-Quiroz et al., in press; 
Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017b; Chu et al., 2017; Corneanu et al., 2016; Essa & Pentland, 1997; 
Martinez, 2017a; Martinez & Du, 2012; Valstar et al., 2017; see Box 6, SOM) making it more 
feasible to observe facial movements as they occur in everyday life, at least in principle (see Box 
7, SOM). Automated FACS coding is accurate (>90%) when compared to the AU codes from 
expert human coders, provided that the images were captured under ideal laboratory conditions, 
where faces are viewed from the front, are well illuminated, are not occluded, and are posed in a 
controlled way (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2016). Under ideal conditions, accuracy is highest (~ 
99%) when algorithms are tested and trained on images from the same database (Benitez-Quiroz 
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et al., 2016). The best of these algorithms works quite well when trained and tested on images 
from different databases (~90%), as long as the images are all taken in ideal conditions (Benitez-
Quiroz et al., 2016). Accuracy (compared to human FACS coding) decreases substantially more 
when coding facial actions in still images or in video frames taken in everyday life where 
conditions are unconstrained and facial configurations are not stereotypical (e.g.,Yitzhak et al., 
2017).15 For example, 38 automated FACS coding algorithms were recently trained on one 
million images (the 2017 EmotioNet Challenge; Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017a) and evaluated 
against separate test images which were FACS coded by experts.16 In these less constrained 
conditions, accuracy dropped below 83% and a combined measure of precision and recall (a 
measure called 𝐹1, ranging from zero to one)
 was below .65 (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017a).17 
These results indicate that current algorithms are not accurate enough in their detection of facial 
AUs to fully substitute for expert coders when describing facial movements in everyday life. 
Nonetheless, these algorithms offer a distinct practical advantage because they can be used in 
conjunction with human coders to speed up the study of facial configurations in millions of 
images in the wild. It is likely that automated methods will continue to improve as better and 
more robust algorithms are developed and as more diverse face images become available.  
Measuring an emotional state. Once an approach has been chosen for measuring facial 
movements, a clear test of the common view of emotional expressions depends on having valid 
measures that reliably and specifically characterize the instances of each emotion category in a 
generalizable way, to which the measurements of facial muscle movements can be compared. 
The methods that scientists use to assess people’s emotional states vary in their dependence on 
human inference, however, which raises questions about the validity of the measures.  
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Relatively objective measures of an emotional instance. The more objective end of the 
measurement spectrum includes dynamic changes in the autonomic nervous system (ANS), such 
as cardiovascular, respiratory or perspiration changes (measured as variations in skin 
conductance), and dynamic changes in the central nervous system, such as changes in blood flow 
or electrical activity in the brain. These measures are thought to be more objective because the 
measurements themselves (the numbers) do not require a human judgment (i.e., the 
measurements are perceiver-independent). Only the interpretation of the measurements (their 
psychological meaning) requires human inference. For example, a human observer does not 
judge whether skin conductance or neural activity increases or decreases; human judgment only 
comes into play when the measurements are interpreted for the emotional meaning.  
Currently, there are no objective measures, either singly or as a pattern, that reliability 
and uniquely identify one emotion category from another in a replicable way. Statistical 
summaries of hundreds of experiments, called meta-analyses, show for example, that currently 
there is no relationship between an emotion category, such as anger, and a single, specific set of 
physical changes in ANS that accompany the instances of that category, even probabilistically 
(the most comprehensive study published to date is Siegel et al., 2018, but for earlier studies see 
Cacioppo et al., 2000; Stemmler, 2004; also see Box 8, SOM). In anger, for example, blood 
pressure can go up, go down, or stay the same (i.e., changes in blood pressure are not 
consistently associated with anger). And a rise in blood pressure is not unique to instances of 
anger; it also can occur during a range of other emotional episodes (i.e., changes in blood 
pressure do not specifically occur in anger and only in anger). 18Individual studies often find 
patterns of ANS measures that distinguish an instance of one emotion category from another, but 
those patterns don’t replicate and instead vary across studies, even when studies use the same 
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methods and stimuli, and sample from the same population of participants (e.g., compare 
findings from Kragel & LaBar, 2013 with Stephens, Christie, & Friedman, 2010). Similar 
within-category variation is routinely observed for changes in neural activity measured with 
brain imaging (Lindquist et al., 2012) and single neuron recordings (Guillory & Bujarski, 2014). 
For example, pattern classification studies discover multivariate patterns of activity across the 
brain for emotion categories such as anger, sadness, fear, and so on, but these patterns do not 
replicate from study to study (e.g., Kragel & LaBar, 2015; Saarimäki et al., 2016; Wager et al., 
2015; for a discussion, see Clark-Polner et al., 2017). This observed variation does not imply that 
biological variability during emotional episodes is random, but rather that it may be context-
dependent (e.g., yellow and green zones of Figure 1). It may also be the case that current 
biological measures are simply insufficiently sensitive or comprehensive enough to capture 
situated variation in a precise way. If this is so, then such variation should be considered 
unexplained, rather than random. 
There is a difficult circularity built into these studies that is worth pointing out, and that 
we encounter again a few paragraphs down: Scientists must use some criterion for identifying 
when instances of an emotion category are present in the first place (so as to draw conclusions 
about whether or not emotion categories can be distinguished by different patterns of physical 
measurements).19 In most studies that attempt to find bodily or neural “signatures” of emotions, 
the criterion is a subjective one, either reported by the participants or provided by the scientist, 
which introduces problems of its own, as we discuss in the next section.  
Subjective measures of an emotional instance. Without objective measures to identify the 
emotional state of a participant, scientists typically rely on the relatively more subjective 
measures that anchor the other end of the measurement spectrum. The subjective judgments can 
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come from the participants (who complete self-report measures), from other observers (who infer 
emotion in the participants), or from the scientists themselves (who use a variety of criteria, 
including commonsense, to infer the presence of an emotional episode). These are all examples 
of perceiver-dependent measurements because the measurements themselves, as well as their 
interpretation, directly rely on human inference.  
Scientists often rely on their own judgments and intuitions to stipulate when an emotion 
is present or absent in participants (as Charles Darwin did). For example, snakes and spiders are 
said to evoke fear. So are situations that involve escaping from a predator. Sometimes scientists 
stipulate that certain actions indicate the presence of fear, such as freezing or fleeing or even 
attacking in defense. The conclusions that scientists draw about emotions depends on the validity 
of their initial assumptions. It is noteworthy that when it comes to emotions, scientists use 
exactly the same categories as non-scientists, which may give us cause for concern, as 
forewarned by William James (James, 1890, 1894)20  
Inferences about emotional episodes can also come from other people, for example 
independent samples of study participants, who categorize the situations in which facial 
movements are observed. Scientists can ask observers to infer when participants are emotional 
by having them judge subjects’ behavior or tone of voice; for example, see our discussion of 
Camras et al. (2007) discussed in the section on infants and children, below.  
A third common strategy to identify the emotional state of participants is to simply ask 
them what they are experiencing. Their self-reports of emotional experience then become the 
criteria for deciding whether an emotional episode is present or absent. Self-reports are often 
considered imperfect measures of emotion because they depend on subjective judgements and 
beliefs and require translation into words. In addition, a person can be experiencing an emotional 
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event yet be unaware of it and therefore unable to report on it (i.e., a person can be conscious but 
unaware of their experience and unable to report it), or may be unable to express how they feel 
using emotion words, a condition known as alexithymia. Despite questions about their validity, 
self-reports are the most common measure of emotion that scientists compare to facial AUs.  
Human inference and assessing the presence of an emotional state. At this point, it 
should be obvious that any measure of an emotional state, to which measurements of facial 
muscle movements can be compared, itself requires some degree of human inference; what 
varies is the amount of inference that is required. Herein lies a problem: To properly test the 
hypothesis that certain facial movements reliably and specifically express emotion, scientists 
(ironically) must first make a reverse inference that an emotional event is occurring – that is, 
they infer the emotional instance by observing changes in the body, brain, and behavior (e.g., 
only if blood pressure consistently and uniquely rises in anger can a rise in blood pressure be 
used as a marker of anger). Or they infer (a reverse inference) that an event or object evokes an 
instance of a specific emotion category (e.g., an electric shock elicits fear but not irritation, 
curiosity, or uncertainty). These reverse inferences are scientifically sound only if measures of 
emotion reliably, specifically and validly characterize the instances of the emotion category. So, 
any clear, scientific test of the common view of emotional expressions rests on a set of more 
basic inferences about whether an emotional episode is present or absent, and any conclusions 
that come from such a test are only as sound as those basic inferences.  
If all measures of emotion (to which measurements of facial muscle movements are 
compared) rest on human judgment to some degree, then, in principle, this prevents a scientist 
from being sure that an emotional state is present, which in turn limits the validity of any 
experiment designed to test whether a facial configuration validly expresses a specific emotion 
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category. All face-emotion associations that are observed in an experiment reflect human 
consensus, i.e., the degree of agreement between self-judgments (of the participants), expert-
judgments (of the scientist), and/or judgments of other observers (of perceivers who are asked to 
infer emotion in the participants). These types of agreement are often incorrectly referred to as 
accuracy. We touch on this point again when we discuss studies that test whether certain facial 
configurations are routinely perceived as expressions of anger, disgust, fear, and so on. 
Testing the common view of emotional expressions: Interpreting the scientific 
observations. If a specific facial configuration reliably expresses instances of a certain emotion 
category in any given experiment, then we would expect measurements of the face (e.g., facial 
AU codes) to co-occur with measurements that indicate that participants are in the target 
emotional state. In principle, those measures might be more objective, such as ANS changes 
during an emotional event, or they might be more subjective, deriving from the scientist, from 
other perceivers who make judgments about the study participants, or from the participants 
themselves. In practice, however, most experiments compare facial movements to subjective 
measures of emotion -- a scientist’s judgment about which emotions are evoked by a particular 
stimulus, perceivers judgments about participants’ emotional states, or participants’ self-reports 
of emotional experience -- because ANS and other more objective measurements do not 
themselves distinguish one emotion category from another in a reliable and specific way. For 
example, in an experiment, scientists might ask: Do the AUs that create a scowling facial 
configuration co-occur with self-reports of feeling angry? Do the AUs that create a pouting facial 
configuration co-occur with perceiver’s judgments that participants are sad? Do the AUs that 
create a wide-eyed gasping facial configuration co-occur when people are exposed to an electric 
shock? And so on. If such observations suggest that a configuration of muscle movements is 
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reliably observed during episodes of a given emotion category, then those movements are said to 
express the emotion in question.  As we will see, many studies show that some facial 
configurations occur more often than random chance, but are not observed with a high degree of 
reliability (according to the criteria from Haidt & Keltner (1999), outlined in Table 2 and Figure 
3). 
If a specific facial configuration specifically (i.e., uniquely) expresses instances of a 
certain emotion category in any given experiment, then we would expect to observe little co-
occurrence between measurements of the face and measurements indicating the presence of 
emotional instances from other categories, except what would be expected by chance (again, see 
Table 2 and Figure 3). For example, in an experiment, scientists might ask: do the AUs that 
create a scowling facial configuration co-occur with self-reports of feeling sad, confused, or 
social motives such as dominance? Do the AUs that create a pouting facial configuration co-
occur with perceiver’s judgments that participants are angry or afraid? Do the AUs that create a 
wide-eyed gasping facial configuration co-occur when people are exposed to a competitor whom 
they are trying to scare? And so on.  
If a configuration of facial movements is observed in instances of a certain emotion 
category in a reliable, specific way within an experiment, so that we can infer that the 
movements are expressing an instance of the emotion in that study as hypothesized, then 
scientists can safely infer that the facial movements in question are an expression of that emotion 
category’s instances in that situation. One more step is required before we can infer that the 
facial configuration is the expression of that emotion: we must observe a similar pattern of facial 
configuration-emotion co-occurrences across different experiments, to some extent generalizing 
across the specific measures and methods used and the participants and contexts sampled. If the 
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facial configuration-emotion co-occurrences replicate across experiments that sample people 
from the same culture, then the facial configuration in question can be reasonably be referred to 
as an emotional expression only in that culture; e.g., if a scowling facial configuration co-occurs 
with measures of anger (and only anger) across most studies conducted on adult participants in 
the US who are free from illness, then it is reasonable to refer to a scowl as an expression of 
anger in the US. If facial configuration-emotion co-occurrences generalize across cultures – that 
is, replicate across experiments that sample a variety of instances of that emotion category in 
people from different cultures -- then the facial configuration in question can be said to 
universally express the emotion category in question. 
Studies of Healthy Adults from the U.S. and Other Developed Nations 
We now review the scientific evidence from studies that document how people 
spontaneously move their facial muscles during instances of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness and surprise, and how they pose their faces when asked to indicate how they express 
each emotion category. We examine evidence gathered in the lab and in naturalistic settings, 
sampling healthy adults who live in a variety of cultural contexts. To evaluate the reliability, 
specificity and generalizability of the scientific findings, we adapted criteria set out by Haidt & 
Keltner (1999), as discussed in Table 2. 
Spontaneous facial movements in laboratory studies. A meta-analysis was recently 
conducted to test the hypothesis that the facial configuration in Figure 4 co-occur, as 
hypothesized, with specific emotion categories (Duran et al., 2017). This analysis was published 
in a book chapter. Thirty-seven published articles reported on how people moved their faces 
when exposed to objects or events that evoke emotion. Most studies included in the meta-
analysis were conducted in the laboratory. The findings from these experiments were statistically 
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summarized to assess the reliability of facial movements as expressions of emotion (see Figure 
5). In all emotion categories tested, other than fear, participants moved their facial muscles into 
the expected configuration more consistently than what we would expect by chance. Consistency 
levels were weak, however, indicating that the proposed facial configurations in Figure 4 have 
limited reliability (and to some extent, limited generalizability; i.e., a scowling facial 
configuration is an expression of anger, but not the expression of anger. More often than not, 
people moved their faces in ways that were not consistent with the hypotheses of the common 
view. An expanded version of this meta-analysis (Duran & Fernandez-Dols, 2018) analyzed 89 
effect sizes from 47 studies totaling 3599 participants, with similar results: the hypothesized 
facial configurations were observed, with average effect sizes of r = .32 (for the average 
correlation between the intensity of a facial configuration and a measure of emotion, with 
correlations for specific emotion categories ranging from .25 to .38, corresponding to weak 
evidence of reliability) and proportion = .19 (for the average proportion of the times that a facial 
configuration was observed during an emotional event, with proportions for specific emotion 
categories ranging from .15 to .25, interpreted as no evidence to weak evidence of reliability).21 
No overall assessment of specificity was reported in either the original or the expanded 
meta-analysis because most published studies do not report the false positive rate (i.e., the 
frequency with which a facial AU is observed when an instance of the hypothesized emotion 
category was not present; see Figure 3). Nonetheless, some striking examples of specificity 
failures have been documented in the scientific literature. For example, a certain smile, called a 
“Duchenne” smile, is defined in terms of facial muscle contractions (i.e., in terms of facial 
morphology): it involves movement of the orbiculari oculis which raises the cheeks and causes 
wrinkles at the outer corners of the eyes in addition to movement of the zygomatic major which 
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raises the corners of the lips into a smile. A Duchenne smile is thought to be a spontaneous 
expression of authentic happiness. Research shows that a Duchenne smile can be intentionally 
produced when people are not happy, however (Gunnery & Hall, 2014; Gunnery et al., 2013; 
also see Krumhuber & Manstead, 2009), consistent with evidence that Duchenne smiles often 
occur when people are signaling submission or affiliation rather than solely reflecting happiness 
(Rychlowska et al., 2017).  
Spontaneous facial movements in naturalistic settings. Studies of facial configuration-
emotion category associations in naturalistic settings tend to yield similar results to studies that 
were conducted in more controlled laboratory settings (Fernandez-Dols, 2017; Fernandez-Dols 
& Crivelli, 2013). Some studies observe that people express emotions in real world settings by 
spontaneously making the facial muscle movements proposed in Figure 4, but such observations 
do not replicate well across studies (e.g., compare Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006 vs. Crivelli, 
Carrera and Fernandez-Dols, 2015; Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994 vs. Fernandez-Dols, Sanchez, 
Carrera, & Ruiz-Belda, 1997). For example, two field studies of winning judo fighters recently 
demonstrated that so-called “Duchenne” smiles were better predicted by whether an athlete was 
interacting with an audience than the degree of happiness reported after winning their matches 
(Crivelli, Carrera, & Fernandez-Dols, 2015). Only eight of the 55 winning fighters produced a 
“Duchenne” smile in Study 1; all occurred during a social interaction. Only 25 out of 119 
winning fighters produced a “Duchenne” smile in Study 2, documenting, at best, weak evidence 
for reliability. 
Posed facial movements. Another source of evidence comes from asking participants 
sampled from various cultures to deliberately pose the facial configurations that they believe they 
use to express emotions. In these studies, participants are given a single emotion word or a 
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single, brief statement to describe each emotion category and then asked to freely pose the 
expression that they believe they make. In this way, they directly examine common beliefs about 
emotional expressions. For example, one study provided college students from Canada and 
Gabon (in Central Africa) with dictionary definitions for ten emotion categories. After practicing 
in front of a mirror, participants posed the facial configurations so that “their friends would be 
able to understand easily what they feel” and their poses were FACS coded (Elfenbein et al., 
2007, p. 134). Similarly, a recent study asked college students in China, India, Japan, Korea, and 
the US, to pose the facial movements they believe they make when expressing each of 22 
emotion categories (Cordaro, Sun, Keltner, Kamble, Huddar & McNeil, 2017). Participants 
heard a brief scenario describing an event that might cause anger (“You have been insulted, and 
you are very angry about it”) and then were instructed to pose a facial (and non-verbal, vocal) 
expression of emotion, as if the events in the scenario were happening to them. Experimenters 
were present in the testing room as participants posed their responses. Both studies found 
moderate to strong evidence for a cross-cultural, common expressive pose for anger, fear, and 
surprise categories, and weak to moderate evidence for the happiness category, with cultural 
variation around those common poses; the findings were weaker for disgust and sadness 
categories (Figure 6).  
Neither study compared participants’ posed expressions to observations of how they 
actually moved their faces when expressing emotion. Nonetheless, a quick comparison of the 
findings from both studies and the proportions of spontaneous facial movements made during 
emotional events (from the Duran et al. (2017) meta-analysis) makes it clear that posed and 
spontaneous movements differ, sometimes quite substantially (again, see Figure 6). When people 
pose a facial configuration that they believe expresses an emotion category, they make facial 
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movements that more reliably agree with the hypothesized facial configurations in Figure 6. The 
same cannot be said of people’s spontaneous facial movements during actual emotional episodes, 
however (for convergent evidence, see Motley & Camden, 1988; Namba et al., 2016). One 
possible interpretation of these findings is that posed and spontaneous facial muscle 
configurations correspond to distinct communication systems. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that volitional and involuntary facial movements are controlled by different circuits in the 
skeletomotor system (Rinn, 1984). Another factor that may contribute to the discrepancy 
between posed and spontaneous facial movements is that people’s beliefs about their own 
behavior often reflect their stereotypes or beliefs and do not necessarily correspond to how they 
actually behave in real life (see Robinson & Clore, 2002).  
Summary. Our review of the available evidence thus far is summarized in the first 
through third data rows in Table 4. The hypothesized facial configurations presented in Figure 4 
spontaneously occur with weak reliability during instances of the predicted emotion category, 
suggesting that they sometimes serve to express the predicted emotion. Furthermore, the 
specificity of each facial configuration as an expression of a specific emotion category is largely 
unknown (because it is typically not reported in many studies). In our view, this pattern of 
findings is most compatible with the interpretation that hypothesized facial configurations are not 
made reliably or specifically enough to use them to infer a person’s emotional state. We are not 
suggesting that facial movements are meaningless and devoid of information. Instead, the data 
suggest that the meaning of any set of facial movements may be much more variable and 
context-dependent than hypothesized by the common view.  
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Studies of Healthy Adults Living in Small-Scale, Remote Cultures 
The emotion categories that are at the heart of common view– anger, disgust, fear, 
happiness, sadness and surprise -- were derived from modern US English (Wierzbicka, 2014) 
and their proposed expressions (in Figure 4) derive from observations of people who live in 
urbanized, Western settings. Nonetheless, it is hypothesized that these are facial configurations 
evolved as emotion-specific expressions to signal socially-relevant emotional information 
(Shariff & Tracy, 2011) in the challenging situations that originated in our hunting and gathering 
hominin ancestors who lived on the African savannah during the Pleistocene era (Pinker, 1997; 
Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). It is further hypothesized that these facial configurations should 
therefore be observed during instances of the predicted emotion categories with strong reliability 
and specificity in people around the world, although the facial movements might be slightly 
modified by culture (Cordaro et al., 2017; Ekman, 1972). The strongest test of these hypotheses 
would be to sample participants who live in remote parts of the world with relatively little 
exposure to western cultural norms, practices and values (Norenzayan & Heine, 2005; Henrich et 
al., 2010) and observe their facial movements during emotional episodes.22 In our evaluation of 
the evidence, we continued to use the criteria summarized by Haidt & Keltner (1999; see Table 
2). 
Spontaneous facial movements in naturalistic settings. Our review of scientific studies 
that systematically measure the spontaneous facial movements in people of small-scale, remote 
cultures is brief by necessity: there aren’t any. At the time of publication, we were unable to 
identify even a single published report or manuscript registered on open-access, pre-print 
services that measured facial muscle movements in people of remote cultures as they 
experienced emotional events. Scientists have almost exclusively observed how people label 
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facial configurations as emotional expressions (i.e., they study emotion perception, not 
production) to test the hypothesis that certain facial configurations evolved to express certain 
emotion categories in a reliable, specific and generalizable (i.e., universal) manner. Later in the 
paper we return to this issue and discuss the findings from these emotion perception studies. 
There are nonetheless several descriptive reports that provide support for the common 
view of universal emotional expressions (similar to what Valente et al., 2017 refer to as an 
“observational approach”). For example, the US psychologist Paul Ekman and colleagues 
curated an archive of photographs of the Fore hunter-gatherers taken during his visits to Papua 
New Guinea in the 1960s (Ekman,1980). The photographs were taken as people went about their 
daily activities in the small hamlets of the eastern highlands of Papua New Guinea. Ekman used 
his knowledge of the situation in which each photograph was taken to assign each facial 
configuration to an emotion category, leading him to conclude that the Fore expressed emotions 
with the proposed facial configurations shown in Figure 4. Yet different scientific methods 
yielded a contrasting conclusion. When Trobriand Islanders living in Papua New Guinea were 
asked to infer emotions in facial configurations by labeling these photographs in their native 
language, both by freely offering words and by choosing the best fitting emotion word from a list 
of nine choices, they did not label the facial configurations as proposed by Ekman and colleagues 
at above chance levels (Crivelli et al., 2017).23 In fact, the proposed fear expression -- the wide-
eyed gasping face -- is actually interpreted as an expression of threat (intent to harm) and anger 
by the Maori of New Zealand and in the Trobriand Islanders in remote Papua New Guinea 
(Crivelli & Fridlund, 2016). 
A compendium of spontaneous human behavior published by the Austrian ethologist 
Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989) is sometimes cited as evidence for the hypothesis 
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that certain facial movements are universal signals for specific emotion categories. No 
systematic coding procedure was used in his investigations, however. Upon close examination, 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s detailed descriptions appear to be more consistent with the studies of people 
from more industrialized cultures that we reviewed above: people move their faces in a variety of 
ways during episodes belonging to the same emotion category. For example, as reported by Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, a rapid eyebrow raise (called an eyebrow flash) is thought to express friendly 
recognition in some, but not all, cultures. This movement would be coded with FACS AU 1 
(inner brow raise) and AU 2 (outer brow raise) that are part of the proposed expressions for 
surprise and fear (Ekman et al., 1983), sympathy (Haidt & Keltner, 1999) and awe (Shiota et al., 
2003). Even Eibl-Eibesfeldt acknowledged that eyebrow flashes were not unique expressions of 
specific emotion categories, writing that they also served as a greeting, to invite social contact, as 
a sign of thanks, an initiation of flirting, and a general indication of “yes” in Samoans and other 
Polynesians, in the Eipo and Trobriand islanders in Papua New Guinea, and in the Yanomami of 
South America. In Japan, eyebrow flashes are considered an impolite way for adults to greet one 
another. In the US and Europe, an eyebrow flash was observed when friends greet one another, 
but not strangers.  
Posed facial movements. One study read a brief emotion story to people who live in the 
remote Fore culture of Papua New Guinea and asked each person to “show how his face would 
appear” if he was the person described in the emotion stories (Ekman, 1972, p. 273; sample size 
was not reported). Videotapes of nine participants were shown to 34 US college students who 
were asked to judge which emotion was being expressed. US participants were asked to infer the 
emotional meaning of the facial poses by choosing an emotion word from six choices provided 
by the experimenter (called a choice-from-array task, see Table 5). Participants inferred the 
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intended emotional meaning above chance guessing for smiling (happiness, 73%), frowning 
(sadness, 68%), scowling (anger, 51%), and nose-wrinkling (disgust, 46%), but not for surprise 
and fear (27% and 18% respectively). 
Summary. Our review of the available evidence from expression production studies in 
small-scale, remote cultures is inconclusive because there are no systematic, controlled 
observations that examine how people who live in these cultural contexts spontaneously move 
their facial muscles during emotional episodes. The evidence that does exist suggests that 
common beliefs about emotion may share some similarities across urban and small-scale cultural 
contexts, but more research is needed before any interpretations are warranted. These findings 
are summarized in the fourth and fifth data rows of Table 4.  
Studies of Healthy Infants and Children 
The facial movements of infants and young children provide a valuable way to test 
common beliefs about emotional expressions because, unlike older children and adults, babies 
cannot exert voluntary control over their spontaneous expressive behaviors, meaning that they 
are unable to deliberately mask or portray instances of emotion in accordance with social 
demands. As a general rule, infants understand far more about the world than what they can 
easily convey through their physical actions, making it difficult for experiments to distinguish 
between what infants understand, which often exceeds what they can actually do. Experiments 
must use human inference to determine when an infant is in an emotional state, as is the case in 
studies of adults (see Human inference and assessing the presence of an emotional state). The 
presence (or absence) of an instance of emotion is inferred (i.e., stipulated), either by a scientist 
(who exposes a child to something that is presumed to evoke an emotion episode) or by adult 
“raters” who infer the emotional meaning of the evoking situation or the child’s body movements 
Facial Expressions of Emotion  39 
 
and vocalizations (see Subjective measures of an emotional instance). In the latter cases, 
inferences are measured by asking research participants to label the situation or the child’s 
emotional state by choosing an emotion word or image from a small set of options, a task known 
as choice-from-array. We address the strengths and weaknesses of choice-from-array tasks (see 
Table 6) and the potential risk of confirmatory bias with the use of such methods (see Some 
observations on interpreting the data, below). 
With such a strong reliance on human inference, there is a risk that scientists will 
implicitly confound the measurements made in an experiment with their interpretation of those 
measurements, in effect over-interpreting infant behavior as reflecting a specific aspect of an 
emotional event, in part because these young research participants cannot speak for themselves. 
Some early and influential studies confound the observation of facial movements with their 
interpreted emotional meaning, leading to the conclusions that babies as young as 7-months of 
age were capable of producing an expression of anger when, in fact, it is more scientifically 
correct to say that the babies were scowling. For example, in one study, infants’ facial 
movements were coded as they were given a cookie, and then the cookie was taken away and 
placed out of reach although still clearly visible. The babies appeared to scowl when the cookie 
was removed and not when it was in their mouths (Stenberg, Campos & Emde, 1983). It is 
certainly possible that this repeated giving and taking away of the treat angered the infants, but 
the babies might also have been confused or just generally distressed. Without some independent 
evidence to indicate that a state of anger was induced, we cannot confidently conclude that 
certain facial movements in an infant reliably express a specific instance of emotion. 
The Stenberg et al. study illustrates some of the design issues that have historically been 
of concern in many studies with infants. First, emotion-inducing situations are often defined with 
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commonsense intuitions rather than objective evidence (e.g., an infant is assumed to become 
angry when a cookie is taken away). In fact, it is difficult to know how any individual infant at 
any point in time will construct and react to such an event. Second, when an infant produces a 
facial movement, a common assumption is used to infer its emotional meaning without 
additional measures or controls (e.g., when a scowling facial configuration is observed, it is 
assumed to necessarily be an expression of infant anger, even if there are no data to confirm that 
a scowl is specific to instances of anger in an infant). In fact, years later, Campos and his team 
revised their earlier interpretation of their findings as their research program progressed, later 
concluding that the facial movements in question (infants lowering and drawing together their 
brows, staring straight ahead, or pressing their lips together) were more generally associated with 
unpleasantness and distress, and were not reliable expressions of anger (e.g., Camras, Oster et 
al., 2007).  
The inference problem is particularly poignant when fetuses are studied.  For example, a 
study that used 4-D ultrasonography observed 20-week-old fetuses knitting their brows and 
described the facial movements as expressions of distress (Dondi et al., 2014). Yet the fetuses 
were producing these facial movements during situations when fetal distress was unlikely. The 
brow-knitting was observed during noninvasive ultrasound scanning that did not involve 
perturbation of the fetus and the pregnant women were at rest. Furthermore, the scans were brief 
in duration and the facial movements were interspersed with other movements that are typically 
not thought to express negative emotions, such as smiling and mouthing. This is an example of 
making a scientific inference about an emotion occurring based solely on the facial movements 
without converging evidence that the organism in question (a fetus) was in a distressed state.  
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Doing so highlights the common but unsound assumption that certain facial movements reliably 
index instances of the same emotion category.  
The study of expression production in infants and children must deal with other design 
challenges, in addition to the reliance on human inference, that are shared by experiments 
employing adult participants. In particular, most experiments observe facial movements in a 
restricted range of laboratory settings rather than in the wide variety of situations that naturally 
occur in everyday life. The frequent use of only a single stimulus or event to observe facial 
movements for each emotion category limits the opportunity to discover whether the expression 
of an emotion category vary systematically with context.  
Even with these design considerations, the scientific findings from studies of infants and 
children parallel those that we encountered from studies on adults: lack of reliability and 
specificity in facial muscle movements is the norm, not the exception (again, according to the 
Haidt & Keltner (1999) criteria in Table 2). Although some older studies concluded that infants 
produce invariant emotional expressions (e.g., Izard, Hembree, Dougherty, & Spirrizi, 1983; 
Izard et al., 1987; Izard et al., 1995; Lewis, Ramsay & Sullivan, 2006), these conclusions have 
been largely overturned by more recent work and in many cases have been reinterpreted and 
revised by the authors themselves (e.g., Lewis, Ramsay & Sullivan, 2006)..  
Facial movement in fetuses, infants and young children. The most detailed research on 
facial movements in fetuses and newborns has focused on smiles. Human fetuses lower their 
brows (AU4), raise their cheeks (AU6), wrinkle their noses (AU9), crease their nasolabia 
(AU11), pull the corners of their lips (AU12), show their tongues (AU19), part their lips (AU25), 
and stretch their mouths (AU27) -- all of which have been implicated, to some degree, in adult 
laughter. Infants sometimes produce facial movements that resemble adult laughter when they 
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are in distress and pain (Dondi et al., 2014; Hata et al., 2013; Reissland et al., 2011; Reissland, 
Francis, & Mason, 2013; Yan et al., 2006). Within 24 hours of birth, infants raise their cheek 
muscles in response to being touched (Cecchini et al., 2011). But these movements are not 
specific to smiling; neonates also raise their cheeks (contract the zygomatic muscle) during rapid 
eye movement (REM) sleep, when drowsy, and during active sleep (Dondi et al., 2007). A 
neonatal smile with raised cheeks is caused by brainstem activation (Rinn, 1984), reflecting 
internally generated arousal rather than expressing or communicating an emotion or even a more 
general feeling of pleasure (Emde & Koenig, 1969; Sroufe, 1996; Wolff, 1987). So, it remains 
unclear whether fetal or neonatal facial muscle movements have any relationship to specific 
emotional episodes, as well as more generally to pleasant feelings or to other social meanings 
(Messinger, 2002).  
In fact, it’s not clear that fetal and neonatal facial movements always have a 
psychological meaning (consistent with a behavioral ecology view of facial movements; 
Fridlund, 2017). Newborns appear to produce some combinations of facial movements for 
muscular reasons. For example, infants produce facial movements associated with the proposed 
expression for “surprise” (open mouth and raised eyebrows) in situations that are unsurprising, 
just because opening the mouth necessarily raises their eyebrows; conversely, infants do not 
consistently show the proposed expressive configuration for surprise in contexts that are likely to 
be surprising (Camras, 1992; Camras et al., 2017). The facial movement that is part of the 
proposed expression for sadness (brows oblique and drawn together) occurs when infants 
attempt to lift their heads to direct their gaze (Michel, Camras, & Sullivan, 1992).  
In addition, newborns produce many facial movements that co-occur with fussiness, 
distress, focused attention, and distaste (Oster, 2005). Newborns react to being given sweet 
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versus sour liquids; for example, newborns make a nose-wrinkle movement, which is part of the 
proposed expressive configuration for disgust, when given a sour liquid (Granchrow et al., 
1983). However, other studies show that newborns also make this facial movement when given 
sweet, salty, sour and bitter tastes (e.g., Rosenstein & Oster, 1988). Still other studies show that 
nose-wrinkling does not always occur when infants taste lemon juice (i.e., when that facial 
movement is expected; Bennett et al., 2002). More generally, infants rarely produce consistent 
facial movements that cleanly map onto any single emotion category. Instead, infants produce a 
variety of facial configurations, indicating a lack of emotional specificity (Matias & Cohn, 
1993).  
There are further examples that illustrate how infant facial movements lack strong 
reliability and specificity. In a study of 11-month old babies from the US, China and Japan, 
infants saw a toy gorilla head that growled (to induce fear) or their arms were restrained (to 
induce anger; Camras et al., 2007). Observers judged the infants to be fearful or angry based on 
their body movements; yet, the infants produced the same facial movements in the two 
situations.24 In another study, one-year-old infants were videotaped in situations where they were 
tickled (to elicit joy), tasted sour flavors (to elicit disgust), watched a jack-in-the box (to elicit 
surprise), had their arm restrained (to elicit anger), and were approached by a masked stranger 
(to elicit fear) (Bennett, Bendarsky, and Lewis, 2002). Infants whose arms were restrained (to 
purportedly induce an instance of anger) produced the facial actions associated with the proposed 
facial configuration for an anger expression only 24 percent of the time (low reliability), and 
instead 80 infants (54%) produced the facial actions proposed as the expression of surprise, 37 
infants (25%) produced the facial actions proposed as the expression of joy, 29 infants (19%) 
produced the facial actions proposed as the expression of fear, and 28 (18%) produced the facial 
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actions proposed as the expression of sadness. This dramatic lack of specificity was observed for 
all emotion categories studied. An equal number of babies produced facial movements that are 
proposed as the expressions of joy, surprise, anger, disgust, and fear categories when a sour 
liquid was placed on infants’ tongues to elicit disgust. When infants faced a masked stranger, 
only 20 (13%) produced facial movements that correspond to the proposed expression for fear, 
compared to 56 infants (37%) who produced facial actions associated with the proposed 
expression for instances of joy.25 
Taken together, these findings suggest that infant facial movements may be associated 
with the affective features of experience, such as distress or arousal, as originally described by 
Bridges (1932), or communicate a desire to approach or avoid something (e.g., Lewis, Sullivan 
& Kim, 2015). Affective features such as valence (ranging from pleasantness to distress) and 
arousal (ranging from activated to quiescent) are continuous properties of consciousness, just as 
approach and avoidance are continuous properties of action.  These affective features are shared 
by many instances of different emotion categories, as well as with mental events that are not 
considered emotional (as discussed in Box 9, in SOM) but are still effective and important for 
infants.26 Over time, infants likely learn to differentiate mental events with simple affective 
features into episodes of emotion with additional psychological features that are specific to their 
socio-cultural contexts, making them maximally effective at eliciting needed responses from 
their caregivers (Barrett, 2017a; Holodynski & Friedlmeier 2006; Weiss & Nurcombe, 1992; 
Witherington et al., 2008).  
The affective meaning of an infant’s facial movements may, in fact, be the very 
properties that make these movements so salient to adult observers. When infants move their 
lips, open their mouths, or constrict their eyes, adults view infants as feeling more positively or 
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negatively depending upon the context (Bolzani et al., 2005). Infant expressions thus do have a 
reliable link to instrumental effects in the adults who observe them – playing an important role in 
parent-infant interaction, attachment and the beginnings  of social communication (Atzil et al., 
2018; Feldman, 2016). For example, if an infant cries with narrowed eyes, adults rate that 
infant’s emotion as more negative or having an unwanted experience or needing help, but if the 
infant makes that same eye movement while smiling, adults interpret the infant as experiencing 
more positive emotion. These data consistently point to the usefulness of facial movements in the 
communication of arousal and valence (properties of affect; Box 9, SOM).  Even when episodes 
of more specific emotions start to emerge, we don’t yet have evidence that facial movements 
map reliably and regularly to a specific emotion category. 
Young children begin to produce adult-like facial configurations after the first year of 
life. Even then, however, children’s facial movements continue to lack strong reliability and 
specificity (Bennett et al., 2002; Camras & Shutter, 2010; Matias & Cohn, 1993; Oster, 2005). 
Examples of a wide-eyed gasping facial configuration, proposed as the expression of fear (see 
Figure 4), have rarely been observed or reported in young infants (Witherington et al., 2010). 
Nor do infants reliably produce a scowling facial configuration, proposed as the expression of 
anger (again, see Figure 4). Infants scowl when they cry or are about to cry (Camras, Fatani, 
Fraumeni & Shuster, 2016). A frown (mouth corner depression, AU15) is not reliably and 
specifically observed when infants are frustrated (Lewis & Sullivan, 2014; Sullivan et al., 2003). 
A smile (cheek raising and lip corner pulling, AU6 and AU12) is not reliably observed when 
infants are in visually engaging or mastery situations, or even when they are in pleasant social 
interactions (Messinger, 2002).  
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Experiments that observe young children’s facial movements in naturalistic settings find 
largely the same results as those conducted in controlled laboratory settings. For example, one 
study trained ethnographic videographers to record a family’s daily activities over four days 
(Sears et al., 2014). Coders judged whether or not the child from each participating family made 
a scowling facial configuration (referred to as an expression of anger), a frowning facial 
configuration (referred to as an expression of sadness), and so on, for the six (presumed) emotion 
categories included in the study -- happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust, fear, and anger. During 
instances that were coded as anger (defined as situations that included verbal 
disagreements/sibling bickering, requests for compliance and/or reprimands from parents, parent 
refusal of child requests, during homework, and sibling provocation), a variety of facial 
movements were observed, including frowns, furrowed brows, and eye-rolls, as well as a variety 
of vocalizations, including shouts and whining, and both nonaggressive and aggressive physical 
behaviors. Perhaps the most telling observations for our purposes is that expressions of anger 
were more often vocal than facial. During anger situations, children raised their voices 42% of 
the time, followed by whining about 21% of the time. By contrast, children made scowling facial 
configurations only 16.2% of the time.27 Yet even during anger situations, the facial movements 
were predominantly frowning, which can be part of many different proposed facial 
configurations. The authors reasoned that children engage in specific behaviors to obtain specific 
goals, and that behaviors such as whining are more likely to attract attention and possibly change 
parental behavior than will a facial movement. Indeed, it is easier for parents to ignore a negative 
facial expression than a whining child in the room!  Similar findings for low reliability and 
specificity of the facial configurations presented in Figure 4 were recently observed in a 
naturalistic study that videotaped seven to nine-year old children and their mothers discussing a 
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conflict during their visit to the laboratory related to homework, chores, bedtime or interactions 
with siblings (Castro et al., 2017).  
Summary. Newborns and infants react to the world around them with facial movements. 
There is not yet sufficient evidence, however, to conclude that these facial movements reliably 
and specifically express the instances of any specific emotion category (findings summarized in 
Table 4). When considered alongside vocalizations and body movements, there is consistent 
evidence that infant facial movements reliably signal distress, interest and arousal, and perhaps 
serve as a call for help and comfort. In young children, instances of the same emotion category 
appear to be expressed by a variety of different muscle movements, and the same muscle 
movements occur during instances of various emotion categories, and even during non-emotional 
instances. It may be the case that reliability and specificity emerges through learning and 
development (see Box 10, in SOM), but this remains an open question that awaits future 
research.  
Studies of Congenitally Blind Individuals 
Another source of evidence to test the common view comes from observations of facial 
movements in people who were born blind. The assumption is that people who are blind cannot 
learn, by watching others, which facial muscles to move when expressing emotion. Based on this 
assumption, several studies have claimed to find evidence that congenitally blind individuals 
express emotions with the hypothesized facial configurations in Figure 4 (e.g., blind athletes 
show expressions that are reliably interpreted as shame and pride, Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008; see 
also Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009). People who are born blind learn through other sensory 
modalities, however (for a review, see Bedny & Saxe, 2012), and therefore can learn whatever 
regularities exist between emotional states and words for facial movements from hearing 
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descriptions in conversation, in books and movies, and by direct instruction.28 As an example of 
such learning, Olympic athletes who win medals smile only when they know they are watched 
by other people, such as when they are on the podium facing the audience; in other situations, 
such as while waiting behind the podium or while on the podium facing away from people but 
towards a flag, they did not smile (but presumably were still very happy; Fernandez-Dols et al., 
1995). Such findings are consistent with the behavioral ecology view of facial expressions, 
Fridlund, 1991, 2017) and with more recent sociological evidence that smiles are social cues that 
can communicate different social messages depending on the cultural context (Martin, 
Rychlowska, Wood and Niedenthal, 2017).  
The limitations that apply to studies of emotional expressions in sighted individuals, 
reviewed throughout this paper, are even more applicable to scientific studies of emotional 
expressions in the blind.29 Participants are given pre-determined emotion categories that shape 
their possible responses, and facial movements are often quantified by human judges who have 
their own biases when making commonsense judgments (e.g., Galati et al., 1997; Galati et al., 
2001; Valente et al., 2017). In addition, people who are blind make additional, often unusual 
movements of the head and the eyes (Chiesa et al., 2015). For example, people who are blind 
from birth often move their head in unusual ways to better hear objects or echoes. These unusual 
movements might interfere with or contaminate expressive facial movements. More importantly, 
they reveal whether a participant is blind or sighted, and this knowledge can bias human raters 
who are judging the presence or absence of facial movements in emotional situations. 
Helpful insights about the facial expressions of congenitally blind individuals comes 
from a recent review (Valente et al., 2017) that surveyed 21 studies published between 1932 and 
2015. These studies observe how blind participants move their faces during instances of emotion 
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and then compared those movements both to the proposed expressive forms in Figure 4 and to 
the facial movements of sighted people. Both spontaneous facial movements and posed 
movements were tested. Eight older studies (published between 1932-1977) reported that 
congenitally blind individuals spontaneously expressed emotions with the proposed facial 
configurations in Figure 4, but Valente et al. (correctly) questioned the objectivity of these 
studies because the data were largely based on subjective impressions offered by researchers or 
their assistants. The 13 studies published between 1980 and 2015 were better designed: they 
videotaped participants’ facial movements and described them using a formal facial coding 
system like FACS for adults or a similar coding system for children. These studies are too few in 
number and have insufficient sample sizes to conduct a formal meta-analysis, but taken together 
they suggest that, in general, congenitally blind individuals spontaneously moved their faces in 
similar ways to sighted individuals during instances of emotion: both groups expressed instances 
of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness or surprise with the proposed expressive 
configurations (or their individual AUs) in Figure 4 with either weak reliability or no reliability 
at all, and neither group produced any of the configurations with any specificity (e.g., Galati et 
al., 2001; Galati et al., 2003; Galati et al., 1997). The lack of specificity is not surprising given 
that, upon closer inspection, several of the studies discussed in Valente et al. (2017) compared 
emotion categories that systematically differ in their prototypical affective properties, contrasting 
facial movements in pleasant vs. unpleasant circumstances (e.g., Cole et al., 1989), or observed 
facial movements only in pleasant circumstances without distinguishing the facial AUs for the 
happiness category vs. other positive emotion categories (e.g., Chiesa et al., 2015), such that 
their findings cannot be interpreted unambiguously as evidence pertaining to emotional 
expressions, per se. 
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While congenitally blind and sighted individuals were similar to one another in the 
variety of their spontaneous facial movements, they differed in their posed facial configurations. 
After listening to descriptions of situations that were supposed to elicit an instance of anger, 
sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, and happiness, sited participants posed their faces with the 
proposed expressive forms for the negative emotion categories in Figure 4 at higher levels of 
reliability and specificity than did blind participants (Galati et al., 1997; Roch-Levecq, 2006). 
These findings suggest that congenitally blind individuals have different beliefs about emotional 
expressions or that their knowledge of social rules for producing those configurations on 
command differs from those of sighted individuals.  
Summary. The evidence from studies of blind individuals is consistent with the other 
scientific evidence reviewed so far (Table 4). Even in the absence of visual experience, blind 
individuals, like sighted individuals, develop the ability to spontaneously make a variety of facial 
movements to express emotion, and those movements do not reliably and specifically configure 
as proposed by the common view of emotion (depicted in Figure 4). Learning to voluntarily pose 
the proposed expressions in Figure 4 does seem to covary with vision, however, further 
emphasizing that posed and spontaneous expressions should be treated as different phenomena. 
Further scientific attention is warranted to examine how congenitally blind individuals learn, via 
other sensory modalities, to express emotions.  
Summary of Scientific Evidence on the Production of Facial Expressions 
The scientific findings we have reviewed thus far – dealing with how people actually 
move their faces during emotional events – does not strongly support the common view that 
people reliably and specifically express instances of emotion categories with spontaneous facial 
configurations that resemble those proposed in Figure 4.  Adults around the world, infants and 
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children and congenitally blind individuals all show much more variability than commonly 
hypothesized. Studies of posed expressions further suggest that particular facial movements are 
linked to particular emotions more by consensus and beliefs, rather than by scientific evidence 
for “emotion expression.” Consequently, the commonly used phrases such as “emotional facial 
expression,” “emotional expression” or “emotional display” are misleading. More neutral 
phrases that assume less, such as “facial configuration” or “pattern of facial movements” or even 
“facial actions,” should be used instead. 
We next turn our attention to the question of whether people reliably and specifically 
infer certain emotions from certain patterns of facial movements, shifting our focus from studies 
of production to studies of perception.  It has been long assumed that emotion perception provide 
an indirect way of testing the common view of emotion production, because facial expressions, 
when they are assumed to be displays of internal emotional states, are thought to have co-
evolved with the ability to recognize and read them (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972). For 
example, Shariff and Tracy (2011) have suggested that emotional expression (production) and 
emotion perception likely co-evolved as an integrated signaling system (for additional 
discussion, see Jack, Sun, Delis, Garrod, & Schyns, 2016).30 In the next section, we review the 
scientific evidence on emotion perception.  
Perceiving Emotions from Facial Movements: A Review of the Scientific Evidence 
 For over a century, an active line of research has directly examined whether people 
reliably and specifically infer emotional meaning in the facial configurations presented in Figure 
4. Most of these studies are interpreted as evidence for people’s ability to recognize or decode 
emotion in facial configurations, on the assumption that the configurations broadcast or signal 
emotional information to be recognized or detected. This is yet another example of confusing 
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what is known and what is being tested. A more correct interpretation is that these studies 
indicate whether people reliably and specifically infer or judge emotion in those facial 
configurations. This pervasive confusion in the scientific literature may explain why very few 
studies have actually investigated the processes by which people detect the onset and offset of 
facial movements and infer emotions in those movements (i.e., few studies consider the 
mechanisms by which people infer emotional states from detecting and perceiving facial 
movements) (for discussion, see Martinez, 2017a, 2017b). In this section, we first review the 
design of typical emotion perception experiments that are used to test the common view that 
emotions can be reliably and specifically “read out” from facial movements. We also examine 
whether people infer emotions from the facial movements in dynamic, computer-generated faces, 
a class of studies that offer a more data-driven way to study emotion perception, and in virtual 
humans, which provides the opportunity for a more implicit approach to studying emotion 
perception.  
The Anatomy of a Typical Experiment Designed to Observe Whether People Reliably and 
Specifically Infer Emotion in Facial Movements 
For a person – a perceiver -- to infer that another person is in an emotional state by 
looking at that person’s facial movements, the perceiver must have many competencies. People 
move their faces continuously (i.e., real human faces are never still), so a perceiver must notice 
or detect the relevant facial movements in question and discriminate them from other facial 
movements (that is, the perceiver must be able to set a perceptual boundary to know when the 
movements begin and end, and, for example, that a scowl is different from a sneer). The 
perceiver must be able to identify (or segment) the movements as an ensemble or pattern (i.e., 
bind them together and distinguish them from other movements that are normally inferred to be 
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irrelevant). And the perceiver must be able to infer similarities and differences between different 
instances of facial movements, as specified by the task (e.g., categorize a group of facial 
movements as instances expressing anger, fear, etc.). This categorization might involve merely 
labeling the facial movements, referred to as action identification (describing how a face is 
moving, such as smiling) or it might involve inferring that a particular mental state caused the 
actions, referred to as mental inference or mentalizing (inferring why the action is performed, 
such as a state of happiness; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). In principle, the categorization could 
also involve inferring a situational cause for the actions, but in practice, this question is rarely 
investigated in studies of emotion perception. The overwhelming majority of studies ask 
participants to make mental inferences, although as we discuss later in this section, there appears 
to be important cultural variation in whether emotions are perceived as situated actions vs. as 
mental states that cause actions.  
The use of posed configurations of facial movements in assessments of emotion 
perception. The majority of the experiments that study emotion perception ask participants to 
infer emotion in facial configurations that are posed by actors who are not in an emotional state 
when the photos were taken or by computer-generated humans who have no actual emotional 
state. As a consequence, it is not possible to assess the accuracy (i.e., validity) of perceivers’ 
emotional inferences and, correspondingly, data from emotion perception studies cannot be 
interpreted as support for the validity of common beliefs about emotional expressions. As is the 
case in studies of expression production, it is more appropriate to interpret participants’ 
responses in terms of their agreement (or consensus) with common beliefs. Even more serious is 
the fact that the proposed expressive facial configurations in Figure 4 do not capture the wider 
range of muscle movements that are observed when people express instances of these emotion 
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categories. A recent study that mined over seven million images from the internet (for method, 
see Box 7 in SOM; Srinivasan & Martinez, 2018) identified multiple facial configurations 
associated with the same emotion category label and their synonyms --17 distinct facial 
configurations were associated with the word “happiness,” five with “anger,” four with 
“sadness,” four with “surprised,” two with “fear,” and one with “disgust.” The different facial 
configurations associated with each emotion word were more than mere variations on a universal 
core expression – they were distinctive sets of facial movements.31  
 Measuring emotion perception. The typical emotion perception experiment takes one of 
several forms, summarized in Table 5. Choice-from-array tasks, in which participants are asked 
to match photos of facial configurations and emotion words (with or without brief stories), have 
dominated the study of emotion perception since the 1970s. For example, a meta-analysis of 
emotion perception studies published in 2002 summarized 87 studies, 83 (95%) of which 
exclusively used a choice-from-array response method (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). This 
method has been widely criticized for over two decades, however, because they limit the 
possibility of observing evidence that could disconfirm the common view. Participants are 
strongly constrained in how they can infer meaning in a facial configuration, such as a 
photograph of a scowling facial configuration, since their choices are constrained to the options 
provided in the experiment (usually a small number of emotion words). In fact, the 
preponderance of choice-from-array tasks in the scientific study of emotion perception has been 
identified as one important factor that has helped perpetuate and sustain the common view 
(Russell, 1994). Other tasks exist for assessing emotion perception (see Table 5), including those 
that use a free-labeling method, where participants are asked to freely nominate words to label 
photographs of posed facial configurations, rather than choosing a word from a small set of 
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predefined options. For example, upon viewing a scowling configuration, participants might 
offer words like “angry,” “sad,” “confused,” “hungry,” or even “wanting to avoid a social 
interaction.” By allowing participants more freedom in how they infer meaning in a facial 
configuration, free-labeling makes it equally possible to observe evidence that could either 
support or disconfirm the common view.  
Recent innovations in measuring emotion perception use computer generated faces or 
heads rather than photographs of posed human faces. One method, called reverse correlation, 
measures participants’ internal model of emotional expressions (i.e., their mental representations 
of which facial configurations are likely to express instances of emotion) by observing how 
participants label an avatar head that displays random combinations of animated facial action 
units (Yu et al., 2012; for a review, see Jack et al., 2018; Jack & Schyns, 2017). As each pattern 
appears (on a given test trial), participants infer its emotional meaning by choosing an emotion 
label from a set of options (a choice-from-array response). After thousands of trials, researchers 
estimate the statistical relationship between the dynamic patterns of facial movements and each 
emotion word (e.g., disgust) to reveal participants’ beliefs about which facial configurations are 
likely to express different emotion categories.  
A second approach using computer-generated faces would have participants interact with 
more fully developed virtual humans (Rickel, Marsella, et al., 2003), also known as Embodied 
Conversational Agents (Cassell et al., 2000). Virtual humans are software-based artifacts that 
look like and act like people (for examples, see Figure 7). They are similar to characters in video 
games in their surface appearance and are designed to interact face-to-face with humans using 
the same verbal and nonverbal behavior that people use to interact with one another. The 
underlying technologies used to realize virtual humans vary considerably in approach and 
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capability, but most virtual human models can be programmed to make context-sensitive, 
dynamic facial actions that, when in a person, would typically communicate emotional 
information to other people (see Box 11 in SOM for discussion). The majority of the scientific 
studies with virtual humans were not designed to test whether human participants infer specific 
emotional meaning in a virtual human’s facial movements, but their design makes them useful 
for studying when and how facial movements take on meaning as emotional expressions: Unlike 
all the other ways of assessing emotion perception discussed so far, which ask participants to 
make explicit inferences about the emotional cause of facial configurations, interactions with 
virtual humans allow scientists to study how a participant implicitly infers emotional meaning 
during social interactions.  
Testing the common view from observations of whether certain facial configurations 
are reliably and specifically perceived as expressions of certain emotion categories. 
Traditionally, in most experiments, if participants reliably infer an emotional state from a facial 
configuration (e.g., inferring anger from a scowling facial configuration) at levels that are greater 
than what would be expected by chance, then this is taken as evidence that people recognize an 
emotional state in its facial display. It is more scientifically correct, however to interpret this as 
evidence that people infer an emotional state (i.e., they consistently make a reverse inference) 
unless the inference has been verified as valid (i.e., the person in the photograph is, indeed, in the 
expected emotional state). Only when reverse inferences are observed in a reliable and specific 
way within an experiment can scientists reasonably infer that participants are perceiving an 
instance of a certain emotion category in a certain facial configuration; technically, the inference 
holds only for emotion perception as it occurs in the particular situations contained in the 
experiment (because situations are never randomly sampled). If the emotion perception evidence 
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replicates across experiments that sample people from the same culture, then the interpretation 
can be generalized to emotion perceptions in that culture. Only when the findings generalize 
across cultures – that is, replicate across experiments that sample people from different cultures -
- is it reasonable to conclude that people universally infer a specific emotional state when 
perceiving as specific facial configuration. These findings might also be interpreted as evidence 
about the reliability and specificity of producing emotional expressions if the co-evolution 
assumption is valid (i.e., that emotional expressions and their perception co-evolved as an 
integrated signaling system; Ekman et al., 1972; Jack et al., 2016; Shariff & Tracy, 2011).  
Studies of Healthy Adults From the U.S. and Other Developed Nations 
Studies that measure emotion perception with choice-from-array tasks. The most 
recent meta-analysis of emotion perception studies was published in 2002 (Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002). It statistically summarized 87 experiments in which over 22,000 participants from over 20 
cultures around the world inferred emotional meaning in facial configurations and other stimuli 
(such as posed vocalizations). The majority of participants were sampled from larger-scale or 
developed countries, including Argentina, Brazil. Canada, Chile, China, England, Estonia, 
Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Scotland, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the US, Zambia and various 
Caribbean countries. The majority of studies (95%) used posed facial configurations; only four 
studies had participants label spontaneous facial movements, a dramatic example of the 
challenges facing validity that we discussed earlier. All but four studies used a choice-from-array 
response method to measure emotion inferences, a good example of the challenges facing 
hypothesis disconfirmation that we discussed earlier.  
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The results of the meta-analysis, presented in Figure 8a, reveal that perceivers inferred 
emotions in the facial configurations in Figure 4 in line with the common view, well above 
chance levels (using the criteria set out by Haidt & Keltner (1999), presented in Table 2).. 
Results provided strong evidence that, when participants are viewing posed facial configurations 
made by people from their own culture, they reliably perceived the expected emotion in those 
configurations: scowling facial configurations were perceived as anger expressions, wide-eyed 
facial configurations were perceived as fear expressions, and so on, for all six emotion 
categories. Moderate levels of reliability were observed when perceivers were labeling facial 
configurations posed by people from other cultures; this difference in reliability between same- 
and cross-culture differences is referred to as an ingroup advantage (see Box 12, in SOM). The 
majority of emotion perception studies do not report whether the hypothesized facial 
configurations are perceived with any specificity (e.g., how likely was a scowl to be perceived as 
expressing an instance of emotion categories other than anger, or as an instance of a mental 
category that is not considered emotional). Without information about specificity, no firm 
conclusions can be drawn about the emotional meaning of the facial configurations in Figure 4, 
especially for the translational purpose of inferring someone’s emotional state from their facial 
comportment in real life.  
Nonetheless, most of the studies cited in the meta-analysis interpret their reliability 
findings alone as evidence for the reverse inference of inferring anger from a scowling face, 
disgust from a nose-wrinkled face, fear from a wide-eyed gasping face, and so on. Such findings 
may explain why many scientists who study emotion, when surveyed, indicated that they believe 
compelling evidence exists for the hypothesis that certain emotion categories are each expressed 
with a unique, universal facial configuration (see Ekman, 2016) and interpret variation in 
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emotional expressions to be caused by cultural learning that modifies what are presumed to be 
inborn universal expressive patterns (e.g., Cordaro et al., 2017; Ekman, 1972; Elfenbein, 2013). 
Cultural learning has also been hypothesized to modify how people “decode” facial 
configurations during emotion perception (Buck, 1984).  
Studies that measure emotion perception with free-labeling tasks. As we 
foreshadowed, experimental methods that place fewer constraints on participants’ inferences in 
experiments that measure emotion perception (Table 5) provide considerably less support for the 
common view of emotional expressions. In the least constrained experimental task, called free-
labeling, perceivers freely volunteer a word (emotion or otherwise) that they believe best 
captures the meaning in a facial configuration rather than choosing from a small set of 
experimenter-chosen options. In urban samples, participants who freely-label facial 
configurations produce the expected emotion labels with weak reliability (when labeling 
spontaneously produced facial configurations) to moderate reliability (when labeling posed facial 
configurations), and usually reveal weak specificity when it is assessed at all (for examples and 
discussion, see Russell, 1994; also see Naab & Russell, 2007). For example, when participants 
from many countries where English, Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Farsi, Arabic and Russian is 
spoken as a first language were then asked to freely provide emotion words to label each of 35 
facial configurations that had been cross-culturally identified (Srinivasan & Martinez, 2018), 
their labels provided evidence of a moderately reliable one-to-one correspondence between any 
facial configuration and emotion category, but there was no evidence of specificity (see Figure 
8b).32 Multiple facial configurations were associated with the same emotion category label (e.g., 
17 different facial configurations were associated with the expression of happiness, five with 
anger, four with sadness, four with surprise, two with fear, and one with disgust). This many-to-
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many mapping is inconsistent with the common view that the facial configurations in Figure 4 
are universally recognized as expressing the hypothesized emotion category, and they give 
evidence of variation that is far beyond what is proposed by the basic emotion view. Some of this 
variability may come from variability across different cultures and languages, but there is 
variability even within a single culture and language.  Evidence of this many-to-many mapping 
is apparent in free-labeling tasks in small-scale, remote samples as well (Gendron et al., 2018), 
which we discuss in the next section.  
Studies that measure emotion perception with the reverse correlation method. Using 
a choice-from-array response method with the reverse correlation method is an inductive way to 
learn people’s beliefs about which facial configurations express an emotion category (for a 
review, see Jack et al., 2018; Jack & Schyns, 2017). In such studies, participants view thousands 
of random combinations of AUs that are computer generated on an avatar head and label each 
one by choosing an emotion word from a set of pre-defined options. All of the facial 
configurations labeled with the same emotion word (e.g., anger) are then statistically combined 
for each participant to estimate a belief about which facial movements express the corresponding 
emotion category. One recent study using the reverse correlation method with U.K. and Chinese 
participants found evidence of both variation in the facial movements that were judged to express 
a single emotion category, as well as similarity in the facial movements that were judged to 
express different categories (Jack et al., 2016). The study first identified groupings of emotion 
words that are widely discussed in the scientific literature (which, we should note, is dominated 
by English), corresponding to 30 English words grouped into eight emotion categories for the 
U.K. sample (happy/excited/love, pride, surprise, fear, contempt/disgust, anger, sad and 
shame/embarrassed) and 52 Chinese words grouped into twelve categories in the Chinese sample 
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(joyful/excitement, pleasant surprise, great surprise/amazement, shock/alarm, fear, disgust, 
anger, sad, embarrassment, shame, pride, and despise). The reverse correlation method revealed 
62 separate facial configurations: the same emotion category in a given culture was associated 
with multiple models of facial movements because synonyms of the same emotion category were 
associated with distinctive models of facial movements. Amidst this variability, Jack and 
colleagues also found that these 62 separate facial configurations could be summarized as four 
prototypes which are presented in Table 6, along with the corresponding emotion words that they 
were frequently associated with. Each prototype was described with a unique set of affective 
features (combinations of valence, arousal and dominance). When the four estimated 
configurations are compared with the common view presented in Figure 4, along with the basic 
emotion hypotheses listed in Table 1, there are some striking similarities: Configuration 1 most 
closely resembles the proposed expression for happiness, configuration 2 is similar to a 
combination of the proposed expressions for fear and anger, configuration 3 most closely 
resembles the proposed expression for surprise, and configuration 4 is similar to a combination 
of the proposed expressions for disgust and anger. 33 Taken together, these findings suggests that, 
at the most general level of description, participants’ beliefs about emotional expressions (i.e., 
their internal models of which facial movements expressed which emotions) were consistent with 
the common view (indeed, they could be taken to constitute part of the common view), but when 
examined in finer detail with more granularity, participants’ also believe that there is substantial 
within-category variation in the facial movements that express instances of the same emotion 
category. This finding suggests that the way the common view is often described in reviews, 
depicted in the media, and used in many applications, does not in fact do justice to people’s more 
detailed beliefs about variability in facial expressions. 
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 Studies that implicitly assess emotion perception during interactions with virtual 
humans. Designers typically study how a virtual human’s expressive movements influence an 
interaction with a human participant. Much of the early research modeling expressive 
movements in virtual humans focused on endowing them with the facial expressions proposed in 
Figure 4. A number of studies have endowed virtual humans with blends of these configurations 
(Bui et al., 2004; Arya et al. 2009). Designers are also inspired by other people’s beliefs about 
how emotions are expressed. Actors, for example, have been asked to pose facial configurations 
that they believe express emotions, which are then processed by graphical and machine learning 
algorithms to craft the relation between emotional states and expressive movements (Alexander 
et al, 2009). In another study, human subjects used a specially designed software tool to craft 
animations of facial movements that they believed express certain mental categories, including 
emotion categories. Then, other human subjects judged the crafted facial configurations (Ochs et 
al., 2010). Increasingly, data-driven methods are used that place people in emotion-eliciting 
conditions, capture the facial and body motion and then synthesize animations from those 
captured motions (Niewadomski et al., 2015; Ding et al., 2014, Wang, Marsella, & Hawkins, 
2008).  
In general, studies with virtual humans nicely show how the situational context 
influences how people infer the meaning of facial movements (de Melo et al., 2014). For 
example, in a game that allowed competition and cooperation (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977), a virtual human who smiled after making a competitive move evoked more 
competitive, less cooperative responses from human participants compared to a virtual human 
using an identical strategy in the game (tit-for-tat) but that smiled after cooperating. Virtual 
humans who make a verbal comment about a film that is inconsistent with their facial 
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movements, such as saying they enjoyed the film but grimacing that was quickly followed by a 
smile, were perceived as less reliable, trustworthy and credible (Rehm & Andre, 2005). 
The dynamics of the facial actions, including the relative timing, speed and duration of 
the individual facial actions, as well as the sequence of facial muscle movements over time, offer 
information over and above the mere presence or absence of the movements themselves and have 
an important influence on how human perceivers interpret facial movements (e.g., Ambadar et 
al., 2009; Keltner 1995; Jack & Schyns, 2017, Krumhuber et al. 2013) and how much they trust a 
virtual human during a social interaction (Krumhuber et al., 2009). Research with virtual humans 
has shown that the dynamics of facial muscle movements are critical for them to be perceived as 
emotional expressions (Niewiadomski et al, 2015; Ochs et al., 2010). These findings are 
consistent with research showing that the temporal dynamics carry information about the 
emotional meaning of facial movements that are made by real humans (e.g., Kamachi et al., 
2001; Sato & Yoshikawa, 2004; Krumhuber & Kappas, 2005; for a review, see Krumhuber, 
Kappas & Manstead, 2013).34   
Summary. Whether or not people can reliably perceive emotions in the expressive 
configurations of Figure 4, as predicted by the common view, depends on how participants are 
asked to report or register their inferences (see Table 4). Hundreds of experiments have asked 
participants to infer the emotional meaning of posed, exaggerated facial configurations like those 
presented in Figure 4 by choosing a single emotion word from a small number of options offered 
by scientists, called choice-from-array-tasks. This experimental approach tends to generate 
moderate to strong evidence that people reliably label scowling facial configurations as angry, 
frowning facial configurations as sad, and so on for all six emotion categories that anchor the 
common view. Choice-from-array tasks severely limit the possibility of observing evidence that 
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can disconfirm the common view of emotional expressions, however, because they restrict 
participants’ options for inferring the psychological meaning of facial configurations by offering 
them a limited set of emotion labels. (As we discuss below, when people are provided with labels 
other than angry, sad, afraid, as so on, they routinely choose them; e.g., Carroll & Russell, 1996; 
also see Crivelli et al., 2017). Additionally, the specificity of those judgments is largely 
unreported. Scientists often go further and interpret the reliability findings from these studies as 
evidence that scowls are expressions of anger, frowns are expressions of sadness, and so on. This 
logic is not sound, however, because most of these studies ask participants to infer emotion in 
posed, static faces which are likely limited in their validity (i.e., people posing facial 
configurations like those depicted in Figure 4 are unlikely to be in the hypothesized emotional 
state). Furthermore, other ways of assessing emotion perception, such as the reverse correlation 
method and free-labeling tasks, find much weaker evidence for reliability and/or specificity of 
emotion inferences. Instead, they suggest that what people actually infer and believe about facial 
movements incorporates considerable variability: In short, the common view depicted in many 
reviews, summaries, the media, and used in numerous applications is not an accurate reflection 
of what people in fact believe about facial expressions of emotion, when probed in more detail.  
In the next section, we discuss scientific evidence from studies of emotion perception in small-
scale remote cultures, which further undermines the common view.  
Studies of Healthy Adults Living in Small-Scale, Remote Cultures 
 A growing number of studies examine emotion perception in people from remote, non-
industrialized groups. A more in-depth review of these studies can be found in Gendron et al. 
(2018). Our goal here is to summarize the trends found in this line of research (see Table 7). 
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Studies that measure emotion perception with choice-from-array tasks. During the 
period from 1969 to 1975, somewhere between five and eight small-scale samples from remote 
cultures in the South Pacific were studied with choice-from-array tasks to investigate whether 
participants perceived emotional expression in facial movements in a similar way when 
compared to people from the US and other industrialized countries of the Western world (see 
Figure 9a). Our uncertainty in the number of samples stems from reporting inconsistencies in the 
published record (see note to Table 7). We present the findings here according to how the 
original authors reported their findings, despite the inconsistencies. Five samples performed 
choice-from-array tasks, three in which participants chose a photographed facial configuration to 
match one brief vignette that described each emotion category (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 
1971; Sorenson, 1975) and two in which they chose a photograph to match an emotion word 
(Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969). All five samples performing some version of a choice-
from-array task provided strong evidence in support of cross-cultural reliability of emotion 
perception in small-scale societies. Evidence for specificity was not reported. Until 2008, all 
claims that anger, sadness, fear, disgust, happiness and surprise are universally recognized (and 
therefore are universally expressed) were largely based on three papers (two of them peer 
reviewed) reporting on four samples (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 
1969).35 
Since 2008, 10 verifiably separate experiments observing emotional inferences in small-
scale societies have been published or submitted for publication. These studies include a greater 
diversity of social and ecological contexts, including sampling five small-scale societies across 
Africa and the South Pacific (see Figure 9b) who were tested with a greater diversity of research 
methods listed in Table 5, including tasks that allow for the possibility of observing cross-
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cultural variation in emotion perception and therefore the possibility of disconfirming the 
common view. Six samples registered their emotion inferences using a choice-from-array task, in 
which participants were given an emotion word and asked to choose the posed facial 
configuration that best matched it or vice versa (Crivelli, Jarillo et al., 2016; Crivelli, Russell et 
al., 2016; Crivelli et al., 2017, Study 2; Gendron et al., 2018, Study 2; Tracy & Robins, 2008). 
Only one study (Tracy & Robins, 2008) reported that participants selected an emotion word to 
match the facial configurations similar to those in Figure 4 more reliably than what would be 
expected by chance, and effects ranged from weak (anger and fear) to strong (happiness) with 
surprise and disgust falling in the moderate range.36 Information about the specificity of emotion 
inferences was not reported. A close examination of the evidence from four studies by Crivelli 
and colleagues suggest weak to moderate levels of reliability for inferring happiness in smiling 
facial configurations (all four studies), sadness in frowning facial configurations (all four 
studies), fear in gasping, wide-eyed facial configurations (three studies), anger in scowling facial 
configurations (two studies) and disgust in nose-wrinkled facial configurations (three studies). A 
detailed breakdown of findings can be found in Box 13, in SOM. None of the studies found 
specificity for any facial configuration, however, except that smiling was reported as unique to 
happiness, but that finding did not replicate across samples.37  
The final study using a choice-from-array task with people from a small-scale, remote 
culture is important because it involves the Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania (Gendron et al., 
2018, Study 2). 38 The Hadza are a high-value sample for two reasons. First, universal and innate 
emotional expressions are hypothesized to have evolved to solve the recurring fitness challenges 
of hunting and gathering in small groups on the African savanna (Pinker, 1997; Shariff & Tracy, 
2011; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008); the Hadza offer a rare opportunity to study foragers who are 
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currently living in an ecosystem that is thought to be similar to that of our Paleolithic ancestors.39 
Second, the population is rapidly disappearing 
(http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/05/farmers-tourists-and-cattle-threaten-wipe-out-some-
world-s-last-hunter-gatherers). Prior to this study, the Hadza had not participated in any studies 
of emotion perception, although they have been the subject of social cognition research more 
broadly (H. C. Barrett et al., 2016; Bryant et al., 2016). After listening to a brief story about a 
typical instance of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise, Hadza participants chose 
the expected facial configuration more often than chance if the target and foil were distinguished 
by the affective property referred to as valence (i.e., a smiling configuration depicting a pleasant 
state vs. a scowling configuration depicting an unpleasant state, consistent with anthropological 
studies of emotion (Russell, 1991), linguistic studies (Osgood, May & Miron, 1975) and findings 
from other recent studies of participants from small-scale societies, such as the Himba (Gendron 
et al., 2014a, b) and the Trobriand Islanders (Crivelli, Jarillo et al., 2014). (Also see Srinivasan & 
Martinez, 2018, described in Box 7, who showed that perceivers can reliably infer valence but 
not arousal in facial configurations). In addition, Hadza participants who had some contact with 
people from other cultures -- they had some formal schooling or could speak Swahili which is 
not their native language – were more consistently able to choose the common facial 
configuration than were those with no formal schooling who spoke minimal Swahili (for a 
similar finding with Fore participants in a free labeling study, see Table 2 in Sorenson, 1975). Of 
the 27 Hadza participants who had minimal contact with other cultures, only 12 reliably chose 
the wide-eyed gasping facial configuration to match the fear story at above chance levels. 
(Compare this finding to the observation that the hypothesized universal expression for fear – a 
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wide-eyed gasping facial configuration – is understood as an aggressive, threatening display by 
Trobriand Islanders; Crivelli, Jarillo & Fridlund, 2016, 2017; Crivelli, Russell et al., 2016). 
Studies that measure emotion perception with free-labeling tasks. During the period 
from 1969 to 1975, between one and three small-scale samples from remote cultures in the South 
Pacific were studied with free-labeling to investigate emotion perception (reported in Sorenson, 
1975; see Table 7). From 2008 onward, two additional studies were conducted, one using 
spontaneous facial configurations (Crivelli et al., 2017, Study 1) and the other using posed facial 
configurations (Gendron et al., 2018, Study 2). Overall, all five studies provide no evidence that 
the facial configurations in Figure 4 evolved to specifically express certain emotion categories. 
The three free-labeling studies reported in Sorenson (1975) produced variable results. The only 
replicable finding appears to be that participants labeled smiling facial configurations uniquely as 
happiness in all studies (as the only pleasant emotion category tested). The two newer free-
labeling studies both indicated that participants only rarely spontaneously labeled facial 
configurations with the expected emotion labels (or their synonyms) above chance levels. 
Trobriand Islanders did not label the proposed facial configurations for happiness, sadness, 
anger, surprise or disgust with the expected emotion labels (or their synonyms) at above chance 
levels (although they did label the faces consistently with other words; Crivelli et al., 2017, 
Study 1). Hadza participants labeled smiling and scowling facial configurations at above chance 
levels as happiness (44%) and anger (65%), respectively (Gendron et al., 2018, Study 2). The 
word “anger” was not used to uniquely label scowling facial configurations, however, and was 
frequently applied to frowning, nose-wrinkled and gasping facial configurations.   
Facial movements carry meaningful information, even if they do not reliably and 
specifically display internal emotional states. The more recent studies of people living in 
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small-scale, remote cultures suggest two interesting observations that are worthy of note. First, 
even though people may not routinely infer anger from scowls, sadness from frowns, and so on, 
they do reliably infer other social meanings for those facial configurations, because facial 
movements often carry important information about a person’s inner state, such as their social 
motives (Crivelli et al., 2016, 2017; Rychlowska et al., 2015; Wood et al., 2016; Yik & Russell, 
1999; for a discussion, see Fridlund, 2017; Martin et al., 2017). For example, as we mentioned 
earlier, Trobriand Islanders consistently labeled wide-eyed gasping faces (the proposed 
expressive facial configuration for the fear category) as signaling an intent to attack (i.e., a threat; 
for additional evidence in carvings and masks in a variety of cultures, including Maori, !Kung 
Bushmen, Himba, Eipo, see Crivelli, Jarillo, & Fridlund, 2016, 2017).  
Second, people do not always infer internal psychological states (emotions or otherwise) 
from facial movements. People who live in non-western cultural contexts, including Himba and 
Hadza participants, are more likely to assume that other people’s minds are not accessible to 
them, a phenomenon called opacity of mind in anthropology (Danziger, 2006; Robbins & 
Rumsey, 2008). Instead, facial movements are perceived as actions that predict future actions in 
certain situations (e.g., a wide-eyed gasping face is labeled as “looking” (Crivelli et al., 2017; 
Gendron et al., 2014a; Gendron et al. 2018). Similar observations were unavailable for the earlier 
studies conducted by Ekman, Friesen and Sorenson because, according to Sorenson (1975), they 
directed participants to provide emotion terms. When participants spontaneously offered an 
action label (e.g. “she is just looking”) or a social evaluation (e.g., “he is ugly”, or “he is 
stupid”), they were asked to provide an “affect term.” Findings like these suggest that there may 
be profound cultural variation in the type of inferences human perceivers make when looking at 
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other human faces in general, an observation that has been raised by a number of anthropologists 
and historians. 
A note on interpreting the data. To properly interpret the scientific evidence, it’s 
crucial to consider the constraints placed on participants by the experimental tasks they are asked 
to complete, summarized in Table 5. In most urban and in some remote samples, experiments 
using choice-from-array tasks produce evidence supporting the common view: Participants 
reliably label scowling facial configurations as angry, smiling facial configurations as happy, and 
so on. (We don't yet know whether perceivers are uniquely labeling each facial configuration as a 
specific emotion because most studies don’t report that information.) It has been known for 
almost a century that choice-from-array tasks help participants obtain a level of reliability in their 
emotion perceptions that are not routinely seen in studies using methods that allow participants 
to respond more freely, and this is one reason they were chosen for use in the first place (for a 
discussion, see Gendron & Barrett, 2009, 2017; Russell, 1994; Widen & Russell, 2013). When 
participants are offered words for happiness, fear, surprise, anger, sadness, and disgust to register 
their inferences for a scowling facial configuration, they are prevented from judging a face as 
expressing other emotion categories (such as confusion or embarrassment), non-emotional 
mental states (e.g., a social motive, such as rejection or avoidance), or physical events (such as 
pain, illness or gas), thus inflating reliability rates within the task. When people are provided 
with other options, they routinely choose them. For example, participants label scowling faces as 
“determined” or “puzzled,” wide-eyed faces as “hopeful” and gasping faces as “pained” when 
they are provided with stories about those emotions rather than with stories of anger, surprise and 
fear (Carroll & Russell, 1996; also see Crivelli et al., 2017). The problem is not with the choice-
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from-array task per se – it is more with failing to consider alternative explanations for the 
observations in an experiment and therefore drawing unwarranted conclusions from the data. 
Choice-from-array tasks may do more than just limit response options, making it difficult 
to disconfirm commonsense beliefs. The emotion words provided during the task may actually 
encourage people to see anger in scowls, sadness in pouts, and so on, or to learn associations 
between a word (such as “anger”) and a facial configuration (such as a scowl) during the 
experiment (e.g., Gendron et al., 2015; Hoemann, Crittenden, Ruark, Gendron, & Barrett, in 
press). The potency of words is discussed in Box 14, in SOM.  
Summary. The pattern of findings from the studies conducted with remote samples 
replicates and underscores the pattern observed in samples of participants from larger, more 
urban cultural contexts: Asking perceivers to infer an emotion by matching a facial configuration 
to an emotion word selected from a small array of options, or telling participants a brief story 
about a typical instance of an emotion category and asking them to pick a facial configuration 
from an array of two or three photos, generally inflates agreement rates, producing evidence that 
is more likely to support the hypothesis of reliable emotion perception when compared to data 
coming from less constrained response methods such as free labeling (see Table 4). This is 
particularly true for studies that include only one pleasant emotion category, i.e., happiness, 
where all foils differ from the target in valence, and therefore the robust reliability and specificity 
for inferring happiness from smiling in these studies may be the result of participants engaging in 
valence perception rather than emotion perception, per se. Studies that use less constrained tasks 
that are designed to more freely discover how people perceive emotion instead yield evidence 
that generally fails to find support for the common view. Less constrained studies suggest that 
perceivers infer more than one emotion category from the same facial configuration, infer the 
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same emotion category in a variety of different configurations and often disagree about the set of 
emotion categories that they infer. Cultural variation in emotion perception is consistent with the 
variation we observed in the first section of this paper when we reviewed studies of emotional 
expression production (again, see Table 4), and is even consistent with the basic of face 
perception, which itself is determined by experience and cultural factors (Caldara, 2016). 
Studies of Healthy Infants and Children 
Some scientists concur with the common view that infants can read specific instances of 
emotion in faces from birth (Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Izard, Woodburn & Finlon, 2010; 
Leppänen & Nelson, 2009; Walker-Andrews, 2005). However, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
infants and young children possess the various capacities required to perceive emotion per se: 
simply detecting and discriminating facial movements is not the same as categorizing them to 
infer their emotional meaning. This is because it is challenging to design well-controlled 
experiments that do a good job of distinguishing these two capacities. Infants are preverbal, so 
scientists use other measurement techniques, such as the amount of time an infant looks at a 
stimulus, to infer whether infants can discriminate one facial configuration from another, and 
ultimately, whether infants categorize those configurations as emotionally meaningful (for a brief 
explanation, see Box 15, in SOM). This approach introduces several possible confounds because 
of the stimuli used in the experiments: infants and children are typically shown photographs of 
the proposed expressive forms that are similar to those presented in Figure 4 (e.g., Leppanen et 
al, 2009; Peltola et al., 2008).  Infants are more familiar with some of these configuration than 
with others (e.g., most infants are more familiar with smiling faces than with scowls or frowns) 
and familiarity is known to influence perception (see Box 15, in SOM), making it difficult to 
know which features of a face are holding an infant’s attention (familiarity or novelty) and which 
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might be the basis of categorization in terms of emotional meaning. The configurations proposed 
for each emotion category also differ in their perceptual features (e.g., the proposed expressions 
for fear and surprise contain widened eyes whereas the proposed expression for sadness does 
not), contributing more ambiguity to the interpretation of findings. For example, when an infant 
discriminates smiling and scowling facial configurations, it is tempting to infer that that the child 
is discriminating expressions of anger and happiness when in fact that target of discrimination is 
the presence or absence of teeth in a photograph (Caron, Caron & Myers, 1985). Moreover, the 
facial configurations in question are usually made from exaggerated facial movements that are 
not typical of the expressive variation that children actually observe in their everyday lives 
(Grossman, 2010). Furthermore, unlike adults, infants may have had little or no experience with 
viewing photographs of anything, including heads of people with no bodies and no context. 
The most important and pervasive confound in developmental studies of emotion 
perception is that most studies are not designed to test whether infants and children discriminate 
facial configurations according to their emotional meaning or whether they are discriminating 
affective features (pleasant vs. unpleasant; high arousal vs. low arousal) (see Box 9, SOM). 
Often, a facial configuration that is intended to depict a pleasant instance of emotion (smiling in 
happiness) is compared to one that is intended to depict an unpleasant instance of emotion (e.g., 
scowling in anger, frowning in sadness or gasping in fear), or these configurations are compared 
to a neutral face at rest (e.g., Leppänen, Richmond, Vogel-Farley, & Nelson, 2009; Leppänen, 
Moulson, Nelson & Vogel-Farley, 2007; Montague & Walker-Andrews, 2001). (This problem is 
similar to the one encountered earlier in our discussion of emotion perception studies in adults 
from small scale societies, in which perceptions of valence can be confused with perceptions of 
emotion categories). For example, in one study, 16-18 month olds preferred toys paired with 
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smiling faces and avoided toys paired with scowling and gasping faces (Martin et al. 2014); this 
type of study cannot distinguish between whether infants are differentiating pleasant from 
unpleasant, approach vs. avoidance, or something about a specific emotion. Another study 
(Soken & Pick, 1999) reported that seven-month-olds distinguish sadness and anger when 
looking at faces, but only when the faces were paired with vocalizations. What is unclear is the 
extent to which the level of arousal or activation conveyed in the acoustic signals were most 
salient to infants. A recent study suggested that 10-month-old infants can differentiate between 
the high arousal, unpleasant scowling and nose-wrinkled facial configurations that are proposed 
as expressions of anger and disgust, suggesting that they can categorize these two facial 
configurations separately (Ruba et al., 2017). Yet, the scowling and nose-wrinkled facial 
configurations also differed in the properties besides their proposed emotional meaning: 
scowling faces showed no teeth, but nose-wrinkled faces were toothy, and it is well known that 
infants use perceptual features such as “toothiness” to categorize faces (see Caron et al., 1985). If 
an infant looks longer at a (pleasant) smiling facial configuration after viewing several 
(unpleasant) scowling faces, this does not necessarily mean that the infant has discriminated and 
understands “happiness” from “anger”; the infant might have discriminated positive from 
negative, affective from neutral, familiar from novel, the presence of teeth from the absence, less 
eye sclera from more, or even different amounts of contrast in the photographs. In the future, 
experiments must be designed to rule out the possibility that infants are categorizing facial 
configurations into different groupings based on factors other than emotion to provide a sound 
basis to infer that infants are processing specific emotional meaning.  
As a consequence of these confounds, there is still much to learn about the developmental 
course of emotion perception abilities. By three months of age, infants can distinguish the facial 
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features (the morphology) in the proposed expressive configurations for happiness, surprise, and 
anger, and, by seven months, they can discriminate the features in proposed expressive 
configurations for fear, sadness, and interest. Left uncertain is whether, beyond just 
discriminating between the mere appearance of particular facial features, infants also understand 
the emotional meaning that is typically inferred from those features. By seven months of age, 
infants can reliably infer whether someone is feeling pleasant or unpleasant when facial 
configurations are accompanied by sensory information from the voice (Flom & Bahrick, 2007; 
Walker-Andrews & Dickson, 1997). Only a handful of studies have attempted to test whether 
infants can infer emotional meaning in facial configurations rather than just discriminating 
between faces with different physical appearances, but they report conflicting results (Schwartz 
et al., 1985; Serrano et al., 1992). One promising future direction involves measuring the 
electrical signals (event related potentials, or ERPs) in infant brains as they view the proposed 
expressive configurations for anger and fear categories (e.g., Kobiella et al., 2008; Hoehl & 
Striano, 2008). Both of these studies reported differential brain responses to the proposed facial 
configurations for anger and fear, but their findings did not replicate one another (and for certain 
measurements, they observed opposing effects; for a broader review, see Grossmann, 2015).  
Studies that measure a child’s ability to use an adult caregiver’s facial movements to 
resolve ambiguous or threatening situations, referred to as social referencing, have been 
interpreted as evidence of emotion perception in infants. One-year-olds use social referencing to 
stay in close physical proximity to a caregiver who is expressing negative affect, while infants 
are more likely to approach novel objects if the caregiver expresses positive affect (Carver & 
Vaccaro, 2007; Moses et al., 2001; Saarni et al., 2006). Similar results emerge from the 
caregiver’s tone of voice (Hertenstein & Campos, 2004; Mumme, Fernald, Herrera, 1996). In 
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fact, by 14 months of age, the positive or negative tone of a caregiver’s voice influence what an 
infant will touch even more so than will a caregiver’s facial movements or the content of what 
the adult is actually saying (Valliant-Molina & Bahrick, 2012; Vaish & Striano, 2004). These 
studies clearly suggest that infants can infer the valenced meaning of facial movements, at least 
when made by live (as opposed to virtual) people who they are familiar with. But, again, these 
data do not help resolve what, if anything, infants infer about the emotional meaning of facial 
movements. 
Learning to perceive emotions. Children grow in emotionally rich social environments, 
making it difficult to run experiments that are capable of testing the common view of emotion 
perception while also taking into account the possible roles for learning and social experience. 
Nonetheless, several themes have emerged in the scientific literature, all of which suggest a clear 
role for learning and context in children’s developing emotion perception capacities. 
One hypothesis that continues to be strongly supported by experiments is that children’s 
capacity to infer emotional meaning in facial movements depends on context (the conditions 
surrounding the face that may convey information about a face’s meaning). For example, 
emotion concept learning, as a potent source of internal context, shapes emotion perception 
capacity (discussed in Boxes 10 and 16 in SOM). There are also developmental changes in how 
people use context to shape their emotional inferences about facial movements. Children as 
young as 19 months old can detect facial movements that are emotionally incongruent with a 
context (Walle & Campos, 2014). For example, when presented with adult facial configurations 
that are placed on bodies posing an emotional context (e.g., a scowling facial configuration 
placed on a body holding a soiled diaper), children (aged four, eight, and twelve) moved their 
eyes back and forth between faces and bodies when deciding how to label the emotional meaning 
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of the faces, whereas adult participants directed their gaze (and overt visual attention) to the face 
alone, judging its emotional meaning in a way that was independent of the bodily context 
(Leitzke & Pollak, 2016). The youngest children were equally likely to label the scene based on 
face or context. The results of this experiment suggest that younger children devote greater 
attention to contextual information and actively cross-reference facial and contextual cues, 
presumably to better learn about and understand the emotional meaning those cues.40  
Another important source of context that shapes the development of emotion perception 
in children involves the broader environment in which children grow. Children who grow up in 
neglectful or abusive environments, where their emotional interactions with caregivers are highly 
atypical, have a different developmental trajectory than do those growing in more consistently 
nurturing environments (Bick & Nelson, 2016; Pollak, 2015). Parents from these high-risk 
families produce unclear or context-inconsistent expressions of emotion (Shackman et al., 2010). 
Neglected children (who do not receive sufficient social feedback) show delays in perceiving 
emotions in the ways that adults do (Camras et al., 2006; Pollak et al., 2000), whereas children 
who are physically abused learn to preferentially attend to and identify facial movements that are 
associated with threat, such as a scowling facial configuration (Briggs-Gowan et al., 2015; 
Cicchetti & Curtis, 2005; da Silva Ferreira, Crippa, & de Lima Osório, 2014; Pollak, Vardi, 
Putzer Bechner, & Curtin, 2005; Shackman & Pollak, 2014; Shackman, Shackman, & Pollak, 
2007). Abused children require less perceptual information to infer anger in a scowling 
configuration (Pollak & Sinha, 2002) and more reliably track the trajectory of facial muscle 
activations that signal threat (Pollak, Messner, Kistler & Cohn, 2009). Children raised in 
physically abusive environments also more readily infer anger and threat in ambiguous facial 
configurations (Pollak & Kistler, 2002) and then require more effortful control to disengage their 
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attention from signs of threat (Pollak & Tolley-Schell, 2003) when compared to children who 
have not been maltreated. This close attention to scowling faces with knitted eyebrows shapes 
how abused children understand what facial movements mean. For example, one study found 
that five-year-old abused children tended to believe that almost any kind of interpersonal 
situation could result in an adult becoming angry; by contrast, most non-abused children 
understand that anger is likely in particular interpersonal circumstances (Perlman et al., 2008).  
By three years of age, North American children not only start to show reliability in their 
emotion perceptions but they also begin to show evidence of specificity. They understand that 
facial movements do not necessarily map on to emotional states, and how someone really feels 
can be faked or masked. Moreover, they know what facial movements are expected in a 
particular context and try to produce them despite their feelings. For example, the “disappointing 
gift” experiments developed by psychologist Pamela Cole and her colleagues demonstrate this 
well. In one study, preschool-aged children were told they would be rewarded with a gift after 
they completed a task. Later, children received a beautifully wrapped package that contained a 
disappointing item, such as a broken pair of cheap sunglasses. When facing a smiling unfamiliar 
adult who has presented them with a gift, children forced themselves to smile (lip corner pull, 
cheek raise, and brow raise) and to thank the experimenter. Yet, while the children were smiling, 
they often kept their eyes focused, down, slumped their shoulders, and made negative statements 
about the object, indicating that they did not, in fact, feel positive about the situation (Cole, 
1986). Moreover, there was no difference in the behavioral responses of visually impaired 
children when receiving a disappointing gift (Cole, Jenkins, & Shott, 1989). Studies like this one 
provide a more implicit way of assessing children’s knowledge about emotion perception (i.e., it 
illustrates the inferences that children expect others to make from their own facial movements).  
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Summary. There is currently no clear evidence to support the hypothesis that infants and 
young children reliability and specifically infer emotion in the proposed expressive 
configurations for anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise categories (presented in 
Figure 4; findings summarized in Table 4). A more plausible interpretation of the existing 
evidence is that young infants infer affective meaning such as valence and arousal in facial 
configurations. Data from infants and young children obtained using a variety of methods further 
suggests that emotion perception abilities emerge and are shaped through learning in a social 
environment. These findings are consistent with evidence that the human face may be 
evolutionarily privileged to communicate importance or salience. But it is not clear that the 
expressive configurations proposed for specific emotion categories are similarly privileged in 
this way.  
Summary of Scientific Evidence on the Perception of Emotion in Faces 
The scientific findings on perception studies generally replicate those from production 
studies in failing to strongly support the common view.  The one exception to this overall pattern 
of findings is seen in studies that ask participants match a posed face to an emotion word or 
scenario.  This method produces evidence to support the common view, even when it is applied 
to completely novel emotion categories with made up expressive cues, opening up interesting 
questions about the psychological potency of the elements that make up choice-from-array 
designs (such as the emotion words embedded in the task or the choice of foils on a given trial).  
These findings reinforce our earlier conclusion that terms like “facial configuration” or “pattern 
of facial movements” or even “facial actions” are preferred to more loaded terms like “emotional 
facial expression,” “emotional expression” or “emotional display,” which can be, at best 
misleading, and at worst, incorrect.  
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Summary and Recommendations 
Evaluation of the Empirical Evidence 
The common view that humans around the world reliably produce and recognize certain 
emotions in specific configurations of facial movements continues to echo within the science of 
emotion, even as scientists increasingly acknowledge that anger, sadness, happiness and other 
emotion categories are more variable in their facial expressions. This entrenched common view 
does more than guide the practice of science. It influences public understanding of emotion, and 
hence education, clinical practice, and applications in industry. Indeed, it reaches into almost 
every facet of modern life, including emoticons and movies. Nonetheless, there is insufficient 
evidence to support it. People do express instances of anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness 
and surprise with the hypothesized facial configurations presented in Figure 4 at above chance 
levels, suggesting that those facial configurations sometimes serve as expressions of emotion as 
proposed. However, the reliability of this finding is weak, and there is evidence that the strength 
of support for the common view varies systematically with the research methods used. The 
strongest support for the common view -- found in data from urban, industrialized or developed 
samples completing choice-from-array tasks -- does not show robust generalizability. Evidence 
for specificity is lacking in almost all research domains. A summary of the scientific evidence is 
presented in Table 4. 
The research findings do not imply that people move their faces randomly or that the 
configurations in Figure 4 have no psychological meaning. Instead, they reveal that the facial 
configurations in question are not “fingerprints” or diagnostic displays that reliability and 
specifically signal particular emotional states regardless of context, person and culture. It is not 
possible to confidently infer happiness from just a smile, anger from a scowl, or sadness from a 
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frown, as numerous technology tries to do when applying what they mistakenly believe to be 
the scientific facts.  
Instead, the available evidence from different populations and research domains – infants 
and children, adults living in industrialized countries and in remote cultures, and even 
individuals who are congenitally blind -- overwhelmingly points to a different conclusion: when 
facial movements do express emotional states, they are considerably more variable and 
dependent on context than the common beliefs allows. There appear to be many-to-many 
mappings between facial configurations and emotion categories (e.g., anger is expressed with a 
broader range of facial movements than just a scowl and scowls express more than anger). A 
scowling facial configuration may be an expression of anger in the sense of being a part of anger 
in a given instance. But a scowling facial configuration is not the expression of anger in any 
generalizable or universal way. Scowling facial configurations and the others in Figure 4 belong 
to a much large repertoire of facial movements that express more than one emotion category, and 
also non-emotional inner states, in a way that is tailored to specific situations and cultural 
contexts. The face is a powerful tool for social communication (Jack & Schyns, 2017). Facial 
movements, like reflexive and voluntary motor movements (Barrett & Finlay, in press), are 
strongly context-dependent. Recent evidence suggests the people’s categories for emotions are 
flexible and responsive to the types and frequencies of facial movements they are exposed to in 
their environments (Plate, Wood, Woodard, & Pollak, in press). 
The degree of variation suggested by the published evidence also goes well beyond the 
hypothesis that the facial configurations in Figure 4 are prototypes or typical expressions, and 
that any observed variation are merely the result of cultural accents, display rules, suppression 
or other regulatory strategies, differences in induction methods, measurement error, or 
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stochastic noise (as proposed by various scientists, including Elfenbein, 2013, 2017; Ekman & 
Cordaro, 2011; Levenson, 2011; Matsumoto, 1990; Roseman, 2011; Tracy & Randles, 2011). 
Instead, the facial configurations in Figure 4 are best thought of as Western gestures, symbols or 
stereotypes that fail to capture the rich variety with which people spontaneously move their 
faces to express emotions in everyday life. A stereotype is not a prototype. The distinction is an 
important one, because a prototype is the most frequent or typical instance of a category 
(Murphy, 2002), whereas a stereotype is an oversimplified belief that is taken as generally more 
applicable than it actually is.  
The conclusion that emotional expressions are more variable and context-dependent than 
commonly assumed is also mirrored by the evidence from physiological changes (such as heart 
rate and skin conductance measures, Box 8, SOM) and even in evidence on the brain basis of 
emotion (Clark-Polner et al., 2017). The task of science is to systematically document these 
context-dependent patterns, as well as understand the mechanisms that cause them, so that we 
can explain and predict them. Clearly, the face is a rich source of information that plays a crucial 
role in guiding social interaction. Facial movements, when measured in a high dimensional 
dynamic context, may serve the diagnostic purpose that many consumers of emotion science are 
looking for (where context can be a cultural context, a specific situation, a person’s learning 
history or momentary physiological state, or even the temporal context of what just took place a 
moment ago; Barrett et al., 2011; Gendron et al., 2013).  
A Note on the Scientific Literature 
Our review identified several broad problems that lurk within the scientific research on 
facial expressions and that may cause considerable misunderstanding and confusion for 
consumers of this research. First, statistical standards are commonly adopted that don’t translate 
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well for applying emotion research to other domains, applied or scientific. Showing that people 
frown when sad or scowl when angry with greater statistical reliability than would be expected 
by chance may be a scientific finding that warrants publication in a peer-reviewed journal, but 
above-chance responding is often low in absolute terms, making broad conclusions impossible, 
particularly for translation to domains of life where a person’s outcomes can be influenced by 
what emotional meaning perceivers infer. Making inferences based on statistical reliability 
without concern for specificity and generalizability is similarly problematic. Second, even 
studies that surmount these common shortcomings often have a mismatch between what is 
claimed in their conclusions (or in what others claim in reviews or citations of those primary 
research papers), and what inferences can, in fact, be supported by the results. Third, and 
relatedly, this mismatch often results from problems in how studies are designed—the particular 
stimuli used, the tasks used, and the statistical analyses are critically important and constrain 
what can be observed and inferred in the first place. Fourth, published research on emotional 
expressions and emotion perception often confounds the measurements made in an experiment 
with the interpretation of the data, referring without sufficient justification to facial movements 
as “emotional displays,” “emotional expressions” or even “facial expressions,” rather than 
“facial configurations,” “facial movements” or “facial actions”; referring to people “detecting” or 
“recognizing” emotion rather than “perceiving” or “inferring” an emotional state based on some 
set of cues (facial movements, vocal acoustics, body posture, etc.); and referring to “accuracy” 
rather than “agreement” or “consensus.”  
A Note on Other Emotion Categories 
 Our conclusions most directly challenge what we have termed the “common view”: that a 
scowling facial configuration is the expression of anger, a nose-wrinkled facial configuration the 
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expression of disgust, a gasping facial configuration the expression of fear, a smiling facial 
configuration the expression of happiness, a frowning facial configuration the expression of 
sadness, and that a startled facial configuration is the expression of surprise. By necessity, we 
focused on our review of evidence on these six emotion categories, rather than the more than 
twenty emotion categories that are currently being studied, because studies on these six are far 
more numerous than for other emotion categories. Nonetheless, some scientists claim that these 
other emotion categories each have distinctive, universal expressions, facial or otherwise, that is 
modified or accented by culture (e.g., Cordaro et al., 2017; Keltner et al., in press). In our view, 
such claims rest on evidence that is subject to the same critique as we offered for the research 
that we reviewed in detail here.  In short, even though our review focused on the six emotion 
categories that are sometimes referred to as “basic emotions,” our observations and conclusions 
generalize to studies of other emotion categories that use similar methods.  
Recommendations for Consumers of Emotion Research on Applying the Scientific Findings 
Presently, many consumers of emotion research assume that certain questions about 
emotional expressions have been answered satisfactorily when in fact this is not the case. 
Technology companies, for example, are spending millions of research dollars to build devices to 
read emotions from faces, erroneously taking the common view as the one that is scientifically 
best supported. A more accurate description, however, is that their technology detects facial 
movements, not emotional expressions.41 Corporations like Amazon are exploring virtual human 
technology to interface with consumers. Virtual humans are used to educate children, train 
physicians, train the military as well as infer psychological disorders and perhaps eventually 
even be used to offer treatments. At the moment, the science of emotion is ill-equipped to 
support these initiatives. Emotional expressions are more variable and context-dependent than 
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originally assumed, and most of the published research was not designed to probe this variation 
and characterize this context-dependence. As a consequence, right now, the scientific evidence 
offers less actionable guidance to consumers than is commonly assumed.  
In fact, our review of the scientific evidence indicates that very little about how and why 
certain facial movements express instances of emotion is actually known at a level of detail that 
such conclusions could be used in important, real-world applications. To help consumers 
navigate the science of emotion, we offer some tips for how to read experiments and other 
scientific papers (Table 8). 
More generally, companies may well be fundamentally asking the wrong question. 
Attempts to simply “read out” people’s internal states from an analysis of their facial movements 
alone, without considering various aspects of context are at best incomplete, and at worst entirely 
lack validity, no matter how sophisticated the computational algorithms. These technology 
developments are powerful tools to investigate the expression and perception of emotions, as we 
discuss below. Right now, however, it is premature to use this technology to reach conclusions 
about what people feel based on their facial movements--which brings us to recommendations 
for future research. 
Recommendations for Future Scientific Research  
Specific, concrete recommendations for future research to capitalize on the opportunity 
offered by current challenges can be found in Table 9, but we highlight a few general points 
here. Foremost, the expressive stereotypes that summarize the common view, like those depicted 
in Figure 4, are ubiquitous in published research, but it’s time to move beyond a science of 
stereotypes to develop a science of how people actually move their faces to express emotion and 
the processes by which those movements carry information about emotion to someone else (a 
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perceiver). (See Box 16 in SOM for a discussion of information theory as applied to emotional 
communication). The stereotypes of Figure 4 must be replaced by a thriving scientific effort to 
observe and describe the lexicon of context-sensitive ways in which people move their facial 
muscles to express emotion, and the discovery of when and how people infer emotions in other 
people’s facial movements. 
New research on emotion should consider sampling individuals deeply, with high 
dimensional measurements, across many different situations, times of day, etc.: a big data 
approach to learn the expressive repertoires of individual people. In the ideal case, videos of 
people in natural situations could be quantified by automated algorithms for various physical 
features such as facial movements, posture, gait, and tone of voice. To this we could add the 
sampling of other physical features such as ambulatory monitoring of autonomic nervous system 
changes to sample the internal milieu of people’s bodies as they dynamically change over time, 
ambulatory eye-tracking to assess gaze and attention, ambulatory brain imaging such as EEG and 
optical brain imaging (fNIRs). The failure to find reliable “fingerprints” for emotion categories 
stems, at least in part, from the same reason there are no reliable facial movements to express 
these categories: approaches have ignored meaningful variability due to context.  There is also 
blue tooth technology to capture the physical spaces people inhabit (which can be quantified for 
various structural and social descriptive features such as how much light and noise they are 
exposed to), whether they are with another person, how that person reacts, and so on. Rich, 
multimodal observations could, in principle, be available from videos, which when time-synched 
with the other physical measurements, could be extremely useful in understanding the conditions 
for when certain facial movements are made and what they might mean in a given context. 
Naturally, big data in the absence of hypotheses is not necessarily helpful. 
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People could be offered the opportunity to annotate their videos with subjective ratings of 
the features that describe their experiences (whether or not they are identified as emotions). 
Candidate features are affective properties such as valence and arousal (see Box 9 in SOM). The 
features might also be appraisals as descriptions of how a situation is experienced (Barrett, 
Mesquita et al., 2007) and have the potential to add to the high dimensional characterization of 
what causes facial movements and what they mean.42 Such an approach introduces various 
technical and modeling challenges, but this sort of deeply inductive approach is now within 
reach. 
Another opportunity for high dimensional sampling involves interactions with virtual 
humans. Because virtual humans can realize contingent behavior in rich social interactions under 
strict and precise experimental control, they can provide a richer, more natural context in which 
to study emotional expressions and emotion perception than is true for traditional laboratory 
studies, while not losing the experimental control that limits the causal inferences from 
ethological studies.  
To date, this potential has not been exploited to explore the reliability and specificity in 
context-sensitive relations between facial movements and mental states. As we noted earlier, 
most of the systems are now designed to teach people a variety of skills, where the goal is not to 
assess how well participants perceive emotions in facial movements under realistic, socially 
ambiguous conditions, but instead to program expressive behaviors into virtual humans that will 
motivate people to learn the needed skills. In these experiments, the psychological realism of 
facial movements is often secondary to the primary goals of the experiment. A scientist might 
even program a virtual human with behavior or appearance that is un-natural or infeasible for a 
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human (i.e., that are supernormal) so that a participant can unambiguously interpret and be 
influenced by the agent’s actions (Tinbergen, 1953; D. Barrett, 2007).  
Nonetheless, the scientific approach of observing people as they interact with artificial 
humans holds great promise for understanding the dynamics and mechanisms of emotion 
perception and may get us closer to understanding human emotion perception in everyday life. 
Virtual humans are vivid. Unlike more passive approaches to evoking emotion such as viewing 
videos or images of facial configurations, a virtual human engages a human participant in a 
direct, social interaction to elicit perceptual judgments that are either directly reported or inferred 
from behaviors measured in the participant. Virtual humans are also highly controllable, 
allowing for more precise experimentation (Blascovich et al., 2002). A virtual human’s facial 
movements and other details can be repeated across participants offering the potential for robust 
and replicable observations. Numerous studies have demonstrated that humans are influenced by 
them (e.g., Baylor & Kim, 2008; Krumhuber et al, 2007; McCall et al., 2009). For example, 
human learners are more engaged by virtual agents who move their faces (and modulate their 
voices), leading them (the real humans) to increased sense of self-efficacy (Kim, Baylor, & Shen, 
2007). As a consequence, virtual humans potentially “allow for the study of emotion in a rich 
virtual ecology, a form of synthetic in vivo experimentation” (Marsella & Gratch, 2016). When 
combined with the high dimensional sampling we described earlier, there is the potential to 
revolutionize our understanding of emotional expressions by asking different questions than 
those encouraged by common views. Automated algorithms using data captured from videos 
offer substantial improvements with a data-driven, unsupervised approach. The result could be 
the robust descriptions about the context-sensitive nature of emotional expressions that is 
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currently missing, and that would set the stage for a more mechanistic, causal account of 
emotions and their expressions.  
An ethology of emotions and their expressions can also be pursued in the lab. 
Experiments can go beyond a study of how people move their faces in a single situation chosen 
to be most typical of a given emotion category. Most studies to date have been designed to 
observe facial movements in only the most typical situations. Future studies should examine 
emotional expression and perception across a range of situations that vary systematically in their 
physical, psychological, and social features, and aim to understand both the various ways that 
humans acquire the skills to express and perceive emotion, as well as the conditions that can 
impair the development of these processes.  
The shift towards more context-sensitive scientific studies of emotion has already begun 
(see Box 3 in SOM), but it currently falls short of what we are recommending. Non-scientists 
(and some scientists) still anchor on the common view and only slowly shift away from it 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Wilson et al., 1996).  The pervasiveness of the common view 
supports strong convictions about what it is that faces signal, and people often continue to hold 
to those convictions even when they are demonstrably wrong (Barrett, 2017a; Todorov, 2017). 
Such convictions reflect cultural beliefs and stereotypes, however. This state of affairs is not 
unique to the science of emotional expression or to the science of emotion more generally (Kuhn, 
1962).  
In our view, the scientific path forward begins with the explicit acknowledgement that we 
know much less than we thought we did, providing an opportunity to cultivate the spirit of 
discovery with renewed vigor and take scientific discovery in a new direction (Firestein, 2016). 
With this context of discovery comes the sobering realization that those of us who cultivate the 
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science of emotion and the consumers who use this research should seriously question the 
assumptions of the common view and step back from what we thought we knew about reading 
emotions in faces. Understanding how best to infer someone’s emotional state or predict 
someone’s future actions from their facial movements awaits the outcomes of future research. 
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End Notes 
1 English does not contain gender-neutral pronouns. As a consequence, we alternate between male and female 
pronouns. 
2 Decades of research in social psychology shows that humans automatically try to predict other people’s behavior 
by inferring a mental state – this is called mental state inference or mentalizing, such as when inferring someone’s 
emotional state (e.g., for a review, see Gilbert, 1998). This research suggests that inference and prediction are not 
separate steps (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). 
3 Bolded words appear in the glossary. 
4 To be clear, teaching children how to infer emotions in others is not a problem because this skill is related to 
efficient communication with others. The question is whether children are being taught information that is 
scientifically valid and generalizable. 
5 As of November 10, 2018, a website for the Detego Group indicated that “The methods developed (sic) by Paul 
Ekman are based on 40 years of research and are being taught to the FBI, CIA, Scotland Yard and more forensics 
specialists around the world” (http://www.detegogroup.eu/paul-ekman-introduction/?lang=en ). 
6 This empirical emphasis is largely consistent with scientists’ explicit reports of what they believe, according to a 
recent survey from 2014. Two-hundred and forty eight scientists who published peer-reviewed papers on the topic of 
emotion were asked about their views on what the scientific evidence shows. Of the 149 (60%) who responded, 119 
(80%) indicated that they believed compelling evidence exists for the hypothesis that certain emotion categories are 
expressed with universal facial configurations or vocal signals (Ekman, 2016); no questions about variability were 
included in the survey. 
7 In social psychology, this is the distinction between identifying an action and making an inference about the mental 
cause of the action (Gilbert, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). 
8 This corresponds to the null hypothesis for the true positive (in Figure 3).  
9 To test the specificity hypothesis, we test something called the false positive: that people frequently scowl when 
not angry, meaning that they scowl more frequently than chance when fearful, sad, confused, hungry, etc. (see 
Figure 3). Retaining the null hypothesis for the false positive, that people do not scowl more frequently than they 
would by chance when fearful, sad, confused, hungry, etc., is equivalent to rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e., finding 
support for) the specificity hypothesis. Rejecting the null hypothesis for the false positive, because people scowl 
when fearful, sad, confused, hungry, etc., in addition to when angry, is evidence of no specificity (i.e., retaining the 
null hypothesis for the test of specificity). 
10 Our decision to focus on the anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise categories was reinforced by 
two observations. First, consider a recent poll that asked scientists about their beliefs (Ekman, 2016). Two-hundred 
and forty eight scientists who published peer-reviewed papers on the topic of emotion were given a list of 18 
emotion labels and were asked to indicate which, according to available empirical evidence, have been established 
as biological categories with universal expressions. Of the 149 (60%) who responded, 
 
“There was high agreement about five emotions … : anger (91%), fear (90%), disgust (86%), sadness (80%), and 
happiness (76%). Shame, surprise, and embarrassment were endorsed by 40%–50%. Other emotions, currently under study 
by various investigators drew substantially less support: guilt (37%), contempt (34%), love (32%), awe (31%), pain (28%), 
envy (28%), compassion (20%), pride (9%), and gratitude (6%).” (Ekman, 2016, p. 32, italics added). 
 
Second, there is no smoking gun in the published research on these additional emotion categories – that is, there are 
no scientific findings related to the production or perception of facial expressions for those emotion categories that 
thus far challenge the general conclusions of this paper.  Simply put: regardless of how few or how many emotion 
categories we evaluated, the findings are the same.  
11 Different number of facial muscles are reported in various sources depending on how muscles are grouped or 
divided. 
12 From http://erikarosenberg.com/facs/ :”scientists often refer to a set of actions that occur on the face 
simultaneously as “facial events,” rather than calling them facial expressions. It is more descriptive. The word 
“expression” suggests that something from the inside becomes observable on the outside. Yet not every facial 
behavior expresses an internal state – most probably do not.” 
13 see https://how-emotions-are-made.com/notes/facial_action_coding 
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14 Box 6 in SOM presents a summary of computer vision algorithms for automatically detecting facial actions. 
15 Changes in illumination and face orientation are currently major hurdles. 
16 Thirty-eight groups, each with their own face reading algorithm, announced their intention to participate in the 
challenge (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017a). Groups tuned their algorithms on the set of training images that were 
provided two weeks before the challenge deadline. Final evaluations were done on the testing set only. Of the 
original 38 groups, only four submitted results before the challenge ended. 
17 These accuracy levels might be considered an upper estimate because of the characteristics of the training and test 
image databases. The methods for choosing the database are described in Benitez-Quiroz et. al 2016), although we 
provide a few important details here: Note, however, that a number of images are posed and professional taken. 
Some facial configurations are exaggerated. Under these idealized circumstances, manual verification of these faces 
was estimated at 81% accuracy.  
18 It is also possible that an individual person has a variety of probabilistic physical changes that reliably and 
specifically occur during the instances of a single emotion category, but for a number of reasons this hypothesis has 
not yet been scientifically tested. Specific studies to address this question would be very helpful. 
19 There are ways to get around this circularity by using unsupervised, data-driven methods to discover categories, 
but to date, studies have used supervised approaches where categories are prescribed by human inference. 
20 By relying on their own beliefs, scientists are using human consensus to identify when an emotional episode is 
occurring and which emotion category it belongs to (i.e., when they agree that fear or some other emotion is present, 
then it is said to be present). It’s important to realize that every single experiment dealing with emotion to date relies 
on human inference in this way. Consensus inferences are made in many areas of science. In physics and astronomy 
consensus emerges from expert scientists whose beliefs and assumptions often challenge the common sense view, 
such as in the case of quantum mechanics, dark matter, and black holes. In other areas of psychology, consensus is 
used to define many categories, such as memory and attention, as well as psychiatric categories, such schizophrenia 
and autism. Even defining depression as a mental vs. a physical illness is a matter of consensus rather than objective 
ground truth. But it is noteworthy that when it comes to emotions, scientists use exactly the same categories as non-
scientists, which may give us cause for concern (as forewarned by William James; James, 1890, 1894).  For 
example, compare the findings in Box 8 with the recent survey of scientists who study emotion (Ekman, 2016): 88 
out of 149 scientists responded continue to believe that certain emotion categories have universal physiological 
markers, despite meta-analyses showing otherwise. 
21 These meta-analytic findings are consistent with an earlier summary published by Matsumoto et al. (2008): of the 
14 studies using rigorous FACS coding by human experts, only five reported that participants spontaneously 
displayed some or all of the hypothesized AUs during emotions. This is in contrast to the nine studies using the less 
reliable EM-FACS coding, all of which reported support. These findings suggest that some type of perceptual bias 
creeps in when observers make configural judgments of whether an AU is present or not (e.g., indicating whether or 
not a participant is smiling, or displaying “happiness”) than when AUs are coded independently, one at a time.  
22 Remote, small-scale cultures are not untouched by western influences. All cultures have some minimal contact 
with western cultures (and this was also the case for the seminal papers published by Ekman and his colleagues in 
the 1970s; Gendron & Crivelli, 2017). 
23 The Trobriand Islanders are a different ethnic group than the Fore; Trobrianders are subsistence fisherman and 
horticulturalists living in a small archipelago of islands located 200km from the mainland (the origin of the original 
Fore who were photographed). As Crivelli et al. make clear in their paper, these findings are a within-nation rather 
than a within-culture comparison.  
24 The value of this particular study is that the researchers not only coded infants’ facial movements but also 
measured a range of concurrent movements that could support inferences about the infants’ feelings of pleasantness, 
unpleasantness and level of arousal, termed affect (see Box 9), including increased respiration, withdrawal/leaning 
away with the body, stilling/freezing, struggling, turning toward the mother, extreme withdrawal, hiding of their 
faces, squirming, self-stimulation, looking toward mother, pointing at the object, doing a “double-take,” and banging 
on the table. 
25 Bennett et al. (2002) note that when they observed facial actions were thought to be associated with more than one 
emotion category (e.g., when an infant produced a facial configuration that was a combination of scowling (anger) 
and pouting (sadness), they interpreted the expression using the facial actions in only the upper region of the face, 
which indicates that infants’ facial movements were even more variable than reported in the data tables. A footnote 
in the paper further indicates that infants produced facial movements that were interpreted to reflect “interest” across 
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all of the eliciting situations, but these facial actions were not included in any data analyses (Bennett et al., 2002, 
footnote 1). Any facial configuration that included AUs stipulated as interest and AUs for another emotion category 
was coded as an expression of the other emotion category.  
26 Also, it is not clear that children find sour foods disgusting (e.g., Stein, Ottenberg, & Roulet, 1958; Rozin et al., 
1986).Young children appear to be attracted to many things that adults find disgusting, whereas by the age of five, 
children have more adult-like behavioral responses and reject them (Rozin et al., 1986). For a discussion of how 
disgust is learned, see Widen & Russell (2013). 
27 In another naturalistic study, videos of children aged four through seven were downloaded from the internet and 
FACS coded (Camras et al., 2018). The children were playing “the scary maze game”: a child solves maze after 
maze of increasing difficulty, only to encounter a screaming, demonic girl from the movie The Exorcist (filmed in 
1973). The game is generally thought to evoke an instance of fear (hence the name “scary”), but it may also evoke 
surprise as the scary stimulus makes a sudden unexpected appearance. Children only produced the wide-eyed, 
gasping configuration (the proposed facial expression of fear) and/or a startled configuration (the proposed facial 
expression of surprise) with weak reliability (38% and 10%, respectively).  
28 By analogy, people who have been blind since birth learn color concepts and the relation between these concepts, 
such as “red,” “blue,” and “green” are similar to those of sighted people (e.g., congenitally blind individuals 
understand the US concept for "blue" is more similar to "green" than to "red”; Shepard & Cooper, 1992). The 
structure of brain regions in visual cortex that represent visual concepts are also virtually indistinguishable in sighted 
and congenitally blind individuals (Koster-Hale et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015).  
29 The onset and severity of blindness varies hugely across studies. Even a small amount of visual experience in 
infancy or early childhood will influence brain development and provide experiences for learning about emotions 
(see earlier section on emotion concept development in infants). Helen Keller, for example, could see and hear until 
she was 19 months old, providing some initial scaffolding for her later ability to communicate. 
30 For example, recently, Ekman (2017) wrote, “Another challenge to the findings of universality came from the 
anthropologist, Margaret Mead …. Establishing that posed expressions are universal, she said, does not necessarily 
mean that spontaneous expressions are universal. I replied (Ekman, 1977) that it seemed illogical to presume that 
people can readily interpret posed facial expressions if they had not seen those facial expressions and experienced 
them in actual social life” (Ekman, 2017, p. 46). 
31 While these findings are instructive, they likely provide a lower limit of the possible real world variation in the 
facial configurations that express the varied instances of a given emotion category. After all, the internet is a curated 
version of reality and some frequent facial configurations are likely missing because they are rarely uploaded to the 
internet. Similarly, some configurations commonly found on the internet might not be commonly observed in the 
real world. 
32 Compare these findings to those from a study that mined images from the internet using a similar but narrower 
approach, and who had two raters use a choice-from-array method to label the images (Mollahosseini et al., 2016). 
33 Configuration 3 also resembles people’s beliefs about the configurations that express fear and awe (i.e., the 
“international core patterns” reported by Cordaro et al. 2017). 
34 More generally, participants are more likely to perceive the intended emotion in the hypothesized facial 
configurations of Figure 4 when they are displayed on dynamically moving, synthetic faces (Wehrle, Kaiser, 
Schmidt, & Scherer, 2000), in video footage of posed facial muscle movements (e.g., Ambadar, Schooler & Cohn, 
2005; Cunningham & Wallraven, 2009), and even in point-light displays of motion created by facial muscle 
movements (Bassili, 1979). This “dynamic advantage” sometimes disappears when participants are viewing real 
human faces (e.g., Fiorentini & Viviani, 2011; Gold, Barker, et al., 2013; Miles & Johnston, 2007; Nelson & 
Russell, 2011). 
35 Ekman & Friesen (1971) was chosen as one of the forty studies that changed psychology (Hicks, 2012) and, 
along with Ekman et al. (1969) is routinely discussed in introductory psychology textbooks. 
36 Dioula participants from Burkina Faso in West Africa showed strong reliability for labeling smiling facial 
configurations as happiness, moderate reliability for labeling frowning facial configurations as sadness, startled 
facial configurations as surprise, and nose-wrinkled facial configurations as disgust, and weak reliability for labeling 
scowling facial configurations as anger and wide-eyed gasping facial configurations as fear. 
37 For example, a sample of Trobriand Islanders, who are subsistence horticulturalists and fishermen living in the 
Trobriand Islands of Papua New Guinea, labeled a scowling facial configuration as anger with above chance 
reliability (.29% of the time), but also labeled that facial configuration more frequently with “feels like avoiding a 
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social interaction” (.50% of the time) (Crivelli, Russell et al., 2017, Study 2). In fact, the wide-eyed, gasping facial 
configuration that is thought to be the expression for fear (Figure 4) is understood as an expression of aggression or 
threat in the Trobriand culture (Crivelli, Jarillo & Fridlund, 2016, 2017; Crivelli, Russell et al., 2016). Trobrianders 
uniquely labeled smiling facial configurations as happiness across two studies but this finding did not replicate in a 
third sample nor in a sample of Mwani participants who are subsistence fisherman living on Matemo Island in 
Mozambigue, Africa. 
38 The ancestors of the Hadza are thought to have been continuously practicing a hunting and gathering lifestyle for 
at least the past 50,000 years in their current region of East Africa. Furthermore, Hadza social structure, mobility, 
residential patterns, and language have thus far remained largely buffered from their interactions with other ethnic 
groups (Apicella & Crittenden, 2016; Crittenden & Marlowe, 2008) which have been sustained for at least the past 
100 years (Jones, 2016) 
39 The wide-eyed gasping stereotype for fear is thought to have evolved for enhanced sensory sampling that supports 
efficient threat detection (Susskind et al., 2008). Similarly, the nose-wrinkle stereotype for disgust is thought to have 
evolved in order to limit exposure to noxious stimuli (Chapman & Anderson, 2012; Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & 
Anderson, 2009).  
40 Interestingly, adult perceivers may have overtly looked at the postures less, but other evidence with the same 
stimuli suggest that different body contexts influenced how adult participants visually scanned the exact same facial 
configurations; Aviezer et al., 2008). At the other end of the age spectrum, older adults are also more influenced by 
context when inferring emotional meaning in facial configurations as compared to young adults (Ngo & Isaacowitz, 
2015). 
41 Some applications will not be affected by context because they are not aiming to use facial movements to infer an 
individual’s underlying emotional state. These initiatives have very specific applications in mind. For example, 
detecting pain in patients (Apple), driver drowsiness (Google), creating virtual facial expression stickers or animojis 
from one’s own facial poses (Facebook, iPhone X), or Alibaba's “smile to pay.” 
42 The word “appraisal” has two meanings in the science of emotion. Here, appraisals simply to refer to the 
descriptive features of how a situation is experienced, such as novelty, goal relevance, etc., without any inference 
about how those experiential features are caused (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 2008; Ortony & Clore, 2013). The other 
meaning of appraisal refers to the mechanisms that cause the experiential features as components of emotion (e.g., 
the component process model of emotion, in which appraisals are considered evaluative “checks” that the human 
mind uses in a serial fashion; e.g., Scherer, Mortillaro & Mehu, 2017). There is very little evidence that appraisals 
are, in fact, causal in nature (for a discussion, Parkinson, 1997). In some studies, for example, participants are 
presented with a written scenario that is assumed to automatically trigger a specific sequence of appraisal checks 
(i.e., cognitive evaluations), which in turn is hypothesized to produce a specific pattern of facial muscle movements. 
Notice that the main causal mechanisms here – appraisal checks – are not measured directly but are inferred to have 
occurred. In other studies, participants are asked to explicitly report on the appraisals they experience, on the 
assumption that the corresponding “checks” are active. Emerging scientific evidence links appraisals, as descriptive 
features, to facial movements, although the evidence to date suggests that these relationships are not as consistent as 
specific as hypothesized (a summary of this research program can be found in in Scherer, Mortillaro & Mehu, 2017). 
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Glossary 
Accuracy:  Extent to which a participant’s performance corresponds to the intended 
performance on an experimental task.  Critically, this requires proper experimental task design, 
so that the intended correct performance is perceiver-independent, and not subject to the whims 
of the experimenter. 
 
Affect: A general property of experience that has at least two features: pleasantness or 
unpleasantness (valence) and degree of arousal. Affect is part of every waking moment of life 
and is not specific to instances of emotion, although all emotional experiences have affect at their 
core.  
 
Appraisal: Scientists use the word “appraisal” either to describe how a situation is experienced 
(e.g., a situation is experienced as novel) or to refer to a literal cognitive mechanism that causes 
those features of experience (e.g., an evaluation or judgment of whether or not a situation is 
novel).  
 
Approach/avoidance: A fundamental dimension of motivated behavior.  It is different from 
valence, which is a dimension of experience rather than of behavior.  
 
Category/Categorization: The psychological grouping of a collection of objects, people or 
events that are perceived to be similar in some way. May be done consciously or unconsciously. 
May be explicit (as when applying a verbal label to instances of the grouping) or implicit 
(treating instances the same way or behaving towards them in the same way). 
 
Choice-from-array tasks: Any judgment task that asks research participants to pick a correct 
answer from a small selection of options provided by the experimenter. For example, in the study 
of emotion perception, participants are often shown a posed facial configuration depicting an 
emotional expression (e.g., a scowl), along with a small selection of emotion words (e.g., 
“angry,” “sad,” “happy”) and asked to pick the word that best describes the face.  
 
Common view:  In this paper, the most predominant view about how emotions are related to 
facial movements.  While difficult to quantify, we characterize it through examples, e.g., an 
internet Google search (Box 1, SOM).  The common view holds that (a) certain emotions 
categories reliably cause specific patterns of facial muscle movements, and (b) specific 
configurations of facial muscle movements are diagnostic of certain emotions categories.  See 
Figure 4. 
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Conditional probability: The probability that an event “X’ will occur given that another event 
“Y” has already occurred, or p(X/Y). If “X” is a frown and “Y” is sadness, then 
p(frown/sadness) is the conditional probability that a person will frown when sad.  See also 
forward inference, reverse inference. 
  
Configural (vs featural) perception of a face: The visual analysis of something, like a face, 
that is holistic, meaning that the face is visually analyzed as a gestalt (or whole unit) that 
incorporates features and their relations. Featural processing means that individual features are 
perceived independently, without reference to one another.  
 
Confirmation bias: The tendency to search for, remember, or believe evidence that is consistent 
with one's existing beliefs or theories, in favor of evidence inconsistent with one’s beliefs or 
theories.  
 
Congenitally blind: People who are born without vision.  In the literature, there is considerable 
heterogeneity, with some people being truly blind from the moment they are born, but others 
having severe visual impairments short of complete blindness or becoming blind in infancy.  If 
the cause is peripheral (in the eyes rather than the brain), such individuals may still be able to 
think and imagine very similarly to sighted individuals. 
 
Consistency: An outcome that does not vary greatly across time, context, or different individuals 
(see forward inference).  Consistency is not accuracy (a group of people can consistently believe 
something that is wrong). 
 
Discrimination: In psychophysics, to judge that two stimuli are different from one another; 
separate from identifying what they are (identification) or what they mean (recognition).  
 
Ecological validity: Refers to the extent to which the findings of a research study are able to be 
generalized to real-life settings; the extent to which an experimental protocol captures valid 
aspects of the real world (related to in-the-wild). 
 
Emotional episode: A window of time during which there is an emotional instance. Often, but 
not always, accompanied by an experience of emotion , and sometimes, but not always, involves  
an emotional expression. 
 
Emotional expression: a facial configuration, bodily movement, or vocal expression that 
reliability and specifically communicates an emotional state.  Many so-called emotional 
expressions are in fact errors of reverse inference on the part of perceivers (e.g., an actor crying 
when not sad). 
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Emotional granularity: experiencing or perceiving emotions according to many different 
categories (e.g., low granularity = angry, sad, and afraid are all synonyms of “unpleasant;” high 
granularity = “frustration,” “irritation,” and “rage” are all distinct from one another and from 
“anger”.   
 
Emotional instance (or instance of emotion): An event categorized as an emotion. For 
example, an instance of anger is the categorization of an emotional episode of anger. In 
cognitive science, an instance is called a “token” and the category is called a “type”. So, an 
instance of anger is a token of the category anger. (see Emotional episode). 
 
Face inferiority effect: A phenomenon observed in emotion perception studies of toddlers and 
young children. They have difficulty inferring the causes for emotions depicted in facial 
movements alone when compared to inferring the causes of emotions depicted with stories or 
words.  
 
Facial affect coding system (FACS): A system to describe and quantify visible human facial 
movements. 
 
Facial configuration: A pattern of visible contractions of multiple muscles in the face; the 
production analog to configural perception of faces.  Configurations can be described objectively 
(e.g., with FACS coding). Not synonymous with “facial expression”, which requires an inference 
about how the facial configurations were caused. 
 
Facial expression: A facial configuration that someone infers is expressing an internal state.  
Facial expressions of emotion are configurations that perceivers reverse infer to have been 
caused by an internal emotion state; they are thus perceiver-dependent. 
 
Facial movement:  A facial configuration that is objectively described in a perceiver-
independent way.  This description is agnostic about whether the movement expresses an 
emotion and does not use reverse inference.  FACS coding is an example. 
 
Forced-choice task: An experimental task in which a participant must choose between options 
provided by the experimenter. 
 
Forward inference: Inferring an effect from knowing its cause. An example would be the 
conditional probability of observing a frown given we know somebody is angry, 
p(frown|anger).   
 
Free labeling: An experimental task that is not forced-choice, but in which the participant 
generates words of her/his choosing.  
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Generalization:  The replication of research findings across different settings, samples, or 
methods.  Generalizability can be weak, for instance if a finding replicates to a limited extent, or 
strong, if it replicates across very different methods and cultures. 
 
Habituation task: In a habituation task, infants are repeatedly shown objects or images that 
belong to the same category. When subsequently shown a novel stimulus (one that is not 
experienced as similar to the others), infants look longer at it.  Used to infer how infants 
categorize stimuli. 
 
In the wild: In the real world (vs. in the lab).  Related to ecological validity. 
 
In-group advantage: In sociology and social psychology, an in-group is the social group of 
which a person psychologically feels they are a member; typically, people have more visual 
experience and familiarity with in-group members. In-group advantage refers to the often 
superior ability to perceive faces or voices from one’s in-group, as compared to from an out-
group. 
 
Mental inference/mentalizing: Assigning a mental cause to actions; also sometimes referred to 
as “theory of mind”.  The reverse inference of attributing emotions from seeing facial 
movements is an example of mentalizing. 
 
Meta-analysis: A method for statistically combining findings from many studies. 
 
Multimodal: Combining information from more than one of the senses (e.g., vision and 
audition).   
 
Null hypothesis: The hypothesis or default position that there is no relationship between 
dependent and independent variables.  The probability of observing results that support the null 
hypothesis is chance level, i.e. what would obtain if observations are random, or permuted.  
Consequently, if the null hypothesis is true, the distribution of p-values is uniform (every 
possible outcome has an equal chance).  
 
Perceiver-dependent: Interpretation of an observation that depends on human judgment. 
Perceiver dependency can produce conclusions that are consistent across people but not accurate 
or valid.  
 
Perceiver-independent: An observation that does not depend on human judgment.  Although 
some philosophers argue that all observations require some human judgment, there are degrees 
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of dependency.  Judging that a flower vase is rectangular or oval is relatively perceiver-
independent, whereas judging whether it looks nice is perceiver-dependent. 
 
Percent agreement: A measure of agreement between raters; high agreement produces high 
inter-subject consistency.  Percent agreement is not the same as percent accuracy, since the 
former is more perceiver-dependent than the latter. 
 
Perceptual matching task: An experimental task that requires research participants to judge two 
stimuli, such as two facial configurations, as similar or different. This only requires 
discrimination, not categorization, recognition, or naming. 
 
Priors: Background beliefs. In the context of Bayes's Theorem, the belief that a hypothesis is 
true depends not just on the evidence presented but also on the strength of prior beliefs.  If a 
person has a strong prior, this may result in a confirmation bias. 
 
Prototype: The most frequent or most typical instance of a category.  Distinct from stereotype: 
A group of people may have a perceiver-dependent stereotype that is an inaccurate 
representation of the prototype.  
 
Recognition: Acknowledging something’s existence (which is confirmed to exist by perceiver-
independent means). Contrast with perception (which involves inference and interpretation). 
 
Replication: The extent to which new experiments come to the same conclusions as a previous 
study.  Strong replications generalize well: similar conclusions are obtained even when the new 
experiments use different subject samples, stimuli, or contexts.   
 
Reverse correlation: A psychophysical, data-driven technique for deriving a representation of 
something (e.g., an image of a facial configuration) by averaging across a large number of 
judgments.  
 
Reverse inference: Inferring a cause from having observed its purported effect.  For instance, 
inferring that a scowl means someone is angry (the conditional probability, p(anger|frown)).  In 
general, reverse inference is poorly constrained, since multiple causes are usually compatible 
with any observation.  
 
Sensory modalities: The different senses: vision, hearing, etc. 
 
Specificity: Research conclusions that include positive as well negative statements.  For 
instance, concluding that a frown signals anger but that other facial movements do not signal 
anger, and that a frown does not signal emotions other than anger.  High specificity helps make 
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reverse inference valid.  Ideally, research conclusions feature both high specificity for some 
domains, and high generalizability for others (e.g., that a frown signals only anger, but does so 
across all people and cultures). 
 
Statistical learning: Detecting statistical regularities from an environment; learning to recognize 
patterns. 
 
Stereotype: a widely held but inaccurate belief about a person or category.   
 
Universal: Something that is common or shared by all humans. The source of this commonality 
(innate or learned) is a separate issue.  If an effect is universal, it generalizes across cultures. 
 
Validity:  Whether an observed variable actually measures what is claimed.  E.g., whether a 
facial movement indicates an emotion (construct validity), or is specific for a particular emotion 
(discriminative validity). 
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Table 1. A comparison of the facial configurations listed as the expressions of selected emotion categories  
 
 
 
Emotion Category 
Proposed Expressive Configurations Described as Facial Action Units 
Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, O’Sullivan & 
Frank (2008) 
 
Cordaro, Sun, Keltner, Kamble,  
Huddar & McNeil (2017) 
 
 
 
Keltner et al. (in 
press) 
 
 
Physical Description 
Darwin’s (1872) 
Description 
Observed in 
reseearch 
Reference Configuration 
Used 
International Core Pattern 
Amusement Not listed Not listed 6, 12, 26 or 27, 55 or 56, a 
“head bounce” (Shiota, 
Campos & Keltner, 2003) 
6, 7, 12, 16, 25, 26 or 27, 
53 
6+7+12+25+26+53 Head back, Duchenne smile (6, 7, 12), 
lips separated, jaw dropped 
Anger 4+ 5+ 24+ 38 4 + 5 or 7 + 
22+23+24 
4 +5 + 7 + 23 (Ekman, 
Levenson & Friesen, 1983) 
4, 7 4+5+17+23+24 Brows furrowed, eyes wide, lips 
tightened and pressed together 
Awe Not listed Not listed 1, 5, 26 or 27, 57 and visible 
inhalation (Shiota et al., 
2003) 
1, 2, 5, 12, 25, 26 or 27, 53 Not listed  
Contempt 9+ 10+ 22+ 41+ 61 
or 62 
12 (unilateral) + 14 
(unilateral) 
12 + 14 (Ekman et al., 
1983) 
4, 14, 25 Not listed  
Disgust 10+ 16+ 22+ 25 or 
26 
9 or 10, 25 or 26 9+15+16 (Ekman et al., 
1983) 
4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 25, 26 or 27 7+9+19+25+26 Eyes narrowed, nose wrinkled, lips 
parted, jaw dropped, tongue show 
Embarrassment Not listed Not listed 12, 24, 51, 54, 64 (Keltner 
& Buswell, 1997) 
6, 7, 12, 25, 54, participant 
dampens smile with 23, 24, 
frown, etc.) 
7+12+15+52+54+64 Eyelids narrowed, controlled smile, 
head turned and down, (not scored with 
FACS: hand touches face) 
Fear 1+ 2+ 5+ 20 1+2+4+5+20, 25 or 
26 
1+2+4+5+7+20+26 (Ekman 
et al., 1983) 
1, 2, 5, 7, 25, 26 or 27, 
participant suddenly shifts 
entire body backwards in 
chair 
1+2+4+5+7+20+25 Eyebrows raised and pulled together, 
upper eyelid raised, lower eyelid tense, 
lips parted and stretched 
Happiness 6 + 12 6 + 12  6+12 (Ekman et al., 1983) 6, 7, 12, 16, 25, 26 or 27 6+7+12+25+26 Duchenne smile (6, 7, 12) 
Pride Not listed Not listed 6, 12, 24, 53, a straightening 
of the back and pulling back 
of the shoulders to expose 
the chest (Shiota et al., 
2003) 
7, 12, 53, participant sits 
up straight 
53+64 Head up, eyes down 
Sadness 1 + 15 1+15, 4,17 1+4+5 (Ekman et al., 1983) 4, 43, 54 1+4+6+15+17 Brows knitted, eyes slightly tightened, 
lip corners depressed, lower lip raised 
Shame Not listed Not listed 54, 64 (Keltner & Buswell, 
1997) 
4, 17, 54 54+64 Head down, eyes down 
Surprise 1+ 2 + 5+ 25 or 26 1+2+5+25 or 26 1+2+5+26 (Ekman et al., 
1983) 
1, 2, 5, 25, 26 or 27 1+2+5+25+26 Eyebrows raised, upper eyelid raised, 
lips parted, jaw dropped 
Note. Darwin’s description taken from Matsumoto et al. (2008), Table 13.1.  International core patterns (ICPs) refer to expressions of 22 emotion categories that 
are thought to be conserved across cultures, taken from Cordaro et al. (2017), Tables 4, 5 and 6. A plus sign means “with”; these action units would appear 
simultaneously. A comma means “sometimes with”; these action units are statistically the most probable to appear, but do not necessarily need to happen 
simultaneously (David Cordaro, personal communication, 11/11/2018). 
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Table 2: Criteria used to evaluate the empirical evidence 
  
Expression Production 
 
 
Emotion Perception 
 
Reliability 
 
When a person is sad, the proposed expression (a frowning facial 
configuration) should be observed more frequently than would 
be expected by chance. Likewise, for every other emotion 
category that is subject to a commonsense belief. Reliability is 
related to a forward inference: given that someone is happy, 
what is the likelihood of observing a smile, p[set of facial muscle 
movements | emotion category].  
 
Chance means that facial configurations occur randomly with no 
predictable relationship to a given emotional state. This would 
mean that the facial configuration in question carries no 
information about the presence or absence of an emotion 
category. For example, in an experiment that observes the facial 
configurations associated with instances of happiness and anger, 
chance levels of scowling or smiling would be 50%.  
 
Reliability also depends on the base rate: how frequently people 
make a particularly facial configuration overall. For example, if a 
person frequently makes a scowling facial configuration during 
an experiment examining the expressions of anger, sadness and 
fear, he will seem to be consistently scowling in anger when in 
fact he is scowling indiscriminately. 
 
Reliability rates between 70% and 90% provide strong evidence 
for the commonsense view, between 40% and 69% provide 
moderate support for the commonsense view, and between 20% 
and 39% provide weak support (Ekman, 1994; Haidt & Keltner, 
1999; Russell, 1994). 
 
 
When a person makes a scowling facial configuration, perceivers 
should consistently infer that the person is angry. Likewise, for 
every facial configuration that has been proposed as the 
expression of a specific emotion category. That is, perceivers 
must consistently make a reverse inference: given that someone 
is scowling, what is the likelihood that he is angry, p[emotion 
category | set of facial muscle movements].  
 
Chance means that emotional states occur randomly with no 
predictable relationship to a given facial configuration. This 
would mean that the presence or absence of an emotion category 
cannot be inferred from the presence or absence of the facial 
configuration. For example, in an experiment that observes how 
people perceive 51 different facial configurations, chance levels 
for correctly labeling a scowling face as anger would be 2%. 
 
Reliability also depends on the base rate: how frequently people 
use a particular emotion label or make a particular emotional 
inference. For example, if a person frequently labels facial 
configurations as “angry” during an experiment examining 
scowling, smiling and frowning faces, she will seem to be 
consistently perceiving anger when in fact she is labeling 
indiscriminately.  
 
Reliability rates between 70% and 90% provide strong evidence 
for the commonsense view, between 40% and 69% provide 
moderate support for the commonsense view, and between 20% 
and 39% provide weak support (Ekman, 1994; Haidt & Keltner, 
1999; Russell, 1994). 
 
 
Specificity   
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If a facial configuration is diagnostic of a specific emotion 
category, then the facial configuration should express instances of 
one and only one emotion category better than chance; it should 
not consistently express instances of any other mental event 
(emotion or otherwise) at better than chance levels. For example, 
to be considered the expression of anger, a scowling facial 
configuration must not express sadness, confusion, indigestion, an 
attempt to socially influence, etc. at better than chance levels.  
 
Estimates of specificity, like reliability, depend on base-rates and 
on how chance levels are defined. 
 
 
If a frowning facial configuration is perceived as the diagnostic 
expression of sadness, then a frowning facial configuration should 
only be labeled as sadness (or sadness should only be inferred 
from a frowning facial configuration) at above chance levels. And 
it should not be consistently perceived as expressions of any 
mental states other than sadness at better than chance levels.  
 
Estimates of specificity, like reliability, depend on base-rates and 
on how chance levels are defined. 
 
Generalizability 
 
Patterns of reliability and specificity should replicate across 
studies, particularly when different populations are sampled, such 
as infants, congenitally blind individuals and individuals sampled 
from diverse cultural contexts, including small-scale, remote 
cultures. High generalizability across different circumstances 
ensures that scientific findings are generalizable. 
 
 
Patterns of reliability and specificity should replicate across 
studies, particularly when different populations are sampled, such 
as infants, congenitally blind individuals and individuals sampled 
from diverse cultural contexts, including small-scale, remote 
cultures. High generalizability across different circumstances 
ensures that scientific findings are generalizable. 
 
Validity 
 
Even if a facial configuration is consistently and uniquely 
observed in relation to a specific emotion category across many 
studies (strong generalizability), it is necessary to demonstrate 
that the person in question is really in the expected emotional 
state. This is the only way that a given facial configuration leads 
to accurate inferences about a person’s emotional state. A facial 
configuration is valid as a display or a signal for emotion if and 
only if it is strongly associated with other measures of emotion, 
preferably those that are objective and do not rely on anyone’s 
subjective report (i.e., a facial configuration should be strongly 
and consistently related to perceiver-independent evidence about 
the emotional state of the expresser). 
 
 
Even if a facial configuration is consistently and uniquely labeled 
with a specific emotion word across many studies (strong 
generalizability), it is necessary to demonstrate that the person 
making the facial configuration is really in the expected emotional 
state. This is the only way that a given perception or inference of 
emotion is accurate. A perceiver can only be said to be 
recognizing an emotional expression if and only if the person 
being perceived is verifiably in the expected emotional state.  
 
Note: Reliability is also related to sensitivity, consistency, informational value, and the true positive rate (for further description, see Figure 3). Specificity is 
related to uniqueness, discreteness, the true negative rate and referential specificity. In principle, we can also ask more parametrically whether there is a link 
between the intensity of an emotional instance and the intensity of facial muscle contractions, but scientists rarely do. 
. 
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Table 3: The Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978) codes for 
adults  
 
AU 
  
 
Description 
 
Facial muscles (type of activation) 
1 Inner brow raiser Frontalis (pars medialis) 
 
2 Outer brow raiser Frontalis (pars lateralis) 
 
4 Brow lowerer Corrugator supercilii, depressor supercilii 
 
5 Upper lid raiser Levator palpebrae superioris 
 
6 Cheek raiser Orbicularis oculi (pars orbitalis) 
 
7 Lid tightener Orbicularis oculi (pars palpebralis) 
 
9 Nose wrinkle Levator labii superioris alaquae nasi 
 
10 Upper lip raiser Levator labii superioris 
 
11 Nasolabial deepener Zygomaticus minor 
 
12 Lip corner puller Zygomaticus major 
 
13 Cheeks puffer Levator anguli oris 
 
14 Dimpler Buccinator 
 
15 Lip corner depressor  Depressor anguli oris 
 
16 Lower lip depressor Depressor labii inferioris 
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17 Chin raiser Mentalis 
 
18 Lip puckerer Incisivii labii superioris and incisivii labii inferioris 
 
20 Lip stretcher Risorius w/ platysma 
 
22 Lip funneler Orbicularis oris 
 
23 Lip tightener Orbicularis oris 
 
24 Lip pressor Orbicularis oris 
 
25 Lips part Depressor labii inferioris or relaxation of mentalis, or 
orbicularis oris 
 
26 Jaw drop Masseter, relaxed temporalis and internal terygoid 
 
27 Mouth stretch Pterygoids, digastric 
 
28 Lip suck Orbicularis oris 
 
41 Lid Droop  
 
42 Slit  
 
43 Eyes Closed  
 
44 Squint  
 
45 Blink  
 
46 Wink  
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Table 4: Reliability and specificity: A summary of the evidence 
  
Reliability 
 
 
Specificity 
 
Expression Production   
Adults, Developed, Spontaneous, Lab weak unknown 
Adults, Developed, Spontaneous, 
Naturalistic 
weak unknown 
Adults, Developed, Posed weak to strong unknown 
Adults, Remote, Spontaneous unclear unknown 
Adults, Remote, Posed weak to strong unknown 
Newborns, Infants, Toddlers unsupported unsupported 
Congenitally Blind  unsupported to weak unsupported 
Emotion Perception   
Adults, Developed, Choice-From-
Array 
moderate to strong unknown 
Adults, Developed, Reverse Inference 
(with Choice-From-Array) 
moderate moderate 
Adults, Developed, Free-Labeling weak to moderate weak 
Adults, Developed, Virtual Humans  unknown unknown 
Adults, Remote, Choice-From-Array 
(before 2008) 
moderate to strong unknown 
Adults, Remote, Choice-From-Array 
(after 2008) 
weak to moderate unsupported 
Adults, Remote, Free-Labeling 
(before 2008) 
unsupported to strong  variable  
Adults, Remote, Free-Labeling (after 
2008) 
unsupported unsupported 
Infants, Young Children unsupported unsupported 
 
Note. Criteria were adopted from Haidt & Keltner (1999), who suggest that reliability rates of 70±90% are 
considered strong evidence for universal emotion perception (following Ekman, 1994a); presumably, this would also 
hold for studies of expression production. Weak evidence is in the range of 20±40% (following Russell, 1994). By 
interpolation, reliability between 41% and 69% would be considered moderate evidence for reliability. Reliability 
estimates below 20% are interpreted as findings that clearly do not support the reliability hypothesis. We also 
adopted these criteria for specificity findings. Developed = studies of participants from the U.S. and other more 
urban countries. Spontaneous = spontaneous facial movements. Posed = posed facial configurations. Remote = 
studies of participants from small-scale, remote samples. 
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Table 5: Common tasks for measuring explicit emotion perception 
 
Concerns Additional Observations 
General Considerations 
Test-retest reliability is rarely evaluated but is critical. A number 
of contextual factors are known to influence judgments, 
including a perceiver’s internal state. 
Test-retest assessments are rarely done for practical reasons. 
Participants are typically asked to infer emotional meaning in 
exaggerated facial configurations. This reduces the ecological 
validity of the findings for how people infer emotional meaning 
in faces in the real world. The facial configurations used in most 
experiments (see Figure 4) are caricatures – they are exaggerated 
to maximally distinguish one from the another. Caricatures are 
easier to label (categorize) than are typical stimuli, particularly 
when the categories in question are highly interrelated 
(Goldstone, Steyvers, & Rogosky, 2003). 
Exaggerated facial configurations have greater “source clarity” 
(Ekman, Friesen & Ellsworth, 1972) 
Participants are typically asked to infer emotional meaning in 
highly selected facial configurations. 
In early studies, a smaller set of exaggerated facial 
configurations were culled from much larger sets of posed faces 
(involving several thousand faces; for a discussion, see Gendron 
& Barrett, 2017; Russell, 1994).  
Participants are typically asked to infer emotional meaning in 
static, non-moving facial configurations (i.e., in photographs 
rather than movies). This reduces the ecological validity of the 
findings for how people infer emotional meaning in faces in the 
real world. In the real world, people have to infer when a set of 
There is information in the dynamics of facial movements (Jack 
& Schyns, 2017; Krumhuber, Kappas & Manstead, 2013), but 
dynamic facial movements, particularly when they are 
spontaneous, do not always produce higher levels of agreement 
in emotion perception studies. Dynamic movements add realism, 
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movements begin and end; this is called discrimination or 
detection).  
intensity and improve levels of agreement primarily when 
movements are degraded or are artificial 
Participants are typically asked to infer emotional meaning in 
posed, rather than spontaneous, facial configurations.  
Spontaneous or candid facial configurations typically produce 
much lower levels of agreement in emotion perception studies 
(e.g., Kayyal & Russell, 2013; Naab & Russell, 2007). 
Only a single task used in most experiments (i.e., participants are 
asked to infer emotion in facial configurations via one method of 
responding). Ideally, multiple tasks should be used with the 
same population of participants to see if convergent results are 
obtained.  
This approach is rarely taken, but for an example, see Crivelli et 
al., 2016; Gendron et al., 2014; Gendron et al., 2018). 
Most experiments ask participants to infer emotion in a 
disembodied face, alone, without context. This reduces the 
ecological validity of the findings for how people infer 
emotional meaning in faces in the real world.  
A growing number of experiments now show that context is an 
important, and sometimes dominant, source of information when 
people infer emotional meaning in a facial configuration. See 
Box 3 in SOM. For example, Situational information tends to 
dominate perception of emotion in faces both when situations 
are common, everyday (Carrera-Levillain & Fernández-Dols, 
1994) and even when situations are more ambiguous than the 
exaggerated facial configurations being judged (Carroll & 
Russell, 1996, Study 3). 
 
Many studies do not report evidence about the specificity of 
emotion perceptions, or the frequency with which people infer 
the non-intended emotional meaning to a facial configuration. 
Until recently, the large majority of experiments included only 
one pleasant emotion category (happiness) among several 
unpleasant emotion categories (anger, fear, sadness, etc.). This 
may be one reason that agreement rates are so high for smiles. 
In the last few years, experiments are now including a larger 
variety of pleasant emotion categories (pride, awe, gratitude, 
etc.), but there continues to be debate over whether or not they 
expect these emotion categories are expressed with consistent, 
specific facial configurations. 
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Choice-From Array: matching photos of facial configurations and emotion words (with or without brief stories) 
Response options are limited to those provided in the task 
Words influence how the brain processes visual inputs from 
faces (e.g., Gendron et al., 2012; Doyle & Lindquist, 2018). 
Stories can prime action perceptions, as well (Gendron et al., in 
press). More generally, choice-from-array tasks have been 
shown to encourage biased perceptual responding using a signal 
detection analysis (e.g., DeCarlo 2012). 
Choice-from-array tasks are easy and efficient.  
The fact that participants are exposed to the same facial 
configurations and emotion words over and over allows them to 
learn the intended pairings even if they don’t know them to 
begin with (Nelson & Russell, 2016). 
 
An emotion word does not necessarily have a one-to-one 
correspondence to a single emotion category for all people in a 
given culture (i.e., they may differ in emotional granularity; 
Barrett, 2004, 2017; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008) or people from 
different cultures. 
Concerns about individual word meaning is why choice-from-
array using stories is preferable. Also, choice-from-array tasks 
are usually straightforward for participants to understand.  
A small range of answers are pre-determined by the 
experimenter, making it easier for participants to provide the 
answers scientists expect. For example, by constraining which 
words participants were allowed to choose from, frowns were 
consensually labeled as fear, wide-eyed gasping faces were 
labeled as surprise (Russell, 1993). Scowling faces are more 
likely to be perceived as fearful when paired with the description 
of danger (Carroll & Russell, 1996, Study 1) and appear 
determined or puzzled depending on the story they are presented 
with (Carroll & Russell, 1996, Study 2). 
Choice-from-array responses are easy for scientists to score. 
Most studies using continuous judgments (rather than forced 
choice) find that participants do not infer emotional meaning in 
facial configurations in a yes/no or on/off sort of way (Russell, 
1994). 
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People are asked to make yes/no decisions about assigning a 
facial configuration to an emotion category. Multiple emotion 
words may apply to a single configuration (i.e., people might 
infer more than one emotional meaning in a face), but the option 
to infer multiple emotional meanings rarely given to participants. 
Continuous judgments, such as on a Likert-type scale ranging 
from one to seven, would solve both of these problems, and also 
allow analysis of the similarity among facial configurations 
(which evidence shows is important, e.g., Jack et al., 2016; 
Kayal & Russell, 2013). Similarity allows scientists to discover 
the emotional meanings that people implicitly assign to a facial 
configuration, rather than having people explicitly state them 
(see further discussion of similarity below). 
A participant might decide that no emotion word provided 
applies to a facial configuration, but the option to respond this 
way is rarely given to participants (they are usually forced to 
choose an emotion word; for discussion, see Frank & Stennett, 
2001).  
See Cordaro et al. (2016) for an example of this design feature. 
If a participant hears a story and is choose between two faces 
(e.g., a scowl and smile), she can give the expected answer (e.g., 
scowl) simply by figuring out that smile is NOT correct. For 
example, after hearing a story about anger, a participant is shown 
a scowl and a smile and can choose the scowl merely by 
realizing the smile is not correct (on the basis of valence). This is 
similar to getting an answer right on a multiple-choice test by 
eliminating all the alternatives—you don’t actually know the 
right answer, but you figured it out because of the structure of 
the task. A similar point can be made about showing a single 
face and asking participants to label it with a word by selecting 
from among a small set of options. Participants use a process of 
elimination strategy: words that are not chosen on prior trials are 
selected more frequently, inflating agreement levels 
(DiGirolamo & Russell, 2017). 
If a participant hears a story about anger and must choose 
between a scowl and a smile, she can figure out that the scowl is 
correct merely because she is distinguishing between negative 
(scowl) and positive (smile). If a participant hears a story about 
anger and must choose between a scowl and a frown, he can 
figure out that the scowl is correct merely because he is 
distinguishing between high arousal (scowl) and low arousal 
(frown).  
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In tasks that involve brief stories or vignettes about emotion, 
only one typical story is offered for each emotion category, 
making it more difficult to observe any variation within a 
category.  
 
Free Sorting: photos of facial configurations are sorted into groupings, such that each grouping represents a category 
Face-to-Cue Matching: matching photos of facial configurations to a recording of posed vocalization 
Most participants still spontaneously use words to guide their 
sorting and organize their groupings. 
Ideal for preverbal participants or those with semantic deficits 
(e.g., Lindquist et al., 2014).  
Similarity Judgments Between Pairs of facial configurations 
Perceptual Matching: Indicating whether or not two photos of facial configurations belong to the same emotion category 
It is inefficient and time consuming to judge the similarity of all 
pairs of facial configurations. For a set of 100 faces, this requires 
(100*100)/2 = 5,000 different similarity judgments.  
 
Participants can arrange face stimuli on a computer screen and 
all pairwise similarity judgments can be computed (the SPAM 
method proposed by Goldstone, 1994; e.g., see Hout et al., 
2013). This procedure also solves the problem that the same pair 
of stimuli will have a different judged similarity depending on 
which item is presented first if face pairs are presented 
sequentially presented faces (the judged similarity of two 
objects, A and B, can depend on the order in which they are 
presented; the similarity of A vs B is not always judged to be the 
same as B vs A; Tversky, 1977). Other advantages are that 
categories can be discovered, rather than prescribed, and verbal 
associations are minimized. Analyses of similarity judgments 
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typically yield more continuous similarity relations between 
emotion categories along affective dimensions (see Russell & 
Barrett, 1999). 
Free-Labeling: photos of facial configurations are labeled with words offered by participants (unconstrained by 
experimenter) 
Forcing people to translate faces into words is not a good match, 
since much of the information from faces cannot be easily 
captured in words (Ekman, 1994). 
This is not a special criticism of free labeling studies -- it applies 
to all studies that ask people to label a face with words, 
including the choice-from-array tasks.  
Facial expressions did not evolve to represent specific verbal 
labels (Ekman, 1994, p. 270). 
“Regardless of the language, of whether the culture is Western 
or Eastern, industrialized or preliterate, these facial expressions 
are labeled with the same emotion terms: happiness, sadness, 
anger, fear, disgust, and surprise" (Ekman, 1972, p. 278).  
There is no widely accepted method for categorizing freely 
provided responses. (Ekman, 1994, p. 274).  
Most scientists group together similar words (synonyms), so that 
a variety of words can be used to show evidence of a correct 
response (e.g., a frowning face, which is the proposed 
expression for sadness, could be labeled as "sad," "grieving," 
"disappointed," "blue," "despairing," and so on. Scientists 
routinely use databases that indicate synonyms, like WORDNET 
(used in Srinivasan & Martinez (2018). Also, it is possible to do 
data-driven groupings of emotion words into semantic categories 
(e.g., Jack et al., 2016; Shaver et al., 1987). The more serious 
problem is that early studies using free-labeling (e.g., Boucher & 
Carlson, 1980; Izard, 1971) did not provide enough information 
in the method sections about how freely provided labels were 
grouped.  
Using freely chosen labels in a study of different cultures is 
difficult because it may be hard to find adequate translations 
(Ekman, 1994, p. 274). A given emotion word, like sadness, can 
correspond to different emotion concepts (with different 
This is not a special criticism of free labeling studies – it holds 
for any experiment that uses emotion words requiring 
translation, including choice-from-array tasks. A standard 
solution to this problem is to use both forward and backward 
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features) in different languages (e.g., Wierzbicka, 1986, 2014). 
A single emotion word in one language can refer to more than 
one concept in another language (e.g., Pavlenko, 2014). Some 
languages have no one-to-one translation for English emotion 
words and some emotion concepts in other languages are not 
directly translatable into English emotion words (see Barrett, 
2017; Russell, 1991; Jack et al., 2016).  
translation (e.g., a word spoken in Hadzane is translated into 
English and then back translated into Hadzane; if there is no 
broken telephone, then the translation has fidelity). An even 
better method is to elicit features for the emotion words in 
question, including typicality of those features, to determine the 
fidelity of translation (e.g., de Mendoza et al., 2010) 
Scientifically, issues with translation are manageable if scientists 
allow phrases to stand in for specific words.  
Using only single words will always fail to capture much of the 
rich information in faces.  
Participants often provide multiple words or even longer 
descriptions of situations, behaviors, or behaviors in situations 
(e.g., see Gendron et al., 2014; Russell, 1994). Such data are 
time consuming to code and analyze. 
Even when participants are told that photographs are of people 
trying to express an emotion, they often offer non-emotion 
labels. For example, Izard (1971) found that people offered 
labels such as deliberating, clowning, skepticism, pain, and so on 
(as reported in Russell, 1994). 
This is not necessarily evidence that participants did not 
understand the task asked of them. It might be evidence that 
these facial configurations are not specific for expressing 
emotions. 
Note. Response tasks are arrayed in order from those that constrain participants’ responses most, making it difficult to observe evidence that can disconfirm 
commonsense beliefs about emotion to those that are least constrained, making it easier to observe variation and disconfirm commonsense beliefs. Choice-from-
array = participants are shown a facial configuration and asked to infer its emotional meaning by choosing an emotion word from a small set of words; or, 
participants presented with an emotion word that labels an emotion category (e.g., sadness) or a brief story about a typical instance of an emotion category (e.g. 
“the boy’s much loved dog just died and he is sad”) along with two or three photographs of faces (typically posed into one of the configurations presented in 
Figure 4) and then asked to choose the facial configuration that they judge best matches the emotional episode described in the word or vignette. Typically, each 
emotion category is represented by a single scenario. Free sorting = Participants are given photographs of facial configurations and asked to sort them into 
emotion categories by piles on a big table or on a computer screen. Pairwise similarity judgments = participants rate the similarity of all possible pairs of face 
stimuli (e.g., on a scale of 0-6). For detailed design concerns about choice-from-array tasks, see Russell (1994, 1995). 
.
Facial Expressions of Emotion  170 
 
Table 6: Culturally common facial configurations discovered using the reverse correlation 
method 
 
 
Facial 
Configuration 
AU 
Description 
Associated Emotion Words – 
U.K. 
Associated Emotion Words 
- China 
  
 
 
6+12+13+14 
 
 
delighted, joy, happy, 
cheerful, contempt, pride 
 
 
joyful, delighted, happy, 
glad, feel well, pleasantly 
surprised, embarrassed, pride 
 
 
 
4+20+24+43 
 
 
fear, scared, anxious, upset, 
miserable, sad, depressed, 
shame, embarrassed 
 
 
afraid, anxious, distressed, 
broken-hearted, sorrow and 
sadness, having a hard time, 
grief, dismay, anguish, 
worry, vexed, unhappy, 
shame, despise 
  
 
 
2+5+26+27 
 
 
ecstatic, excited, surprised, 
frightened, terrified 
 
 
amazed, greatly surprised, 
alarmed and panicky, scared, 
fear 
 
 
 
7+9+16+22 
 
 
hate, disgust, fury, rage, anger 
 
 
disgusted, bristle with anger, 
furious, wild wrath, storm of 
fury, storm of anger, 
indignant, rage 
Note. Facial configurations extracted using reverse correlation from 62 models of facial configurations. Red coloring 
indicates stronger AU presence and blue indicates weakest AU presence. Some words and phrases that refer to 
emotion categories in Chinese are not considered emotion categories in English. Modified from Jack et al. (2016) 
and reproduced with permission. 
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Table 7: Summary of cross-cultural emotion perception in small-scale societies 
 Unsupported Weak Support Moderate Support Strong Support 
 Culture N Citation Culture N Citation Culture N Citation Culture N Citation 
Free-labeling 
Fore, PNGa 100  Sorenson (1975), Sample 
2 c 
      Sadong, Borneo a1 15 Sorenson 
(1975), Sample 
4 b 
Bahinemo, PNG 71 Sorenson (1975) , 
Sample 3 
         
Hadza, Tanzania 43 Gendron et al. (2018), 
Study 1 
         
Trobrianders, PNG 32f  Crivelli et al. (2017), 
Study 1 
         
Cue-to-cue 
matching 
   Shuar, Ecuador 23 Bryant & Barrett 
(2008), Study 2 
      
Choice-from array: 
Matching face and 
words 
 
Fore, PNGa 32 Ekman et al. (1969)c          
Mwani, 
Mozambique 
36ef Crivelli, Jarillo et al. 
(2016), Study 2 
      Sadong, Borneo a1 15 Ekman et al. 
(1969) b 
Trobrianders, PNG  24f Crivelli et al. (2017), 
Study 2 
Dioula, Burkina 
Fasoa 
39 Tracy & Robbins 
(2008), Study 2 
      
Trobrianders, PNG 68 ef Crivelli, Jarillo et al. 
(2016), Study 1 
         
Trobrianders, PNG 36 f Crivelli, Russell et al. 
(2016), Study 1a 
         
Choice-from array: 
Matching face and 
scenario 
Hadza, Tanzania 54 Gendron et al. (2018), 
Study 2 
   Dani, New 
Guineaa 
34 Described in 
Ekman (1972) g 
   
         Fore, PNG a1 189, 
130 e 
Ekman & 
Friesen (1971) d 
      Fore, PNG a1 189, 
130 e 
Sorenson (1975), 
Sample 1 d 
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Notes. Findings summarized for anger, disgust, fear, sadness and surprise; happiness is the only pleasant category tested in all studies but Tracy & Robins (2008) 
and therefore perception can be (and likely is) guided by distinguishing valence in those studies. All studies used photographs of posed facial configurations that 
are similar to those in Figure 4, except Crivelli, Jarillo et al. (2016), Study 2 and Crivelli et al. (2017), Study 1. The Bryant & HC Barrett (2008) study was 
designed to examine emotion perception from vocalizations but is included because perceivers matched them to faces; in addition, participants were tested in a 
second language (Spanish) in which they received training. All choice-from-array studies did not carefully control whether foils and target facial configurations 
could be distinguished by valence and/or arousal except Gendron et al. 2018, Study 2. N = sample size. All participants were adults unless otherwise specified as 
adol=adolescents, ch=children. PNG = Papua New Guinea. Unsupported = reliability and specificity at chance, or any level of reliability above chance combined 
with evidence of no specificity. Weak support = reliability between 20% and 40% (weak) for at least a single emotion category other than happiness combined 
above chance specificity for that category or reliability between 41% and 70% (moderate) for at least a single category other than happiness with unknown 
specificity. Moderate support = reliability between 41% and 70% (moderate) combined with any evidence of above chance specificity those categories or 
reliability above 70% (strong) for at least a single category other than happiness with unknown specificity. Strong support = strong evidence of reliability (above 
70%) and strong evidence of specificity for at least a single emotion category other than happiness. Superscript a: Specificity levels were not reported. 
Superscript a1: Specificity inferred from reported results. Superscript b: The sample size, marginal means and exact pattern of errors reported for the Sadong 
samples is identical in Sorenson (1975), Sample 3 and Ekman et al. (1969); Sorenson described using a free-labeling method and Ekman et al. (1969) described 
using a choice-from-array method in which participants were shown photographs and asked to choose a label from a small list of emotion words; Ekman (1994) 
indicated, however, that he did not use a free-labeling method, implying that the samples are distinct. Superscript c: Sorenson (1975), Sample 2 included three 
groups of Fore participants (those with little, moderate and most other group contact). The pattern of findings is nearly identical for the subgroup with the most 
contact and the data reported for the Fore in Ekman et al. (1969); again, Sorenson described using a free-labeling method and Ekman et al. (1969) described 
using a choice-from-array method. It is questionable whether the Sadong and the Fore subgroup should be considered isolated (see Sorenson, 1975, p. 362 and 
363), but we include them here to avoid falsely dichotomizing cultures as “isolated from” versus “exposed to” one another (Fridlund, 1994; Gewald, 2010). 
Superscript d: these are likely the same sample because the sample sizes and pattern of data are identical for all emotion categories except for the fear category, 
which is extremely similar, and for the disgust category which includes responses for contempt in Ekman & Friesen (1971) but was kept separate in Sorenson 
(1975). Superscript e: participants were children. Superscript f: participants were adolescents. Superscript g:The Dani sample reported in Ekman (1972) is likely 
a subset of the data from Ekman, Heider, Friesen, and Heider (unpublished manuscript).  
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Table 8: Recommendations for reading scientific studies about emotion 
1. Take note of whether an experiment is studying expressive stereotypes or more variable facial movements. 
2. Take note of data on specificity and generalizability; do not focus solely on reliability at above chance levels. 
3. Make a distinction between the data in an experiment (what was measured) and how those data are interpreted.  
4. Translate “emotional expressions” or “emotional displays” into “facial movements.”  
5. Translate “emotion recognition” into “emotion perception” or “emotion inference.” 
6. Translate “accuracy” to “agreement,” “consensus” or “reliability.” 
7. Give more weight to studies that measure facial movements or study the perception of facial movements made in more naturalistic settings. 
8. Take note of studies that measure or manipulate context. 
9. Field studies of people from small-scale, remote cultures are often less well-controlled than studies conducted in the laboratory, but they are invaluable in 
the information that they provide and should be valued. 
10. Remember that emotions are not understood as internal states in all cultures. In some cultures they are understood as situated actions.  
11. Do not skip the method and results sections and skip to the discussion to learn the results of an experiment. It is important to know what was measured and 
observed, not just how scientists interpret their measurements. 
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Table 9: Recommendations for future research 
 
General Recommendations 
▪ Take chances on studies that attempt to go beyond merely supporting traditional views of emotion. 
  
▪ Support papers that attempt to study facial movements in real life, measuring context, sampling across cultures even though these studies are often less well 
controlled than studies in the laboratory, or may use facial stimuli that are less familiar to reviewers than canonical stimulus sets. 
  
▪ Prioritize multidisciplinary studies that combine classical psychology methods with cognitive neuroscience, machine learning, etc. 
 
▪ Support larger scale studies that bridge the lab and the world, that study individual people across many contexts, and measure emotional episodes in high 
dimensional detail, including physical, psychological and social features; encourage multiple investigators with different areas of expertise to work together. 
  
▪ Support the development of computational approaches. 
 
▪ Create R&D teams that pair psychologists and cognitive scientists trained in the psychology of emotion with engineers and computer scientists. 
  
▪ Increase opportunities to test innovative methods and novel hypotheses, with the acknowledgement that such approaches are likely to elicit resistance from 
established scientists in the field of emotion. 
  
▪ Generate more studies to identify the underlying neural mechanisms of the production and perception of facial movements. 
  
▪ Direct funding to thornier but necessary new questions and be critical of projects that perpetuate past errors in emotion research. 
  
▪ Direct healthy skepticism to tests, measures, and interventions that rely upon assumptions about “reading facial expressions of emotion” that seem to ignore 
published evidence and/or ignore integration of contextual information along with facial cues. 
  
▪ Develop systematic, precise ways to describe and/or manipulate the dynamics of specific facial actions. 
Stimulus Selection Recommendations 
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Limitations in stimulus selection 
can bias results. 
▪ For perception studies, incorporate images from the wild (e.g., from multiple internet sources) to capture the full range of 
facial movements that humans produce in their everyday lives. 
  
▪ For both production studies (where stimuli are designated to evoke emotion) and perception studies, build variation into 
stimulus sets so conclusions about emotion categories are not inferred (or evoked) from limited stimuli. Consider randomly 
sampling a variety of stimuli for a given category and treating stimuli as a random variable. 
  
▪ For production studies, ensure that multiple stimuli per emotion category are used to evoke an emotion. 
Little is known about the dynamics 
of the production and perception of 
emotion signaling. 
▪ For perception studies, use dynamic images rather than rely on still images. For production studies, code the temporal 
dynamics of facial movements.   
  
▪ Attempt to determine full dynamics and the apex of an emotion signal, changes to AUs as signals emerge and recede, and 
whether the kinematics of distinct AUs are similar or different across sequences or phases of emotion signaling. 
  
▪ Ensure sufficient temporal resolution to allow for event segmentation to be assessed in perception studies. 
The role of context is hotly 
debated, but rarely measured. 
▪ Manipulate (or at least measure) the context in which target stimuli are perceived to evaluate whether data are truly stimulus-
specific or influenced by context features. 
  
▪ Describe in a systematic way the differences in context, whether for production or perception studies. Theories about the 
effects of context cannot be resolved until we address how to measure and quantify context. 
 
Sample Selection Recommendations 
Cross-cultural studies can provide 
powerful insights, but are limited in 
number and scope. 
▪ Quantify, as best as possible, participants’ degree of exposure to the west, as well as the amount and type of formal 
schooling made available to participants. 
  
▪ Harness technology to collect larger numbers of images and video sequences of facial movements across cultures. Use 
unlabeled classification approaches to discover emotion categories and their expressive forms, rather than continuing to ask 
whether other cultures are similar to the US. Remember that emotions and mental inferences may be understood differently 
in different cultures.   
Task and Method Design Recommendations 
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Measurement versus interpretation 
of emotion is often blurred in 
research studies. 
▪ Contrast more than one “emotion” category with a baseline, so that conclusions about a specific emotion category are not 
drawn from a comparison of an emotion versus a no emotion condition. 
  
▪ Compare multiple emotion categories to non-emotion categories in a given study.  
New insights about emotion are 
constrained by reliance on, and 
assumptions about, traditional 
categories. 
▪ Measure emotional episodes in a multimodal way and attempt to discover explicit criteria for when an emotion is present or 
absent. Such discovery may require within-person approaches. 
  
▪ Sample broader categories of possible emotion states than the limited categories used in prior research (move beyond 
categories such happiness, anger, sadness, fear, etc.). Test for variations in intensity within these categories and similarity 
across categories. 
  
▪ Unless a study design is completely data-driven, explicitly state the theoretical priors of the research team. The distinction is 
between whether you are seeking to discover versus verify emotion categories. Both approaches are valid, but should be 
clearly articulated. 
  
Data Analysis Recommendations 
Findings are limited by a failure to 
consider issues related to forward 
and reverse inference. 
▪ Address issues of reliability and specificity when presenting data on emotion expression and emotion perception. 
  
▪ Use formal signal detection analytics and information theoretic measures rather relying on frequency or levels of agreement. 
Consider using Bayesian methods so that the null hypothesis can be tested directly.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Explanatory frameworks guiding the science of emotion: The nature of emotion 
categories and their concepts. Figure is plotted along two dimensions. Horizontal: represents 
hypotheses about the surface similarities shared by instances of the same emotion category (e.g., 
the facial movements that express instances of the same emotion category). Vertical: represents 
hypotheses about the deep similarities in the mechanisms that cause instances of the same 
emotion category (e.g., to what extent do instances in the same category share deep, causal 
features?). Colors represent the type of emotion categories that are proposed in each theoretical 
framework (green = ad hoc, abstract categories; yellow = prototype or theory-based categories; 
red = natural kind categories). 
 
Figure 2. Example figures from recently published papers that reinforce the common belief of a 
one-to-one mapping between a single emotion category and a single facial configuration. A. 
Keltner et al., in press, Table 2, formatting modified. B. Shariff & Tracy, 2011, Figure 2.  
Permissions pending. 
 
Figure 3.Evaluation criteria: Reliability and specificity in relation to forward and reverse 
inference. Anger and fear are used as the example categories. 
 
Figure 4. Facial action ensembles for commonsense facial configurations. Facial action coding 
system (FACS) codes that correspond to the commonsense expressive configuration in adults. A 
is proposed expression for anger and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for anger (AUs 4, 
5, 7, and 23). B is proposed expression for disgust and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code 
for disgust (AU 10). C is proposed expression for fear and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS 
code for fear (AUs 1, 2, and 5 or 5 and 20). D is proposed expression for happiness and 
corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for the so-called Duchenne smile (AUs 6 and 12). E is 
proposed expression for sadness and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for sadness (AUs 
1, 4, 11 and 15 or 1, 4, 15 and 17). F is proposed expression for surprise and corresponds to 
prescribed EMFACS code for surprise (AUs 1, 2, 5, and 26). It was originally proposed that 
infants express emotions with the same facial configurations as adults. Later research revealed 
morphological differences between the proposed expressive configurations for adults and infants. 
Only three out of a possible nineteen proposed configurations for negative emotions from the 
infant coding scheme were the same as the configurations proposed for adults (Oster et al., 
1992). G, adapted from Keltner et al., in press, Table 2. H. adapted from Shariff & Tracy, 2011, 
Figure 2.  Permissions pending. 
 
Figure 5. Meta-analysis of facial movements during emotional episodes: A summary of effect 
sizes across studies (Duran et al., 2017). Effect sizes are computed as correlations or proportions 
(as reported in the original experiments). Results include experiments that reported a 
correspondence between a facial configuration and its hypothesized emotion category and those 
that reported a correspondence between individual AUs of that facial configuration and the 
relevant emotion category; meta-analytic summaries for entire ensembles of AUs only (the facial 
configurations specified in Figure 2) were even lower than those that appear here. 
 
Figure 6: Comparing posed and spontaneous facial movements. Results from Table 6, Cordaro 
et al. (2017), degree of overlap between the hypothesized configuration of facial movements for 
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each emotion category and the “International Core Patterns” derived from participants’ 
expressive poses; Gabonese participants in Elfenbein et al. (2007), reliability for the anger 
category is for AU4 + AU5 only; proportion data only from Duran et al., (2017). 
 
Figure 7. Examples of virtual humans. Virtual humans are software-based artifacts that look like 
and act like people. (A) Feng et al, 2017; (B) Zoll et al., 2006; (C) Hoyt et al., 2003; (D) 
Marsella et al. 2000.  
Figure 8 Emotion perception findings. (A) Average effect sizes for perceptions of facial 
configurations from Elfenbein & Ambady (2002), in which 95% of the articles summarized used 
choice-from-array to measure participants’ emotion inferences. (B) Free-labeling of facial 
configurations across five language groups from Srinivasan & Martinez (2018). IDs chosen 
represent the best match to the commonsense facial configurations in Figure 4 based on AUs 
present. No configuration discovered in this study exactly match the AU configurations proposed 
by Darwin or documented in prior research. Proportion of times participants offered emotion 
category labels (or their synonyms) are reported. According to standard scientific criteria, 
universal expressions of emotion should elicit agreement rates that are considerably higher than 
those reported here, generally in the 70 ± 90% range, even when methodological constraints are 
relaxed (Haidt & Keltner, 1999). Specificity data were not available for the Elfenbein & Ambady 
(2002) meta-analysis. 
 
Figure 9. Map of cross-cultural studies of emotion perception in small-scale societies. People in 
small scale societies typically live in groupings of several hundred to several thousand that 
maintain autonomy in social, political and economic spheres. (A). Epoch 1 studies, published 
between 1969 and 1975, were geographically constrained to societies in the South Pacific. (B). 
Epoch 2 studies, published between 2008 and 2017, sample from a broader geographic range 
including Africa and South America, and are more diverse in the ecological and social contexts 
of the societies tested. This type of diversity is a necessary condition for discovering the extent 
of cultural variation in psychological phenomena (Medin et al., 2017). Reproduced with 
permission from Gendron et al. (2018). 
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Figure 1. Explanatory frameworks guiding the science of emotion: The nature of emotion categories and their concepts.  
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6+7+12+25+26+
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Interest 
 
 
1+2+12 
 
Sympathy 
 
 
1+17+24+57 
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Figure 2. Example figures that reinforce the common belief of a one-to-one mapping between a single emotion category and a single 
facial configuration.  
 
A. Keltner et al., in press, Table 2, formatting modified. B. Shariff & Tracy, 2011, Figure 2.  Permissions pending. 
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Figure 3. Reliability and specificity in relation to forward and reverse inference. 
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Facial Expressions of Emotion  184 
 
A  B     C        D            E     F 
 
 
G 
 
 
 
H 
 
 
 
Facial Expressions of Emotion  185 
 
Figure 4. Facial action ensembles for commonsense facial configurations. Facial action coding system (FACS) codes are shown for 
six expressive configurations in adults. A is proposed expression for anger and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for anger 
(AUs 4, 5, 7, and 23). B is proposed expression for disgust and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for disgust (AU 10). C is 
proposed expression for fear and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for fear (AUs 1, 2, and 5 or 5 and 20). D is proposed 
expression for happiness and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for the so-called Duchenne smile (AUs 6 and 12). E is 
proposed expression for sadness and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for sadness (AUs 1, 4, 11 and 15 or 1, 4, 15 and 17). F 
is proposed expression for surprise and corresponds to prescribed EMFACS code for surprise (AUs 1, 2, 5, and 26). It was originally 
proposed that infants express emotions with the same facial configurations as adults. Later research revealed morphological 
differences between the proposed expressive configurations for adults and infants. Only three out of a possible nineteen proposed 
configurations for negative emotions from the infant coding scheme were the same as the configurations proposed for adults (Oster et 
al., 1992). G, adapted from Keltner et al., in press, Table 2. H. adapted from Shariff & Tracy, 2011, Figure 2.  Permissions pending. 
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Figure 5. Meta-analysis of facial movements during emotional episodes.  
 
Effect sizes are computed as correlations or proportions (as reported in the original experiments). Results shown here included 
experiments that reported a correspondence between a facial configuration and its hypothesized emotion category combined with 
those that reported a correspondence between a partial configuration (any individual AU comprising that facial configuration) and the 
relevant emotion category; meta-analytic summaries for entire ensembles of AUs only (the facial configurations specified in Figure 4) 
were even lower than those that appear here. Colored bars show correlations and proportions as averages across the studies (number of 
studies given by N), vertical black line indicates the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 6: Comparing posed and spontaneous facial movements.  
Results from Table 6, Cordaro et al. (2017), percent of overlap between the hypothesized expressive form for each emotion category 
and the “International Core Patterns” derived from participants’ expressive poses. For Elfenbein et al. (2007), proportion of Gabonese 
participants who posed the hypothesized universal facial configuration for each emotion category, reliability for the anger category is 
for AU4 + AU5 only. Proportion data from Duran et al., (2017) are also presented for comparison. 
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Figure 7. Virtual humans: Examples.(A) Feng et al, 2017; (B) Zoll et al., 2006; (C) Hoyt et al., 2003; (D) Marsella et al. 2000.  
Permissions pending. 
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 % EMOTION LABELS OFFERED 
 
 Anger Disgust Fear Happiness Sadness Surprise Non-Affective Action 
 
39.92  7.19  7.93  12.92 3.96 
 
11.38 24.94  2.63 10.05  12.39  
 
4.14 4.01 34.75 4.12 4.13 18.61 2.73  
 
   48.84  3.17 1.84 10.01 
 
8.31  8.60  37.41  13.40 
 
 
 
2.16 6.02 12.23 6.01  31.90  1.82 
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Figure 8 Emotion perception findings.A. Average effect sizes for perceptions of facial configurations from Elfenbein & Ambady (2002), in 
which 95% of the articles summarized used choice-from-array to measure participants’ emotion inferences. B. Free-labeling of facial 
configurations across five language groups from Srinivasan & Martinez (2018). IDs chosen represent the best match to the commonsense facial 
configurations in Figure 4 based on AUs present. No configuration discovered in this study exactly match the AU configurations proposed by 
Darwin or documented in prior research. Proportion of times participants offered emotion category labels (or their synonyms) are reported. 
According to standard scientific criteria, universal expressions of emotion should elicit agreement rates that are considerably higher than those 
reported here, generally in the 70 ± 90% range, even when methodological constraints are relaxed (Haidt & Keltner, 1999). Specificity data 
were not available for the Elfenbein & Ambady (2002) meta-analysis. 
 
  
Facial Expressions of Emotion  193 
 
A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sadong of Borneo*
Ekman et al. (1969) Sadong of Borneo
Sorenson (1975)
Bahinemo of 
Papua New 
Guinea
Sorenson (1975)
Fore of Papua 
New Guinea
Ekman & Freisen
(1971)
Dani of Indonesia 
(Western New Guinea)
Ekman (1972)
Dani of Indonesia
(Western New Guinea)
Ekman, Heider et al. 
(unpublished)
Fore of Papua 
New Guinea (2 
samples)
Sorenson (1975)
Fore of Papua 
New Guinea
Ekman, 
Sorenson & 
Friesen (1969)*
Facial Expressions of Emotion  194 
 
B 
 
Figure 9. Map of cross-cultural studies of emotion perception in small-scale societies.  
People in small scale societies typically live in groupings of several hundred to several thousand that maintain autonomy in social, political and 
economic spheres. A. Epoch 1 studies, published between 1969 and 1975, were geographically constrained to societies in the Pacific area. B. 
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Epoch 2 studies, published between 2008 and 2017, sample from a broader geographic range including Africa and South America, and are 
more diverse in the ecological and social contexts of the societies tested. This type of diversity is a necessary condition for discovering the 
extent of cultural variation in psychological phenomena (Medin et al., 2017). Reproduced with permission from Gendron et al. (2018)
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Box 1:  Google Search Evidence Demonstrating the Existence of a Common View of 
Emotional Expressions 
This box provides perhaps the simplest characterization of the “common view” of 
emotional expressions: how it is represented in the internet.  It is important to note that we are 
not suggesting that the common view is necessarily the view that individual scientists personally 
hold, nor the view that all laypeople personally hold.  Instead, it is the view that most laypeople 
think science supports, and the view that many scientists, intentionally or unintentionally, have 
perpetuated in the literature.  It is the modal view that computer scientists, educators, and 
psychiatrists draw from, in the assumption that it is the view currently best supported by 
scientific evidence; and this is the assumption we evaluate in our paper. 
The items retrieved from a Google search represent the consensus of our culture in many 
ways, and certainly represent what most people take as a summary of the conclusions best 
supported by current science, broadly conceived.  Since different search histories and browsers 
may produce somewhat different results, we asked 23 students and post-doctoral fellows to 
search the term “emotional facial expressions,” and send us a screenshot of their first page of 
results.  
This search produced web pages very similar to the small reproduction below.  In all 
pages that included images (21/23; like the one at the upper right in the example), the first and 
most prominent image shows the 6 “basic” facial expressions of emotion; in several this was the 
only image produced.  In all searches that included the box “People also ask” (7/23), the first 
item listed was “What are the 6 universally accepted facial expressions?” 
In 22/23 searches, the very first hit, titled “Reading facial expressions of emotion,” brings 
up an APA article (https://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2011/05/facial-expressions.aspx) that 
leads with a section on the universality of facial expressions; Figure 1 in that article is a picture 
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of the facial configurations that are hypothesized to express anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, surprise and contempt and the APA article concludes with “Because facial expressions 
of emotion are part of our evolutionary history and are a biologically innate ability, we all have 
the ability to read them.”  The second common hit (15/23; this and subsequent hits get truncated 
because not all searches had screens that permitted a long list) is to a website 
(https://thoughtcatalog.com/january-nelson/2018/06/list-of-emotions/) that lists the 6 basic 
emotions together with their facial expressions (the source of the most common image retrieved 
by the search).  The next most common hit in the list (14/23, usually third or fourth entry) is a 
2018 news from Science Daily titled, “How emotions in facial expressions are understood.”  It 
mentions by name only the following emotions:  fear, happiness, surprise, anger, sadness.  It 
covers a research paper that showed participants “images of faces expressing the six emotions 
and one neutral expression”.  The next most common hit is typically a research paper; in our 
sample it was https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5152920/ (10/23 hits) which is an 
article investigating emotion perception from faces, using as stimuli only photos of the six basic 
emotions.  Another common research article here was 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2852199/, whose very first sentence in the 
abstract is, “Emotional faces communicate both the emotional state and behavioral intentions of 
an individual.”  
These searches are complemented by the Wikipedia entry for “facial expressions,” as 
well as by later search hits that paint a more nuanced picture and nearly always explicitly note 
that there is considerable controversy about how reliably we can judge emotion from faces, what 
categories of emotional expression there are, and whether emotional facial expressions are 
culturally universal.  Our conclusion from this google search is twofold. First, there is 
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overwhelming evidence that the modal view that is available on the internet with a casual search 
represents the common view: that specific facial expressions correspond to specific emotions 
(usually about 6), and that these can be reliably perceived.  Second, closer scrutiny notes that the 
common view has strong critiques.  These two facts motivated our paper and the aim to produce 
the most thorough review of the evidence. 
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Box Figure 1-1. Screenshot of the first page of a google search for “emotional facial expressions.” 
Box 2: Theoretical Frameworks and Their Relation to Emotion Categories 
An instance of emotion can be described by a variety of features: physical features (such 
as patterns of expressive facial movements, vocal acoustics, autonomic nervous system changes, 
and neural activity), affective features that capture what the instance feels like (e.g., how pleasant 
or unpleasant the episode feels, how arousing it feels; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Russell & 
Barrett, 1999), appraisal features that refer to how the situation is experienced (e.g., whether the 
situation is experienced as novel or familiar, as conducive to one’s immediate goals or not, and 
so on; Barrett, Mesquita et al., 2007; Clore & Ortony, 2008, 2013; Scherer et al., 2017) and 
functional features that refer to the goals that a person is attempting to meet (e.g., to avoid a 
predator, to get closer to someone, to win a competition, etc.; e.g., Adolphs, 2017; Lazarus, 
1993). An emotion category is a grouping of emotional episodes that share some feature or set of 
features in common.  
Many debates about the nature of emotion boil down to disagreements about the nature of 
the similarities shared by instances of the same emotion category and the degree of variation in 
the relevant features, as well as potential similarity and differences in features across emotion 
categories. These debates can be summarized by two dimensions, as depicted in Figure 1: The 
horizontal dimension represents hypotheses about the surface similarities across instances of the 
same emotion category, such as being expressed by similar patterns of facial movements. And 
the vertical dimension represents hypotheses about the deep similarities across instances of the 
same emotion category, such as sharing the same neural circuitry.  
Similarities and Variation in Surface Features 
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In this paper, we are primarily concerned with the horizontal dimension representing the 
similarity and variation in surface features, such as the facial movements that express instances 
of emotion. At one end of the “surface” continuum, basic emotion approaches (e.g., Ekman, 
1972; Tracy & Randles, 2011) and the discrete emotion approach (e.g., Izard, 2007, 2010; Izard, 
Woodburn & Finlon, 2010), in their original form, propose that anger, sadness, fear, disgust, 
happiness and surprise are each spontaneously expressed with universal configurations of unique 
facial movements (as depicted in Figure 1). These approaches acknowledge some variation in the 
facial movements that express the instances of each category, but they are hypothesized to result 
from processes that are external to the processes that caused the emotional instance, such as 
display rules, cultural learning, emotion regulation, and so on. Therefore, instances within the 
same emotion category would be expected to be relatively similar in their expressions (high 
reliability) across contexts, people and time, and instances of different emotion categories are 
expected to be relatively unique in their expressions (high specificity). Updated basic emotion 
theory allows for more variation in expressions within a category, assuming that instances of an 
emotion category vary around one supposed “best instance” (the prototype) that is either most 
typical or most frequent in nature.43 Nonetheless, each instance of an emotion category is 
hypothesized to share enough of a characteristic facial expression that is consistently present and 
recognizably different from the patterns found in other emotion categories (for specific 
quotations, see Ekman, 1992, p. 550; Ekman & Cordaro, 2001, p. 364; Levenson, 2011, p. 379; 
Scarantino & Griffiths, pp. 448-449).  
Intermediate along the horizontal dimension is the component process model of emotion 
which proposes that sequences of evaluations, referred to as appraisal checks, drive the dynamics 
of facial movements that express emotion (Scherer, Mortillaro & Mehu, 2017; Scherer et al., 
Facial Expressions of Emotion  202 
 
2018). This approach belongs to a collection of causal appraisal approaches, which characterize 
appraisals as more than descriptive features of an emotional instance – they are considered to be 
actual causal cognitive mechanisms that produce instances of emotion, including how a situation 
is experienced and the associated facial expressions as components of the instance. Causal 
appraisal approaches acknowledge the possibility that, in principle, different temporally extended 
patterns of appraisals can cause instances of the same emotion category, and therefore is 
consistent with a larger variety of facial configurations that can express the emotion (for 
discussion, see Barrett, 2017c; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Scherer et al., 2017). In practice, however, 
this possible variation remains largely unexplored in scientific experiments. 
At the other end of the continuum are approaches that explicitly predict substantial, 
situated variation within categories and similarity between categories, e.g., the theory of 
constructed emotion (Barrett, 2012, 2013, 2017a, b); core affect theory (Russell, 2003); 
functional approaches to emotion (relevant references, see Adolphs, 2017; Anderson & Adolphs, 
2018; Campos et al., 1994); and descriptive appraisal approaches (e.g., Ortony & Clore, 2013; 
for a discussion, see Barrett, 2017c; Gross & Barrett, 2011). That is, they predict, in advance, 
that instances of the same emotion category are highly variable in their expressions (a specific 
set of facial movements have low reliability as expressions across people, situations and cultures) 
and instances of different emotion categories or even non-emotion categories are similar in their 
expressions (a given set of facial movements have low specificity as expressions of a single 
emotion category). For example, the theory of constructed emotion proposes that facial 
expressions of emotion are intrinsically constructed in a context-dependent way that has been 
learned in a particular culture.  
Similarities and Differences in Deep Features 
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At the top of the “deep” continuum, basic emotion approaches propose that anger, 
sadness, fear, disgust, happiness and surprise are each caused by their own set of dedicated 
neural circuits (Tracy & Randles, 2011), a hypothetical affect program (Ekman & Cordaro, 
2011), or a set of computations (Bach & Dayan, 2017). Some approaches allow for considerable 
variation in the physical causes of emotion and instead propose that each category shares a 
universal, functional similarity across situations (e.g., fear is the desire to escape from a predator; 
Adolphs, 2017; Anderson & Adolphs, 2018; Campos et al., 1994). At the bottom end of the 
continuum, theoretical approaches hypothesize that an emotion category does not exist in the 
brain as a fixed neural circuit, a fixed computation, or a fixed function. Instead, the human brain 
is thought to construct an emotion category on the fly, as needed for a situation-specific goal, 
with the help of the emotion concepts that person has acquired using the language they speak 
(Barrett, 2017a, b). This type of ad hoc category is called a goal-based category, because the 
similarity of its instances is based on the goal that the instances serve in a particular situation at a 
particular moment in time (Barsalou, 1983, 1985; Barsalou et al., 2003). 
Importantly, most of these approaches explicitly anchor their hypotheses in evolutionary 
considerations, so it is misleading to refer to any one approach as an “evolutionary” approach. 
Most assume that emotion categories are psychological as well as biological categories. And 
both draw inspiration from Charles Darwin (albeit from different books, making very different 
assumptions about the nature of biological categories; for discussion, see Barrett 2017a, b). 
Emotion Concepts 
An emotion concept is a mental representation of an emotion category. Theoretical 
hypotheses about the proposed degree of variation in surface and deep features of an emotion 
category strongly relate to the proposed nature of emotion concepts. Approaches that 
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hypothesize strong reliability and specificity in emotional expressions and other physical features 
shared by the instances of an emotion category, along with a deep causal similarity, propose that 
emotion categories are natural kind or Aristotelian categories (the red zone in Figure 1); 
correspondingly, instances of different categories can be distinguished by their physical features, 
like the facial movements expressing emotion. If an emotion category has a classical structure, 
then its corresponding concept reads like a dictionary definition that is stored in memory, 
describing its necessary and sufficient features. 
A variety of theoretical approaches propose that emotion categories are prototype 
categories (the yellow zone in Figure 1), whose instances share some family resemblance. Of all 
the features that might describe the category, each instance might contain only a sample 
(resulting is more within-category variation and more between-category similarity than is true for 
Aristotelian categories). The corresponding emotion concept (its prototype) might be the most 
frequent instance found in the category, or its most typical instance (i.e., it is the instance that has 
all or most of the category’s distinguishing features). Or the prototype might be a theory that 
describes the most typical instance (e.g., Clore & Ortony, 1991). The hypothesis that emotion 
categories are structured as prototypes is consistent with a variety of theoretical approaches in 
the science of emotion, including basic emotion approaches (e.g., Cowen & Keltner, 2017; 
Ekman & Cordaro, 2011), appraisal approaches (e.g., Shaver et al., 1987) psychological 
construction approach (e.g., Russell, 2003) and functional approaches (e.g., Campos et al., 1994; 
Campos, Campos & Barrett, 1989). The assumption, however, is that there is a single 
representation – a single prototype – for each category. 
More recently, it has been proposed that emotion categories are goal-based, conceptual 
categories (green zone, Figure 1). The instances of a given emotion category are thought to share 
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a common set of features within a specific situation, but these features (including the goal or 
function of the category) will change from situation to situation (Barrett, 2006, 2012, 2013, 
2017a, b; Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015; LeBois et al., 2018; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011). The hypothesis is that emotion categories, like all abstract categories, 
do not have conceptual cores (Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2015; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011), meaning that emotion concepts are constructed on the spot, as needed 
(i.e., they are ad hoc concepts). 
Unlike the typological thinking that supports classical and prototype categories, 
conceptual categories are rooted in population thinking, or the idea that a biological category is 
populated with context-dependent, variable instances, so that any summary of the category (like 
a prototype) is an abstraction. The proposal that emotion categories are goal-based, conceptual 
categories, derives from Darwin’s use of population thinking in On the Origin of Species 
(1859/2001; see Mayr, 2004), as well as Barsalou’s research on grounded concepts (Barsalou, 
1983, 1985, 2008; Barsalou et al., 2003), where the prototype of a category is context-dependent, 
and represents the ideal instance that best suits the function or goal in a specific situation, 
whether or not it actually exists in nature (e.g., Barsalou, 1993; Voorspoels, Vanpaemel, & 
Storms, 2011). Correspondingly, the hypothesis is that the similarity in an emotion category is 
not fixed or static – it varies from situation to situation because the similarity of its instances is 
based on the goal that the instances serve in a particular situation at a particular moment in time. 
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Box 3: The Current Study of Context Effects in Emotion Perception 
There is growing evidence that both the facial movements that express emotions and the 
emotional meaning inferred for those movements are strongly influenced by the contexts in 
which they occur. In the scientific study of how people infer emotions in the facial movements of 
other people, three types of context have been increasingly studied: situationally-based context, 
in which a face is physically presented with other sensory input that has some informational 
value, such as a body posture or a tone of voice, person-based context, in which the processes 
inside the brain or body the person inferring emotion in the facial movements of other people, 
and broader cultural contexts (for summaries, see Aviezer & Hassin, 2017; Barrett, Mesquita, & 
Gendron, 2011; de Gelder, 2016; Gendron, Mesquita & Barrett, 2013; Hess & Hareli, 2017; 
Wieser & Brosch, 2012).1 In the majority of studies, other cues dominate emotion-related 
inferences, such that the emotional meaning of face is interpreted in line with its context, rather 
than its hypothesized emotional meaning as portrayed in Figure 4 (e.g., Aviezer et al., 2008, 
2012; van den Stock et al., 2007; Wallbott, 1988; Wood, Martin, Alibali, & Niedenthal, 2018). 
Studies of how the context influence the activation of facial muscle movements are less frequent, 
but still exist (but for several clever examples, see Fernandez-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1997; 
Fridlund, 1991; Ruiz-Belda et al., 2003). Nonetheless, when context is properly acknowledged 
and assessed, scientific findings run contrary to the notion that facial muscle movements are 
universal expressions of emotion containing all of the information that is necessary and sufficient 
to communicate emotional states. They are consistent with functionalist, constructionist and 
behavioral ecology theories of emotion (Box 2). Contextual influences here are consistent with 
                                                 
1 Gendron et al. (2013) was first written and submitted for publication in 2010. 
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evidence showing that context is intrinsically involved in the most basic aspects of movement 
and object perception.  
The classic demonstration of how context impacts the interpretation of facial movements 
is the Kuleshov effect. In the early 20th century, the Soviet filmmaker Lev Kuleshov 
demonstrated that that the emotional meaning of an actor’s neutral face changes depending on 
what was viewed immediately before: videos designed to evoke pleasantness (a little girl playing 
with a doll) or lust (a woman on a divan), unpleasantness (a dead woman in a coffin), and hungry 
(a bowl of soup) (Barratt et al., 2016; Mobbs et al., 2006; see Calbi et al., 2017 for a recent study 
as well as older references). These findings are echoed in more recent studies by the US 
psychologist Jim Russell and may explain the recent emergence of “resting bitch face” and 
“backpfeifengesicht” (literally, a face in need of a punch) in social media. 
When scientists ask participants to pose an emotional expression in the absence of 
context (or in a singular, impoverished; e.g., Cordaro et al., 2017) or to infer emotion in a facial 
configuration that is absent any context except that provided by the experimental task, they are 
typically taking a reductionist approach to discover the emotional meaning of facial movements 
alone. Participants may instead be communicating a culturally established expectation, 
stereotype, or meme that may or may not hold in everyday contexts that are richer in the 
multimodal information that they carry (Srinivasan & Martinez, 2018). We focus our attention 
on one another’s faces when we communicate, but this is not evidence that emotional 
information is carried solely, or even primarily, in the face alone (Aviezer et al., 2012). In real 
life, faces don’t appear in isolation. Instead, they appear in a multi-sensory context that includes 
a body, a broader situational arrangement, and often a voice, smells, and so on. These additional 
sources of information are only considered “context” when the starting assumption is that the 
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face is primary in communication emotion. In our view, this “context” in all its forms must be 
explicitly measured and modeled to achieve an ethology of emotional communication in the wild 
(Martinez, 2017b). 
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Box 4: The Origin of the Proposed Facial Expressions 
The belief that certain configurations of facial movements express emotion and therefore 
display a person’s inner state of mind reached prominence in the paintings by Rembrandt in the 
17th century. Different sets of universal expressive forms were proposed by various artists, such 
as in the drawings of Charles Le Brun, the 17th century French painter for King Louis XIV of 
France (Montagu, 1994), in the facial movements found in Hindu Navarasa dance 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1uIan6u3UrQ), in the heads depicted by the 18th century 
German sculptor Franz Xaver Messerschmidt (https://www.pinterest.com/tkearneyg/franz-
xaver-messerschmidt/), in moving photographs by the 19th century Czech neuroscientist Jan 
Evangelista Purkinje (Wade, 2016), in the prescriptions of the 19th century French dramatist 
François Delsarte (Stebbins & Delsarte, 1887/2013), and in the photographs taken by the French 
physician Guillaume-Benjamin-Amand Duchenne, which were highlighted in the writings of 
Charles Darwin (Darwin, 1872). These varying proposals were united by the assumption that 
each emotion category was expressed by one specific facial configuration, making it possible to 
infer one (emotional state) from the other (the configuration of facial movements). 
How did the science of emotion end up focusing almost exclusively on the facial 
configurations displayed in Figure 4? The story of their origin has been discussed in Ekman, 
Friesen & Ellsworth (1972), Gendron & Barrett (2017) and Russell (1994). Darwin did not 
discover the facial configurations through careful observation in the same way that such 
observations led him to discover the idea of natural selection. Instead, he stipulated them based 
on drawing by Bell (1806) and photographs by Duchenne (1990/1862), continuing the tradition 
of others who, before him, stipulated other facial movements as the expressions of emotions 
(see introduction in main paper).  
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Darwin conducted two informal studies of emotional expressions. In The Expression of 
the Emotions in Man and Animals, he described an informal survey about these facial 
movements that he believed expressed emotions in a way that is shared with other animal species 
and therefore in a specific and universal way around the world. He provided his colleagues with 
verbal descriptions of specific expressive forms along with the emotion category he thought they 
expressed, and he asked his colleagues (living in various parts of the world) whether they 
believed his hypotheses were true. Darwin also conducted a second informal study that he 
described in a letter to a colleague, in which he presented 24 participants with 11 static 
photographs of facial configurations elicited by electrical stimulation of facial muscles (detailed 
in Snyder, Kaufman, Harrison, & Maruff, 2010). These photographs were taken by Duchenne, 
who believed that facial muscles produce expressions that reveal a person’s inner state. 
Duchenne created over 60 photographs of facial configurations that are often referred to as 
“induced emotional expressions,” but actually the photographs capture exaggerated facial muscle 
contractions elicited by external electrical stimulation. Darwin’s description of the study suggests 
he asked his participants to freely describe the emotion presenting in each photo (i.e., he used a 
free-labeling response method).  
Research that proceeded in the early 20th century attempted to replicate and extend 
Darwin’s second study using photographs of faces posed in exaggerated configurations. Others 
went about the task of detailing the specific facial movements that constitute the configurations 
that were believed to be emotional expressions. Few research studies evaluated whether 
emotional expressions made in everyday life actually conform to these portrayals. The emotion 
perception studies during this period generally showed that perceivers were highly variable in the 
in the emotional causes they inferred for each configuration, with little reliability and specificity. 
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(The one exception was studies using a choice-from-array approach involving brief vignettes 
describing each emotion category, referred to as the Dashiell method). This larger body of 
research gave rise to a scientific era that was guided by the hypothesis emotions and their 
expressions were socially constructed and culturally variable.  
In the early 1960’s the U.S. psychologist Paul Ekman and his colleagues resurrected a 
research paradigm to test Darwin’s original ideas about emotional expressions. They took a large 
set of photographs developed by Sylvan Tomkins, in which actors posed what they believed to 
be the expression of anger, contempt, disgust, fear, happiness, interest, sadness, shame and 
surprise categories. Participants viewed the candidate poses and based on their reliability in 
choosing the expected emotion word to label each photo, a final set was chosen. The focus on six 
categories -- anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise was accidental, not based on 
theoretical considerations – portrayals of contempt, interest and shame expressions were not 
labeled reliably and so were not initially studied. Ekman and colleagues also incorporated work 
by the Swedish anatomist Carl-Herman Hjortsjö, who catalogued Duchenne’s facial 
configurations and stipulated them to be emotional expressions (Hjortsjö, 1969).  
This is the origin of the facial configurations in Figure 4, which are used in the majority 
of experiments of emotion perception and that correspondingly constitute commonsense beliefs 
about how certain emotion categories are specifically expressed. Many different sets of facial 
poses haven been developed over the years, a selection of which can be found here: 
https://rystoli.github.io/FSTC.html 
http://cbcsl.ece.ohio-state.edu/downloads.html 
http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~gary/CAFE/ 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8013713/ 
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Box 5:  The Face: Anatomy of Facial Muscles and Facial Electromyography 
The Anatomy of Facial Muscles 
To understand how people make certain patterns of facial movements, it’s helpful to 
consider how facial muscles develop and are structured. Healthy humans have a common set of 
17 facial muscles on each side of the face that contract and relax in patterns (Rinn, 1984) 2. 
Facial muscles develop in utero. By 36 weeks, almost all of the muscles used to produce facial 
movements are formed (Gasser, 1967), although their morphology is not identical to an adult 
human. The muscles are controlled by cranial nerves V and VII which become functional a bit 
earlier, by 11 weeks in utero (Reissland et al., 2011). Facial muscle movements support many 
functions, such as sucking movements necessary for feeding and tongue movements necessary 
for speech (Haywood & Getchell, 2014). As a consequence, the development of facial muscles 
influences a wide range of behaviors and capacities over and above expressing emotion.  
To create facial movements that are visible to the naked eye, facial muscles contract, 
moving skin into folds and wrinkles on an underlying skeletal structure. These are the 
movements people observe in one another, that are captured in photographs and videos, and that 
express emotions. These visible facial articulations are called Action Units (AUs). Clear and 
consistent data are currently not available to indicate when facial expressions are first formed. 
While fetuses in utero definitely make some facial movements, it is currently entirely unknown if 
these have anything to do with emotion-like states. Some scientists claim that young infants 
produce facial movements to pain that resemble those of adults (Izard et al., 1987), even though 
the underlying anatomy is not morphologically identical (Camras & Shutter, 2010).  
                                                 
2 There are somewhat different numbers often given, because a single muscle may comprise more than one 
functional unit. 
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Individual differences in facial anatomy, as well as in the brain’s control of facial 
muscles, cause variation in the details of how facial movements are executed at the muscular 
level and how they look to the naked eye. People vary in the underlying bone structure of the 
face and details of the skin, the structure and strength of their facial muscles (Pessa et al., 1988), 
the dynamics of facial muscle movements, and consequently they vary in how their facial 
movements look to a human observer (e.g., Farahvash et al., 2010; Shim et al., 2008; Shimada & 
Gasser, 1989). In addition, some people have strong asymmetries for one side of the face or the 
other, and some people lack certain smaller muscles altogether (Waller, 2008). In fact, if you 
inserted your exact facial muscles into a different face (someone with a different bone structure 
or someone much older or younger than you, or whose face is thinner or fatter), the resulting 
muscle movements would look different than they do on your face. And even when facial 
movements look the same to the naked eye, there may be differences in their execution under the 
skin. As human perceivers, we see stable facial behaviors (i.e., a frown) when in reality, under 
the skin, there is more variation that meets the eye. A facial behavior, like frowning, or scowling, 
is, in fact, a category of variable instances. When you watch a frown unfold in the same person 
on two different occasions, the exact muscle contractions that curl the upper lip and turn down 
the corners of the mouth can subtly vary from one instance to another. What to the naked eye 
looks like the same frown in two different people can result from different patterns of underlying 
muscle contractions.  
Put simply: something as seemingly simple as a single facial movement is best 
understood as a conceptual category, resulting from a variable set of more basic, variable 
physical changes. The same is true for all motor movements, for smells and for sounds. For 
example, the sound of a “b” is acoustically different when heard in the words “bad” and “bed”, 
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yet human brains wire themselves to hear both as the sound of “b” (i.e., the sound of a “b” is a 
category; Barsalou 1992).  
 
 
Box Figure 5-1. The muscles of the face. From www.hdanatomy.com. Permission pending. 
 
Measuring Facial Movements with Facial Electromyography (fEMG) 
The most sensitive and direct way to measure facial muscle movements is to record the 
electrical activity of facial muscles as they contract. This is called facial electromyography, or 
facial EMG, and is done by placing electrodes in or on the muscles of the face. Actually inserting 
thin electrodes into the muscles provides the most sensitive and specific electrical recordings, but 
this approach is rarely used since it is more invasive. It is more common to use surface 
recordings from electrodes placed on the skin that measure the changes in electrical potential of 
muscle depolarization. EMG recordings of facial muscle movements were first made in the late 
1950s and were later used for studying emotion and affect in the 1970s (Tassinary et al., 2007). 
The specificity with which individual muscles can be distinguished from one another depends on 
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how many electrodes are put on the face. Typically, only three to six electrodes are put on the 
face, although many more than that can be uncomfortable for a test subject. This means that 
many facial muscle movements are not measured in most studies that use facial EMG. Current 
research suggests that specific patterns of facial EMG activity reliably distinguish between 
pleasant vs. unpleasant states, as well as the intensity of the states along with how social the 
situation is, but that they do not reliably distinguish between different individual categories of 
emotion (Cacioppo et al., 2000).  
 
Box Figure 5-2. Measuring facial electromyography (fEMG). Left: Common electrode locations, showing some of 
the facial muscles whose activity they can measure. VII indicates that all the muscles are controlled by the facial 
nerve (7th cranial nerve). Right: example of a recorded EMG signal. The trace plots the absolute value of the change 
in electrical activity (in microvolts) versus time (in seconds). Reproduced with permission from van Boxtel (2010). 
See Figure 4 for a summary of how combinations of these muscles contribute to facial action units in FACS coding. 
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Box 6: A Summary of Computer Vision Algorithms for Automatically Detecting Facial 
Actions 
The goal of computer vision algorithms is to identify a functional mapping between to 
variables x and y, where x is the image of a face and y the list of active action units (AUs) 
observed in the face in x, i.e., AUs=f(face image). There are two main solutions to the problem 
of identifying f(.). One is to manually derive functions that we believe do a good job at 
identifying AUs in images. The other approach is to learn f(.) from the data – from pairs of 
samples x and y. This second approach is called machine learning.  
Manually-Derived Functions 
There are three types of manually-derived functions for solving AUs=f(face image). 
1. Optical flow: Optical flow is the apparent motion of landmark points on an object, such as a 
face (Kroeger et al., 2016), e.g., how does the landmark point defining the left corner of the 
mouth appear to move when we activate AU 12 (lip corner puller). A dense optical flow 
approach is when  most of the pixels defining a face are landmark points. A computer vision 
algorithm can use dense optical flow to identify AUs on a face by computing the apparent 
movement of a set of facial landmark points between a generic neutral face and the given 
image (Donato et al., 1999; Yacoob & Davis, 1996; Martinez, 2003). One way to improve 
the performance of this algorithm is to use a person-specific approach, where the neutral face 
used to compute the optical flow is an image of the same individual as that in the image we 
need to analyze. Advantages: This approach generally worked well in lab conditions (>80%) 
and where the face is seen frontally and is not occluded. The algorithm’s performance 
improves (>90%) when we use a person-specific approach. Disadvantages: Both a person’s 
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neutral face (at rest) and the image of the apex of a facial configuration must first be known. 
Detection of the apex is a problem that has received scarce attention in computer vision. 
This, combined with the need for non-occluded, frontal images, has limited the use of this 
approach to images filmed in controlled, lab conditions. The method is also limited to people 
for whom we have a neutral face available or one can be detected in a video sequence.  
2. Linear filters: Another solution is to use a linear filter h(.). A linear filter (such as a Gabor 
filter) is a functional mapping that acts locally on an image and has the linear constraints. 
The functional mapping is given by a convolution of the image with the filter h(.). A 
convolution can be intuitively understood as the multiplication of the pixels of the filter with 
a local patch of the image of the same size as the filter, with this multiplication being applied 
to every possible placing of the filter on the image. The response of these local 
multiplications is generally different when the AU is active in a face than when it is not. 
Because of this, local filters have been extensively used to identify AUs in images of faces 
(Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2016; De la Torre & Cohn, 2011; Liu & Wechsler, 2002; Lyons et al., 
1999; Tian et al., 2002). Advantages: Convolutions are fast operators. This makes for fast 
(i.e., processing at >30 frames per second) and accurate algorithms (>90%) detection of AUs 
in images filmed in the lab as well as in the wild. To date, this is one of the most successful 
approaches to identifying some (but not all) AUs (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017a). 
Disadvantages: Local filters only work when the texture in the patch of the image is well 
defined. When the local patch is smooth (e.g., middle of the cheeks), the response of a filter 
is similar for active versus inactive AUs. 
3. Shape descriptors: The shape of an object is defined as the geometric properties of the object 
when all information related to the object’s position, scale and rotation have been eliminated 
Facial Expressions of Emotion  223 
 
(Hamsici & Martinez, 2009). Shape is especially useful to define AUs that deform major 
components of the face, e.g., the lips, eyelids, eyebrows, nose, and jaw line. Shape can also 
be used to define the wrinkles seen in the forehead when activating AUs 1 (inner brow raiser) 
and 2 (outer brow raiser) as well as those around the nose caused by AUs 9 (nose wrinkler) 
and 10 (upper lid raiser). These descriptors have been successfully used to detect these and 
other AUs in images filmed in the lab and in the wild (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2016; Martinez 
& Du, 2012; Neth & Martinez, 2010; Kotsia et al., 2008). Advantages: Works in local 
patches with little texture and contrast. Can be applied to low-resolution images and under 
varying pose. Disadvantages: Not all image changes caused by AUs define an easily 
detectable shape change, e.g., AUs 11 (nasolabial deepener) and 14 (dimpler). 
Machine Learning-Derived Functions 
There are two types of machine-learning functions for solving AUs=f(face image). 
1. Probabilistic algorithms: Statistical learning theory and statistical pattern recognition are 
algorithms that learn from sample pairs: S={(x1,y1),…,(xn,yn)}, where yi=f(xi), and f(.) is 
generally a probability density function (pdf) or a mixture of pdfs (McLachlan & Peel, 
2004). Intuitively, a pdf is a function that give the relative likelihood of a value of xi to 
belong to a value of yi. Given the training set S, we can estimate these likelihoods and, 
hence, the pdf. This approach works best when combined with the computer vision 
features defined above (optical flow, linear filters, and shape) (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 
2016; Zafeiriou et al., 2016; Corneanu et al., 2016). Advantages: To date this is the most 
successful approach to the recognition of AUs in the lab and in the wild (Benitez-Quiroz 
et al., 2016, 2017a, 2019). Disadvantages: The training set S needs to include images 
under a variety of image conditions (illumination, pose) as well as people of diverse 
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ethnicities, races and skin colors. The lack of diversity in these datasets has resulted in 
technology that is based to minorities (Buolamwini, 2018). 
2. Deep learning: An alternative to the above approach is to learn the function f(.) using 
regression analysis. Regression analysis identifies relationships between predictor 
variables and dependent variables, much like probabilistic algorithms. The difference 
here is that we need not use a probabilistic model (Belkin & Niyogi, 2003). Rather, we 
assume the functional mapping provides a direct relationship between x and y (see, for 
example, Martinez, 2017a, for some examples). In this approach, the goal is to estimate 
the parameters of the manifold (function). If the function is linear, we can use linear 
least-squares. If the function is non-linear (which is typically the case), we need to use a 
non-linear optimization approach. One famous solution is gradient descent (Rumelhart et 
al., 1988). Additionally, when the number of parameters to be estimated is very large, this 
approach is called deep learning. Deep learning has been extremely successful in many 
computer vision applications. Missing from the list of successful applications, however, 
is the recognition of AUs. The reason for this is simple: to estimate a very large number 
of parameters in f(.), we require an equally large number of sample pairs (xi,yi), i=1,…,n, 
with n large. As we discussed in the paper though, manually annotating a large number of 
images (xi) with their corresponding AUs (yi) would require years and millions of dollars 
to complete. A solution that is being attempted is to use automatic annotations instead 
(Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017b; Zhao et al., 2016b). That is, we can use current algorithms 
to automatically annotate AUs in a large number of images. One then uses these 
annotations to train a deep learning algorithm that is robust to errors in the training data. 
We are awaiting additional experiments to determine if this approach will succeed. One 
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solution may be to use deep learning to generate realistically-looking samples, typically 
called deep fakes. A recent paper (Pumarola et al., 2018) shows this should be possible.  
Improving Automatic Annotations  
Researchers in computer vision are studying ways of improving the performance of 
current algorithms to map facial movements to AU codes (Corneanu et al., 2016). One promising 
approach identifies dependencies in facial movements (Zhao et al., 2016). Facial movements 
typically do not occur in isolation. Try this: Face a mirror and try to move the outer corners of 
your eyebrows (AU2) while keeping every other facial muscle at rest. You will notice this is a 
difficult task. Algorithms can learn these dependencies to improve the automatic annotation of 
AUs of any of the algorithms described above (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017b). For example, if we 
uncover that AUs 1 and 2 are co-articulated quite often and that AU 1 almost never co-occurs 
with AU 23, we can use this knowledge to improve the annotations of AU 1 once we know 
whether a face has AU 2 and/or 23 active. Box Figure 1 shows the dependencies obtained on a 
small set of posed facial configurations taken in controlled, lab conditions. Learning AU 
dependencies is important to understand the evolution of AU production from birth to adulthood. 
For example, if these dependencies are small in babies and large in adults, it suggests a learning 
or developmental process in the production of facial configurations; no changes may indicate an 
innate system that is anatomically constrained and possibly available at birth. In addition, if these 
dependencies vary across cultures, it would point to a cultural influence in the malleability of 
facial movements; no cultural variation would suggest that there are universal (possibly 
anatomical or neural) constraints on the facial configurations that a human face can produce. 
These hypotheses about AU dependencies await future research.  
Research to Validate Automated Coding of AUs Relies on Supervised Learning  
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For the above algorithms to work, we need the training set S defined above. That is, we 
need a set of images whose AUs have been coded by an expert FACS coder (i.e., the images are 
manually annotated). Many databases have been collected of posed and spontaneous facial 
configurations in lab conditions (for example, see Lucey et al., 2010; Mavadati et al., 2013). 
These databases typically have between a few to several hundred training images. Recently, a 
large database of facial expressions in the wild was collected and made available to researchers 
(Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2016). This large dataset was used in the EmotioNet Challenge3 (Benitez-
Quiroz et al., 2017a), as discussed in the paper. To evaluate the accuracy of AU annotation of 
these computer vision algorithms, part of the dataset is used for training an algorithm and an 
independent set of images is used for testing the accuracy of the algorithm. Accuracy of 
annotations as well as true and false positive and true and false negative are usually reported. 
Temporal Information 
Temporal features have also been used to identify AUs (Bartlett et al., 2014). 
Unfortunately, these algorithms are not based on a natural model of facial movement dynamics 
(Cohn & Schmidt, 2004; Zuckerman et al., 1976). Instead, these algorithms attempt to identify 
correlations between temporal image features with the presence of AUs. Ideally, we would like 
to have algorithms that use the same temporal features employed by humans. Unfortunately, 
these temporal features are, for the most part, unknown at present. Hence, there is a need to 
better understand the dynamics of facial movements and how these dynamics aid detection and 
contribute to their inferred psychological meaning. This is an area of future research for both 
psychologists and computer scientists.  
 
 
                                                 
3 http://cbcsl.ece.ohio-state.edu/EmotionNetChallenge/index.html 
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Box Figure 6-1. Co-articulation of action units. Positive correlations (red) and negative correlations (yellow) 
between facial actions, estimated from a set of 350,000 frames of facial movements. Adapted from Zhao et al. 
(2016). This approach uses dependencies to predict the presence or absence of AUs before they are detected, 
improving the accuracy of the algorithms to detect facial movements and map them to AUs (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 
2017b). These algorithms have also been recently tested in less constrained conditions (i.e., in the wild; Zafeiriou et 
al., 2016).  
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Box 7: Variations in Facial Movements 
 In principle, a human face can make a multitude of movement patterns: 16 million 
different combinations are possible, in principle, assuming each of the 24 AUs corresponding to 
muscle movements could move independently (ignoring temporal dynamics; Martinez, 2017b). 
In addition, facial muscles can contract with different intensities and varying time to peak 
contraction (Jack & Schyns, 2017), further increasing the number of movement patterns a face 
can generate, in principle. In practice, however, a much smaller subset of combinations is likely 
because of the way that brain controls the face as well as various anatomical constraints (e.g., 
some muscles are more or less likely to move together because of their relative position to one 
another, how they are attached to facial bones, or how they are innervated by nerves).   
Several obstacles make it challenging to scientifically observe which configurations are 
made by healthy people and with what frequency. The most serious obstacle is one of naming: 
many published studies equate facial movements with emotional expressions rather than treating 
their correspondence as a hypothesis to be tested. For example, facial AU 4, 5, 7 and 23 are 
referred to as an expression of anger rather than as a lowered brow (AU 4), raised upper lid (AU 
5), tightened lid (AU 7) and tightened lip (AU 23). This conflation is sometimes built into an 
experiment itself, particularly if FACS coding is not used (for a good example, see Calvo et al., 
2014). Some studies measure the presence or absence of facial movements with a less systematic 
coding system called the EMFACS (Emotion FACS), in which coders decide whether a pre-
specified group of AUs (i.e., the stipulated expression for each emotion category) are active en 
masse (i.e., coders identify the presence or absence of the entire configuration), rather than 
independently identify the presence or absence of each facial AU. Hence, EMFACS is less 
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reliable than the FACS 4 because it encourages coders to make mental inferences about the 
meaning of the muscle movements while they are describing the muscle movements, thereby 
conflating scientific measurements (which facial muscles moved) with their interpretation (which 
emotions were expressed).  
Approach 
To date, no research has systematically or fully cataloged the number of configurations 
that are biologically possible nor which are routinely made in the wild and with what frequency, 
but one study makes a start, and also offers a clear example of combining automated-human 
FACS coding (Srinivasan & Martinez, 2018). Over seven million images were mined from the 
internet by first identifying all the nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, along with their 
semantic and lexical relations in the English dictionary that many people think of as emotions.5 
These words were then translated into Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Farsi, Arabic and Russian. 
The words were then used to identify and download images of human faces using a variety of 
online search engines. The configuration of AUs in each image was automatically FACS coded 
using a computer vision algorithm (Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2016; Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2017b; 
Benitez-Quiroz et al., 2019).  Human FACS coders then manually verified the accuracy of the 
results provided by the automated analysis for a subset of images. 
                                                 
4 EMFACS identifies a prescribed set of AUs that are thought to express emotion rather than coding the presence or 
absence of each AU one at a time. Anyone who is trained to use FACS can also use EMFACS; there is no special 
training. It is important to take note of which coding is used, because EMFACS is less reliable (Rosenberg, Erika. 
Frequently Asked Questions. erikarosenberg.com/faq) and potentially more prone to bias.  
5 WordNet (Miller, 1995) defines a structure—a graph—that identifies synonyms as well as superordinate and 
subordinate concepts for each word. A subordinate is a word with a more specific meaning (e.g., despair a 
subordinate of sadness). A superordinate is a word with more general meaning (e.g., emotion is a superordinate of 
sadness). 
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Facial Configurations Discovered 
Thirty-five configurations of AUs were observed as common to the images mined in all 
six languages (see Box Table 7-1). This amounts to 22% of the facial configurations that were 
identified in the seven million images (1.87% of the seven million images contained these 35 
configurations). Only eight additional facial configurations were identified that were common in 
the images mined in one or more, but not all, of these languages.6  
The results provide the very first attempt at cross-cultural assessment of facial 
configurations observed in the wild (rather than deliberately posed) and invite a variety of 
interpretations. One possibility is that these findings support the hypothesis of a small number of 
facial configurations that are available for emotional expression within and across cultures 
(although admittedly significantly larger than the six proposed configurations in Figure 4, e.g., 
Martinez, 2017a). This interpretation is cautioned by several considerations, however.  
First, the scientific approach taken by Srinivasan & Martinez (2018) is likely to have 
missed some facial configurations. Current algorithms only identify 16 of the 24 possible AUs.7 
Human coders only verified the AUs detected by the algorithm, meaning that AUs that were 
actually present in the images but went undetected by the algorithm were missed entirely. More 
generally, as illustrated by the EmotioNet Challenge (http://cbcsl.ece.ohio-
state.edu/EmotionNetChallenge/), current algorithms do not have high accuracy for detecting 
facial movements in the wild. In addition, English words were used to mine for images, but the 
other languages sampled (Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Farsi, Arabic and Russian) contain 
                                                 
6 Of these, 2 were observed in a single language, 2 in two languages, 3 in three languages and 1 in four languages.  
7 These are the most frequently observed AUs. Those AUs that are not currently detected are infrequent. 
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indigenous words for emotions that do not correspond easily to single English words (Smith, 
2016), and therefore may be associated with AU configurations that were not sampled in the first 
place. 
Second, the images used by Srinivasan & Martinez (2018) were derived from the 
internet. Internet images, while better than posed faces, do not substitute for scientific 
observations of facial movements in the real world. The internet is a curated version of reality. 
Some common facial configurations are likely missing because they are rarely uploaded to the 
internet, and some configurations commonly found on the internet may not be commonly 
observed in the real world.  
For these reasons, and also because the cultures sampled have some contact with 
practices and norms of the U.S., the Srinivasan & Martinez (2018) study does not, on its own, 
confirm that the 35 identified facial configurations are, in fact, universal. Instead, the study 
suggest that these facial configurations are commonly used to express instances of emotion 
across a number of languages in industrialized nations. Furthermore, even if future studies reveal 
that some or all of these 35 facial configurations are indeed universally made, this does not 
automatically mean that each is an innate expression with a unique emotional meaning; the 
universality of these expressions may be a result of cultural norms people learn as children (see 
Box 10). 
Box Table 7-1: Thirty-five unique combinations of facial actions observed in cultures whose 
primary languages are English, Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Farsi, and Russian (from Srinivasan 
& Martinez, 2018). 
 
ID AUs Examples ID AUs Examples ID AUs Examples 
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1 4 
 
13 4, 7, 9, 10, 
17 
 
25 1, 2, 5, 
25, 26 
 
2 5 
 
14 9, 10, 15 
 
26 4, 7, 9, 
25, 26 
 
3 2, 4 
 
15 12, 25 
 
27 12, 25, 
26 
 
4 4, 7 
 
16 6, 12, 25 
 
28 2, 12, 
25, 26 
 
5 12 
 
17 2, 5, 12, 
25 
 
29 5, 12, 
25, 26 
 
6 2, 12 
 
18 1, 2, 5, 12, 
25 
 
30 2, 5, 12, 
25, 26 
 
7 5, 12 
 
19 6, 12, 25 
 
31 1, 2, 5, 
12, 25, 
26 
 
8 1, 2, 5, 
12 
 
20 10, 12, 25, 
26 
 
32 6, 12, 
25, 26 
 
9 6, 12 
 
21 1, 2, 25, 
26 
 
33 7, 9, 20, 
25, 26 
 
10 4, 15 
 
22 1, 4, 25, 
26 
 
34 1, 2, 5, 
20, 25, 
26 
 
11 1, 4, 15 
 
23 5, 25, 26 
 
35 1, 4, 5, 
20, 25, 
26 
 
12 4, 7, 17 
 
24 2, 5, 25, 
26 
 
   
Note. ID is the unique identification number given to each facial configuration. An example of each is shown. AUs 
are the active facial action units that describe each configuration. IDs 1, 2, 10, 11, and 21 were most frequently 
labeled by participants as expressions of sadness. IDs 5 through 9, 15 through 19, and 26 through 32 were most 
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frequently labeled as expressions of happiness. IDs 20 and 22 through 24 were most frequently labeled as 
expressions of surprise. IDs 4, 12, 14, 25, and 35 were most frequently labeled as expressions of anger. IDs 33 and 
34 were most frequently labeled as expressions of fear. ID 13 was most frequently labeled as an expression of 
disgust. No consistent labels were offered for ID 3. No configuration exactly matches the AU configurations 
proposed by Darwin or documented in prior research (for AU comparisons, see Cordaro et al., 2017; Ekman et al., 
1968; Matsumoto et al., 2008). 
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Box 8: Meta-Analytic Evidence of Autonomic Nervous System Changes During Emotion 
There have been four statistical summaries of scientific findings (called meta-analyses) 
from experiments designed to measure autonomic nervous system (ANS) changes during 
emotional episodes (Cacioppo et al., 2000; Siegel et al., 2018; Stemmler, 2004; for a discussion, 
see Quigley & Barrett, 2014). All of them, including the most comprehensive meta-analysis 
published to date covering over 200 published experiments involving more than 20,000 
participants (Siegel et al., 2018) replicate the same results: ANS changes are neither consistent 
nor specific for any emotion category. Combining different measurements into a pattern 
performed no better at distinguishing one emotion category from another than did individual 
measures (Siegel et al., 2018). Some review articles have tried to make a case for the existence of 
emotion-specific ANS fingerprints (e.g., Friedman, 2010; Kreibig, 2010), but the meta-analyses 
are consistent in their findings that different emotion categories cannot be distinguished from one 
another by changes in heart rate, respiration rate, skin conductance, or any other measure of the 
autonomic nervous system, alone or in combination; said another way, ANS measures 
individually, or in combination, are neither consistent nor specific for emotion categories. 
The variety in emotion-related ANS changes is consistent with the writings of William 
James (1890), population views of emotion (Box 2), with Darwin’s articulation of population 
thinking in On the Origin of Species (1859/2001) (for a discussion, see Barrett, 2017) and with 
the US physiologist Paul Obrist’s findings that peripheral physiological changes are tied to the 
metabolic demands associated with action (e.g., cardiosomatic coupling; Obrist, Webb, Sutterer, 
& Howard, 1970) or anticipated action (e.g., supra-metabolic activity; Obrist, 1981; Sterling, 
2012; Turner & Carroll, 1985). Because all animals (including humans) behave in a variety of 
context-sensitive ways, crying, shouting, smiling, freezing and laughing in anger will each be 
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supported by a distinct pattern of ANS change. In this view, ANS variation is not a bug to be 
explained away as error or designated as epiphenomenal to the nature of emotion. Substantial 
variation in ANS patterns within an emotion category is a feature that should be expected 
because it confers evolutionary advantage (for a discussion on how evolution selects for 
variation in emotion, see Barrett, 2017a). 
The variation in emotion categories observed for ANS changes is consistent with the 
evidence for the brain basis of emotion in humans (Barrett, 2017b; Clark-Polner et al., 2016) and 
in non-human animals (for a discussion, see Barrett, 2017b; Barrett & Satpute, 2017). For 
example, even studies of “fear” learning in rodents find evidence of variability in ANS responses 
and neural circuitry (e.g., Barrett & Finlay, in press; Gross & Canteras, 2012; Iwata & LeDoux, 
1988; Tovote et al., 2015). Behavioral experiments also clearly show that the variation within 
emotion categories is meaningfully tied to context and situational factors and is not merely due 
to variability in the experimental method. A growing number of studies of emotion are designed 
to explicitly model and capture heterogeneity within emotion categories both within individuals 
and across cultures (e.g., Ceulemans, Kuppens, & Van Mechelen, 2012; Gendron, Roberson, van 
der Vyver, & Barrett, 2014; 2014; Hortensius, Schutter, & Harmon-Jones, 2011; Kuppens, Van 
Mechelen, & Rijmen, 2008; Kuppens et al., 2007; Nezlek, Vansteelandt, Van Mechelen, & 
Kuppens, 2008; Stemmler, Aue, & Wacker, 2007; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 
2013; 2015; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011).  
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Box 9: Emotional Episodes and Their Affective Features 
 In English, the word ‘‘affect’’ means ‘‘to produce a change.’’ To be affected by 
something is to be influenced by it. In science, and particularly in psychology, ‘‘affect’’ refers to 
a special kind of influence—something’s ability to influence your mind in a way that is linked to 
changes in your body. Sometimes “affect” is used as a cautious term, to mean anything 
emotional. It allows people to refer to emotions in general terms, without specifying exactly what 
an emotion is or how it should be defined. Sometimes “affect” is used to refer specifically to 
emotional experiences – to be affected is to feel something (e.g., Panksepp, 1998). In modern 
psychological usage, ‘‘affect’’ refers to the mental counterpart of internal bodily sensations, 
whether or not those sensations are associated with emotions. Historically, “affect” referred to 
simple feelings that are part of every waking moment of your life (Wundt, 1998b/1897; for a 
discussion, see Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). This allows us to clarify some persistent 
confusions that muddle the scientific study of emotions and their expressions. 
Affective Features 
Affect is a property of consciousness (e.g., Edelman & Tononi, 2000; James, 1890; 
Searle, 1992, 2004) and is not perfectly synonymous with emotion. More than a century of 
research has revealed that affect, whether part of an emotional episode or otherwise, can be 
described as a single point in a space with at least two features: valence (pleasure to displeasure), 
arousal (high to low), although other features are sometimes discussed (interpersonal closeness 
to distance, dominance to submissiveness, etc.; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Valence and arousal are 
not ingredients of affect – they are descriptions of feeling in a given moment. They are 
descriptive features of emotional instances (Box 2), but they are not specific to emotion. Nor are 
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causal processes or mechanisms that cause anything. These two features of affect form a low-
dimensional, circular space that describes how a person feels at any moment in time, as in Box 
Figure 9-1. Valence and arousal are not independent from one another (as one feature changes, 
so does the other; for a discussion, see Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Kuppens et al., 2013).  
Thus far, what we understand about the brain-basis of affect (e.g., Lindquist et al., 2016) 
is consistent with the hypothesis that affective feelings are associated with a wide range of 
psychological phenomena (reviewed in Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Valence and arousal are 
likely low dimensional representations of internal bodily sensations (referred to as interoception; 
Craig, 2015) that result from the constantly changing state of the body’s internal systems, such as 
the autonomic nervous system, the immune system, the endocrine system, and so on (referred to 
as allostasis; Sterling, 2012). Somehow, bodily sensations, which are physical, are transformed 
into affective feelings, which are mental. Scientists don’t yet know how this transformation 
happens, but many studies suggest that it does. For the moment, it remains one of the mysteries 
of consciousness. 
Emotional Episodes 
Affect provides a quick summary of the physiological state of the body, like a barometer, 
without much detail (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009). Therefore, affect alone does not indicate 
what to do next, or how to act, other than to approach something or avoid it (Davidson, 1992; 
Lang et al., 1993). Many scientists propose that emotional episodes, on the other hand, are 
specific instances of affect that involve very specific intentions to act. Their specific relation to 
affect depends on how emotion is defined (various theoretical proposals are presented in Box 2).  
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Box Figure 9-1. The affective circumplex. Hedonic valence is represented on the horizontal axis and arousal on the 
vertical axis. Reprinted with permission from Barrett & Bliss-Moreau (2009). 
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Box 10: Learning to Express and Perceive Emotions 
Expressing Emotion 
Increasingly, scientists have been riveted by discoveries that very young human infants 
are powerful learners who quickly learn and make use of cues from their environments. When 
children begin to produce facial movements during emotional episodes with some regularity, 
they appear to reflect the influences of learning about cultural and social expectations (for 
review, see Kärtner, Holodynski, & Wörmann, 2013). For example, social smiling is often 
described as a purely maturational phenomenon, but recent cross-cultural studies suggest its 
development is influenced by sociocultural factors (see Wörmann, Holodynski, Kärtner, & 
Keller, 2012). Children are sensitive to variations in the distribution of multimodal sensory 
changes in their environments, and this variation becomes reflected in the perceptual categories 
children form for facial movements (Pollak & Kistler, 2002). Infants generalize from small 
samples to larger populations and gauge their inferences depending upon whether sampling 
strategies are strong or weak (Denison, Reed & Xu, 2013; Gweon, Tenenbaum & Schulz, 2010). 
Young children are also able detect complex probabilistic information in their environments, as 
well as implicitly learn and reproduce the underlying statistical distributions (Plate et al., 2017). 
These studies suggest that the patterns of facial communication are readily learned by children 
from their social environments, likely beginning shortly after birth. As noted by Sullivan and 
Lewis (2003), how specific patterns of facial movements become associated with specific 
contexts is still unresolved.  
There is some evidence that infants learn to express instances of emotion with facial 
movements as they begin to acquire the emotion concepts of their cultural context. For example, 
recent studies suggest the facial configuration proposed as the expression of disgust (see Figure 
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4) is learned in middle childhood as children learn their culture’s concept for disgust (Stevenson, 
Oaten, Case, Repacholi & Wagland, 2010; Widen & Russell, 2013).8 Further details remain 
unknown however, due to a gap in the scientific literature. Published studies that carefully 
describe a child’s facial muscle movements during emotional episodes have not yet directly 
measured individual differences in emotion concept learning, nor variation in parenting or family 
environment that serves as the context to learn emotion concepts. Studies that have examined the 
link between how children moves their faces during emotional episodes and how their parents act 
during emotional situations unfortunately do not precisely quantify the facial muscle movements. 
Emotion Perception 
Infants begin by implicitly perceiving broad affective distinctions (e.g., positive-negative; 
approach-avoid; pleasant-unpleasant) as discussed in the main text of the paper. Additional 
research is needed to understand the developmental trajectory of infants’ implicit emotion 
perceptions. More is known about the development of children’s explicit emotion perception 
capacities. Numerous experiments now suggest that very young children do not explicitly 
understand the emotional meaning of facial movements, but that this is a skill they learn over the 
course of development (Pollak & Kistler, 2002). That is, newborns appear to learn to detect faces 
and facial movements in the first few days of life, but their capacity to associate these 
movements with the emotional meaning (i.e., to see facial movements as emotional expressions) 
is learned during childhood.  
                                                 
8 These studies focus on learning the association between emotion words and facial movements. However, as we 
describe below, other theorists (e.g., Röttger‐Rössler et al. 2015) have proposed that infants begin learning 
associations between faces and other nonverbal emotion components during early interactions with their caregivers. 
In this manner, caregivers might shape infants’ nonverbal emotion concepts. For example, adults might respond to 
infants’ diffuse responses to emotion eliciting situations by producing specific facial movements and behavioral 
responses of their own. Thus, probabilistic learning from the environment could result in the infant learning emotion 
categories, which might be considered “concepts” as well (Pollak, 2009). Still, there is little direct evidence with 
respect to distinguishing among different negative emotions concepts in infancy. 
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One careful line of research provides robust, consistent evidence for this hypothesis 
(reviewed in Widen, 2016). In this research, young children are shown the proposed expressive 
forms in Figure 4 and are asked to freely label them as emotional expressions by nominating 
emotion words. Almost twenty experiments now suggest that North American toddlers make 
broad affective distinctions (e.g., feels good-feels bad) when explicitly labeling the facial 
configurations, but these perceptions narrow and become more emotionally differentiated (more 
emotionally granular) as children’s emotion concepts develop (again, see Widen, 2016). 
Summarizing across eleven different published studies observing over 1,000 children ranging in 
age from two to nine years old, it is possible to discern an average developmental trajectory from 
affect perception to emotion perception (see Box Figure 10-1). Children’s perceptions begin to 
differentiate around the age of two years of age and continue becoming more specific until the 
middle school years when they look more adult-like (for a review, see Widen, 2016). Even 
elementary school-aged children commonly label disgust as “anger”, and when asked to select 
disgust from standardized sets of facial configurations, improvement with age is very gradual, 
with only about 50% of nine year olds offering the word “disgusted” (or a close synonym) for 
the proposed disgust expression (Widen & Russell 2013). There is growing evidence that  
Nonetheless, some scientists argue that more specific aspects of emotion perception are 
operating much earlier in development than the above studies seem to suggest (e.g., Izard et al., 
2010; Leppänen & Nelson, 2009). For example, Grossman (2010) claims that by age three 
months infants can distinguish proposed expressive configurations for happiness, surprise, and 
anger, and that by seven months they can discriminate the proposed expressive configurations for 
fear, sadness, and interest. These claims suggest the interesting possibility that emotion 
perception might be observed much earlier than two years of age using methods that do not 
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require children to overtly label faces depicting emotional expressions. They are also consistent 
with other evidence suggesting that infants and young children may implicitly perceive emotion 
in facial movements when assessed with the habituation task or a perceptual matching task. Left 
uncertain is whether, beyond discriminating between different facial movements, infants 
understand the emotional meaning that is typically inferred from these cues. Once again, we see 
that the choice of stimuli and task design can yield substantially different conclusions.  
 
 
Box Figure 10-1. Developmental trajectories for emotion concept acquisition. N = 1065. Adapted from Widen 
(2016) with permission From an early age, children used the expected emotion labels (with standard errors) for the 
smiling facial configuration (“happiness”), the scowling configuration (“anger”), and the frowning configuration 
(“sadness”) but the expected emotion labels for the other facial configurations gradually increased with age. Data 
from 11 studies were aggregated (for details, see Widen, 2016). The N for each age group was: two years (N=94), 
three years (N=229), four years (N=299), five years (N=209), six years (N=74), seven years (N=66), eight years 
(N=61), and nine years (n=33). 
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Box 11: Research with Virtual Humans 
Virtual humans (Rickel et al., 2002) (or Embodied Conversational Agents, Cassell et al., 
2000) are software-based artifacts that not only look like people but are also engineered to 
interact with us using the same verbal and nonverbal behavior that we use to interact with each 
other. To support interaction, virtual humans are designed with a range of technologies that allow 
them to interpret a human’s behavior, maintain beliefs about the interaction, reason about how to 
achieve its goals given those beliefs and express itself to achieve those goals. This requires the 
researcher to engineer virtual humans to simulate perception, beliefs, goals and behavior, 
bringing together theory and scientific insights spanning traditional scientific disciplines. For 
example, to model emotion expression and perception in a virtual human, a designer may 
consider the interactions between the simulations of emotion with those for perception, decision-
making, behavior and consequently social interaction (Rickel et al., 2002; Becker-Asano & 
Wachsmuth, 2008).  
In the process of crafting a virtual human, a designer is exploring challenges from an 
engineering perspective that are closely tied to fundamental psychological questions about the 
mechanisms and processes that underlie mental events, such as how should a virtual human’s 
internal states such as emotions and communicative intentions map to its expressive behavior in 
the context of a social interaction? A designer must also grapple with questions about the 
mechanisms and processes that infer emotional meaning from facial movements (i.e., emotion 
perception), such as how should a virtual human interpret its perceptions of another’s facial 
movements and what role should its prior beliefs, goals, emotions and the context of the 
interaction play in that interpretation? Virtual human designs vary considerably in the details of 
the mechanisms and processes used to perform these tasks. They may seek to simulate how these 
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inference processes work, for example how do prior beliefs bias interpretations. They may use 
machine learning approaches to acquire a model from human behavioral data. At another 
extreme, the designer may more simply use a canned or fixed approach that makes specific 
inferences in specific situations.  
There are some unique challenges when considering how to engineer emotion 
expressions and perceptions, because often the goal is not to faithfully render human behavior as 
it occurs in everyday life, but to implement them in a virtual human to achieve some other 
scientific or applied goal. For example, the design of a child’s virtual tutor (Lester et al. 1997) 
may employ exaggerated, unambiguous or supernormal nonverbal behavior to motivate the 
student. Nonetheless, in other cases, psychological realism in the virtual human’s nonverbal 
behavior, as well as accurate inferences about the human’s nonverbal behavior, is often 
desirable, such as in systems that are designed to train social skills, where inferring the 
psychological meaning of movements, like facial movements, is crucial (Kron et al., 2017). In 
some cases, psychological realism is paramount, as when virtual humans are designed to elicit 
behavior in a human interaction partner that allows the diagnosis of depression (Devault et al, 
2015).  
Mapping the virtual human’s simulated internal states to its movements 
Often the realization of expressive behavior in a virtual human involves two connected 
computational models. There is the model of the emotion elicitation that determines the virtual 
human’s internal, mental states, in essence simulating how the virtual human’s experiences elicit 
the internal emotional states it “feels.” In addition, there is a model that maps those states to the 
behaviors or physical movements such as facial actions designed to express those states. Some 
studies also endow virtual humans with the capacity to regulate their emotion simulations 
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(Marsella & Gratch, 2009), allowing the face to dynamically portray episodes of both 
authentically “felt” emotion and strategically intended emotional expressions. 
Simulating emotional states. The design of the computational models of emotion elicitation used 
in these systems (Dias & Paiva, 2005; Marsella & Gratch, 2009; Becker-Asano & Wachsmuth, 
2008) have been most heavily influenced by appraisal theories (See Box 2). Appraisal theories 
are popular in computational models in virtual human research because each appraisal (e.g., 
pleasantness, novelty, etc.) maps readily to formalisms used in Artificial Intelligence to model 
internal states such as beliefs, desires and intentions.9 
The computational models of emotion elicitation used in virtual humans have not been 
empirically validated against human data, except for a few notable exceptions. For example, one 
study compared human self-reports of their changing emotional experience over the course of 
playing the two-person competitive game of Battleship to the predictions of alternative 
computational models of emotion (Gratch et al., 2009). A related study (Marsella et al, 2009) 
evaluated a computational model, EMA, (EMotion and Adaptation, inspired by the appraisal 
model developed by Lazarus, 1991) that could simulate an emotional episode and regulate the 
simulation. Again, the game of Battleship was used. In both cases, the subjective reports of 
emotional experience at key points in the unfolding game were compared to the model’s 
predictions for those experiences (i.e., what the model predicted the real human would feel and 
how the person would regulate those feelings). In both cases evidence was found supporting 
aspects of the various models while also identifying some discrepancies between subjects’ 
subjective report and model predictions. For example, EMA correctly predicted the changes in 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, many of the computational models have been based on appraisal models, such as Ortony, Clore & 
Collins (1988). However, the computational work has treated it as a causal model, so that the appraisals are the sole 
cause of emotions, even though the work of Ortony et al was designed as a descriptive model. 
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subjective reports of emotion intensity, as well as changes in subject’s reports of their effort to 
win and the importance of winning, in the service of regulating their emotions. However, it 
incorrectly predicted that subjects would engage in wishful thinking, increasing their 
expectations of eventually winning, in the face of evidence that they were actually losing. In fact, 
when faced with losing, subjects tended to lower their expectations of winning, perhaps again as 
a means to down regulate the eventual negative emotions that would result from losing.  
Mapping states to movements. Once an emotion simulation is implemented, another 
model is used to express the simulated emotions in the virtual human’s movements, including 
facial actions. Expression stereotypes (see Figure 4) have frequently been used to map the 
simulated emotions provided by these computational models to facial actions made by virtual 
humans. The component process model of emotion (Scherer et al., 2017) has also been explored 
by tying the virtual human’s facial actions to the simulated appraisals generated by its emotion 
model (Paleari et al, 2007; Malatesta et al, 2009).  
Data-driven techniques provide an alternative to theory driven approaches. One approach 
to using data is to depend on other people’s beliefs about which facial movements express 
emotion, rather than to rely on scientists. For example, posed expressions from actors can be 
digitally scanned, creating visually realistic faces with posed facial actions (Alexander et al., 
2009) that in appearance can be indistinguishable from humans.10 However, the goal here is 
typically grounded in perception, as opposed to physical realism. Specifically, the facial 
movements and their dynamics, as expressions of emotion, are based on beliefs, stereotypes or 
artistic interpretation, with an underlying expectation that a human user will infer emotional 
                                                 
10 Digital scanning enables film makers to fool audiences so that, for example, they can bring an actor back to life, 
twenty years after his death, as was done in the recent Hollywood film, Rogue One, when Peter Cushing (who 
played a general in the Empire) made an appearance. 
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meanings from those movements. The main weakness in these approaches is ecological – as we 
discuss in the main text of the paper, people’s beliefs about emotional expressions are often 
better thought of as stereotypes and may not accurately capture how they actually move their 
faces when expressing emotion in real life. An alternative data-driven approach, one with greater 
potential for ecological validity, is to record people’s facial movements while they are engaged 
in situations that are assumed to evoke emotion, either in the lab or in everyday life, but this 
requires inferring which emotional episodes are being created (for a discussion on the difficulties 
in measuring an emotional episode, see discussion in the main paper). 
To date, there is no strong empirical evidence that compares these alternative models of 
expressing emotions in terms of the psychological realism of the facial movements they generate.  
An additional challenge is the mismatch between abstract details provided by a 
psychological hypothesis and the far more specific engineering details about the appearance of 
the character’s face, skin, as well as realizing realistic dynamics for the individual facial actions 
required to animate a virtual human’s face. Those dynamics include not only timing of each 
action unit, but also its duration and the rates at which it moves. Furthermore, the dynamics of 
the action units must influence other elements, such as the bunching and wrinkling of skin. 
Beyond realizing one configuration of facial movements, there is also sequencing of the 
movements over time, such as when initial surprise may transition into an instance of fear or 
anger. Such dynamics encompass not only the facial movements themselves but also the 
dynamics of the underlying mental states that are being expressed.  These factors are all critical 
to getting a realistic effect. That is, basic emotion theory and the componential model of emotion 
describe their hypotheses in terms of abstract (non-physical) processes, not the physical 
mechanisms by which movements or simulations are realized. This requires designers to make 
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inferences as they build computational models. As a consequence, in a given study, it is difficult 
to infer whether the results pertain to the engineering choices made to realize a psychological 
theory or more generally to the theory itself. 
More broadly, mapping a virtual human’s simulated internal states to its movements is, in 
fact, more complex than simply connecting the emotion simulation (as an output of an emotion 
elicitation model) to physical movements (as an output of an expression model). Virtual humans 
are designed to engage us in face-to-face interaction. As in human-to-human social interactions, 
facial movements in a virtual human-to-human interaction serve a variety of functions, such as 
establishing rapport by mirroring the human participants’ behavior (Huang et al., 2011; Tickle-
Degnen & Rosenthal, 1990), emphasizing something with shared attention (Ekman, 1979), 
regulating turn-taking in the interaction, greetings, communicating attitudes, and so on (Cafaro et 
al., 2017).  
Endowing a virtual human with the capacity to infer emotions from facial movements 
Virtual humans often are designed to infer psychological meaning in the nonverbal 
movement of real humans and use those inferences to inform how they interact. This involves 
two connected technologies: technologies to sense facial movements, and a model of emotion 
perception that determines the virtual human’s emotion inferences about what those states mean.  
In drawing emotional inferences about a human’s facial movements, virtual human 
designs have typically exploited standard technologies that rely on data-driven machine learning 
techniques discussed earlier. For example, the SimSensei virtual human system was designed to 
interview patients suffering from depression and post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD), as well 
as nonpatients, asking people questions such as “What is your dream job?”, “What do you do 
now?” and “Tell me about something you did recently that you really enjoyed?” (Devault et al., 
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2015). A range of sensing technologies were used to measure, for example, smile 
intensity/duration (OKAO11), facial actions & emotion (FACET12) and acoustic/vocal qualities13. 
 Wörtwein & Scherer (2017) reports on another study that used the SimSensei virtual 
human. The focus of the study was to discover which questions asked by the virtual human and 
which nonverbal actions emitted by the participants were most diagnostic of whether or not a 
given test-subject was suffering from PTSD. Questions were ranked in terms of information 
gained14 to discover the most diagnostic nonverbal actions associated with that information. For 
example, depending on the question, reduced variability of movement (they moved the facial 
feature less), or reduced average displacement for facial actions AU1, AU2, AU9, AU17, AU18 
and AU26 was found to be correlated with PTSD. Interestingly, which facial actions were more 
diagnostic depended on the question, leading the researchers to suggest that context matters in 
the sense that the specific context of the question being asked determined what facial actions 
were most diagnostic of PTSD.  
 More recent work has begun to explore how a virtual human’s model of the human can 
help bias the inferences of the human’s mental states. For example, to the extent the virtual 
human has a model of the goals and beliefs of the human, it can use a theory of emotion15 to 
predict how the human may emotionally react and use those predictions to refine its 
interpretation of the human’s facial movements as well as use the movements to refine its model 
of the human’s beliefs and goals (Alfonso et al., 2015). In addition, the virtual human can 
                                                 
11 //www.omron.com/r d/coretech/vision/okao.html  
12 http : //www.emotient.com/ 
13 http : //www.cogitocorp.com/  
14 See the discussion of information theory in Box 16. 
15 In the two works we cite here (Alfonso et al, 2015; Yongsatianchot & Marsella, 2016), variants of appraisal 
theories were used to provide the virtual agent with a folk theory of emotion. Alfonso et al (2015) used a model 
inspired by Smith & Lazarus (1990) and Roseman (2001) while Yongsatianchot & Marsella (2016) used a model 
inspired by Ortony et al., (1988) 
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acquire and refine over the course of an interaction how a specific human tends to move his face 
during a situation thought to evoke emotions (Yongsatianchot & Marsella, 2016).  
Should we care about the impact of virtual human technology?  
Virtual humans provide an important tool for studying the human perception of emotion 
in the laboratory. However, they are likely to have an additional, broader social impact.  As these 
systems increasingly play a role in our day-to-day lives, they are likely to have a significant 
impact on our culture. For example, major corporations such as Microsoft and Amazon are 
exploring the use of virtual humans in a range of business and home applications, suggesting that 
virtual humans increasingly will integrate with our everyday life.  A valuable lesson is to be 
learned from the study of how television watching hinders children’s ability to infer emotion in 
facial movements in natural settings (Coats et al., 1999). We might similarly expect the design of 
virtual humans to impact how we perceive emotion in one another. One might even expect the 
impact to be more profound and immediate than passive watching of television since virtual 
humans are designed to engage us in an interaction. 
More specifically, virtual humans are being designed to train social skills that have 
significant real-world consequences, such as medical student’s bedside manner (Kron et al, 
2017) or a soldier’s ability to cross-culturally negotiate (Kim et al, 2009; Traum et al., 2003). 
These systems either implicitly or explicitly seek to teach how to express emotion and infer 
emotions from expressions, in highly critical situations such as informing patients that they have 
a life-threatening disease. As part of the learning process, the system can try to assess and seek to 
improve the learner’s ability to infer emotion from the virtual human’s expression as well as to 
express their emotion in ways the system design deems is appropriate. Clearly, the models of 
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expression production and recognition that are incorporated into the system will impact what is 
learned.
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 Box 12: The In-Group Advantage in Emotion Perception 
People’s perceptions of emotion are in better agreement with scientists’ expectations 
when judging faces from their own culture or heritage, referred to as an in-group advantage 
(Elfenbein, 2017; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002a, 2002b, 2003), suggesting that people are better 
able to infer emotional states from configurations of muscle movements when they are more 
familiar with the structural features of the faces they are asked to label (Neth & Martinez, 2010). 
This suggests that perceptual learning may play an important role in perceiving emotion. 
Perceptual learning may be necessary for making sense of even the most basic visual details in 
photographs. For example, it is only when we are familiar with other people that we realize that 
different photos of the same person are, in fact, the same person (i.e., perceptual learning and 
familiarity are necessary to categorize faces by identity; Beale & Keil, 1995; Jenkins, White, 
Monfort, & Burton, 2011; McKone, Martini & Nakayama, 2001; Viviani, Binda & Bosato, 2007; 
for a discussion of how familiarity is important for face perception, see Young & Burton, 2017).  
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 Box 13: Some Details of the Emotion Perception Studies by Crivelli and Colleagues 
 Crivelli and colleagues have published three articles examining emotion perception in 
small-scale, remote cultural contexts that are relevant to this paper.  If we only pay attention to 
the reliability with which participants infer an emotional cause for the facial configurations in 
Figure 4, then it appears that several of these experiments provide moderate support for the 
commonsense hypothesis that anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise each are 
expressed with the facial configurations in Figure 4.  But a closer examination of the specificity, 
in addition to reliability, makes it clear that they do not.   
 
1. Crivelli, C., Jarillo, S., Russell, J. A., & Fernández-Dols, J. M. (2016). Reading emotions 
from  faces in two indigenous societies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
145(7), 830-843. 
 
In Study 1 of Crivelli, Jarillo, et al. (2016), photographs of six posed facial configurations 
similar to those in Figure 4 of the main paper were spread before participants from the Trobriand 
Islands; participants were asked  to point to the person who felt a specific emotion (so, this was a 
choice-from-array task: matching facial configurations to words).   
 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (.58 [.39, .74]) Labeled as anger (.20 [.09, .38]) 
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.46 [.29, .65]) Labeled as fear (.27 [.13, .46]) 
Gasping Labeled as fear (.31 [.16, .50]) Labeled as anger (.30), disgust (.29) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.25) Labeled as fear (.27), sad (.23), anger (.20) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger  (.07) Labeled as disgust (.08) 
Results from Table 1 of Crivelli et al., Study 1. Facial configurations are listed in the first column.  95% confidence 
intervals (CIs) presented in square brackets. 
 
There is only above chance reliability and specificity for smiling as an expression of happiness. This 
result has an untested alternative explanation:  participants were able to pick the correct label based on 
 
valence alone (smiling faces depict a pleasant state and the only pleasant word offered was happiness).  
For a discussion, see main text.  
In Crivelli, Jarillo et al. (2016) Study 2,  the method was the same (matching faces to words), 
except that some participants saw posed static photographs of facial configurations and some saw posed 
dynamic videos. Participants were the Mwani of Mozambique and the experiment was conducted in their 
native language (Kimwani).  There was no difference between the static and dynamic conditions. Only 
the static condition is discussed here for brevity.  
 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (.58) Labeled as sadness (.21) 
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.16) Labeled as anger (.16), fear (.16), disgust (.32) 
Gasping Labeled as fear (.58)  Labeled as anger (.21) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.37) Labeled as sadness (.16), anger (.32), fear 
(.11) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger  (.26) Labeled as happiness (.11), sadness (.16), fear 
(.11), disgust (.11) 
Results from Table 5, of Crivelli et al., Study 2. Facial configurations are listed in the first column.  The Specificity 
column lists results that are not statistically different from those in the Reliability column. 
 
No facial configuration was labeled specifically as hypothesized.  The results for the dynamic 
facial configurations was similar, except that the smiling configuration was specifically labeled as 
happiness, which is tempered by an alternative explanation (perceiving valence).   
 
2. Crivelli, C., Russell, J. A., Jarillo, S., & Fernández-Dols, J. M. (2016). The fear gasping face as a 
threat display in a Melanesian society. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
113(44), 12403-12407.  
 
In this study, Trobriand Islanders were asked to point to the posed facial configuration of a person 
who felt a specific emotion (in the emotion condition) or who was communicating a specific social 
motive (in the social motive condition).  Participants could select a facial configuration from an array of 
six, pick a card with a black cross meaning “face not present in the array,” or answer that they did not 
know the response. 
  Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (1.0)  
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.53 [.15, .57]) Labeled as hunger (.31), fear (.25), 
submission (.25) 
Gasping Labeled as fear (.39)  Labeled as anger (.56), threat (.69) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.22) Labeled as fear (.28), rejection (.56) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger  (.06) Labeled as disgust (.36), hunger (.14), help 
(.19), submission (.14), rejection (.22), about 
to eat (.19) 
Results from Table S1, of Crivelli et al. Facial configurations are listed in the first column.  The Specificity column 
lists results that are not statistically different from those in the Reliability column. 
 
There was strong reliability and above chance specificity for smiling as an expression of 
happiness, which is tempered by an alternative explanation (perception of valence). 
 
3. Crivelli, C., Russell, J. A., Jarillo, S., & Fernández-Dols, J. M. (2017). Recognizing spontaneous 
facial expressions of emotion in a small scale society of Papua New Guinea, Emotion, 17(2), 337-
347. 
 
In Study 1, Trobriand Islanders were asked to freely label spontaneous expressions of happiness, 
sadness, anger, surprise and disgust produced by the Fore people of Papua New Guinea; the photographs 
were labeled by and published by Ekman (1980).   
 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (.13 [.04, .29] ) Labeled as laughing or smiling (.44) 
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.16 [.06, .32] Labeled as avoidance (.19) 
Startled Labeled as surprise (.00)  Labeled as avoidance (.19), sadness (.16) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.06 [.01, .21]), Labeled as avoidance (.22) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger  (.03 [.00, .17]) Labeled as avoidance (.56) 
Results from Table 1, of Crivelli et al., Study 1. Facial configurations are listed in the first column.  The Specificity 
column lists results that are not statistically different from those in the Reliability column. 
 
No spontaneous expression was labeled as predicted by Ekman (1980) or by the commonsense 
view. 
 
 
In Study 2 of Crivelli at al. (2017), Trobriand Islanders matched posed facial configurations to 
emotion labels that were provided by the experimenter (i.e., they performed the matching faces to words 
method that was used in Crivelli, Jarillo et al., 2016).  According to the paper, “The response format 
consisted of nine written terms. Five of the labels were predicted by Ekman (1980): mwasawa 
(happiness), ninamwau (sadness), leya (anger), eyowa lopola (surprise, startle), and minena (disgust). 
Two of the labels were Study 1’s modal categories: gigila (laughing, smiling) and gibulwa (feels like 
avoiding social interaction). And, two of the remaining labels were itwali (other emotion) and gala 
anukwali (I do not know). On the actual questionnaire, only the Kilivila terms were listed. The items were 
always presented in the same order: gilbuwa, ninamwau/mwau, minena, eyowa lopola, gigila, leya, 
mwasawa, itwali, and gala anukwali.” 
 
 Reliability Specificity  
Smiling  Labeled as happiness (.17 [.06, .37]) Labeled as laughing, smiling (.69), sadness 
(.13) 
Pouting  Labeled as sadness (.29 [.15, .49]) Labeled as anger (.17), surprise (.17) 
Startled Labeled as surprise (.21 [.09, .41])  Labeled as sadness (.21), happiness (.13), 
avoidance (.17) 
Nose-scrunch  Labeled as disgust (.38 [.21, .57]) Labeled as avoidance (.33) 
Scowling  Labeled as anger  (.13 [.04, .32]) Labeled as sadness (.29), avoidance (.50) 
Results from Table 3 of Crivelli et al., Study 2. Facial configurations are listed in the first column.  The Specificity 
column lists results that are not statistically different from those in the Reliability column. 
 
No spontaneous expression was labeled as predicted by the commonsense view. The smiling 
configuration was consistently chosen as the expression for “happy” just barely above chance, it was also 
labeled sadness as frequently.  And the smiling configuration was also labeled as laughter more reliably 
than it was labeled “happy,” replicating Study 1. Nor did a pouting configuration meet the specificity 
criterion; proportionally, participants were just as likely to label a pouting face as anger or surprise. The 
startled configuration (proposed as the surprise expression) was as reliably labeled as sadness, happiness 
or “feels like avoiding a situation” as it was labeled surprise. A nose-wrinkled configuration (the proposed 
disgust expression) was consistently labeled as “disgust” better than what would be expected by chance, 
 
but it was not specifically (uniquely) labeled as “disgust,” as it was just as often labeled as “feels like 
avoiding a social interaction.” 
  
 Box 14: The Power of Words in Emotion Perception Experiments 
 
The emotion words provided during choice-from-array tasks may have a psychological 
impact that extends beyond just constraining participants’ word choice – they may actually help 
to create reliable emotion inferences.   
Words Support Perception 
In people who already possess conceptual knowledge for U.S. concepts of anger, fear, 
and so on, emotion words appear to encourage participants to see certain emotions in the facial 
configurations of Figure 4 more so than they would otherwise. Many experiments now show that 
words have a more basic function in supporting perception, even for unfamiliar objects (Lupyan, 
Rakison & McClelland, 2007), contradicting the widespread assumption that people simply learn 
names for categories they already know, and supporting the hypothesis that words shape how 
categories are learned in the first place (Gelman & Roberts, 2017; Waxman & Gelman, 2010). 
Consistent with these broader findings, emotion words have been shown to shape how 
participants perceive and even literally see faces (Gendron et al., 2012) because they influence 
how people encode and remember facial features (Fugate et al., 2010, 2017; Doyle & Lindquist, 
2018).  Additional evidence also shows that the conceptual knowledge linked to words 
dynamically shapes the perception of facial configurations: when participants believe that two 
emotion categories are conceptually more similar to one another, facial configurations depicting 
those categories were also perceived as more similar, even when controlling for the actual 
perceptual similarity of the facial configurations (using novel research methods like reverse 
correlation and computer mouse tracking; Brooks & Freeman, 2018).  
Words Invite Concept Learning 
Research shows that the words provided in choice-from-array tasks may actually quickly 
teach participants the expected answers in an experiment. Participants in an experiment might 
see anywhere from a dozen to a hundred proposed expressive configurations, and for each one 
 they see, the same handful of emotion words are presented over and over again. Under these 
conditions, participants quickly learn which words are supposed to correspond to each facial 
configuration. For example, children learn to label an artificially constructed facial expression 
(e.g., a blowfish expression) with the word “pax” in a choice from array task at levels that are 
comparable to the proposed expressive configurations in Figure 4 (Nelson & Russell, 2016). 
Participants also use a process of elimination strategy: words that are not chosen on prior trials 
are selected more frequently, inflating agreement levels (DiGirolamo & Russell, 2017).  
There is some evidence that choice-from-array tasks inadvertently allow participants to 
learn emotion categories during the course of an experiment. In a recent study, emotion 
categories that are untranslatable with a single word in English, in Mandarin Chinese and in 
Hadza culture (and that do not exist in those cultures) were presented to participants from those 
cultures in a choice-from-array task along with contrived cues (in this case, made up 
vocalizations). Participants free-labeling of the vocalizations indicated that they were unfamiliar 
with them; they did not label the vocalizations with words for the novel emotion concepts or with 
words for anger, disgust, fear, and so on. Nonetheless, participants labeled the vocalizations with 
reliability and specificity when they were offered the novel category words in a choice-from-
array task, making those emotion categories and their (completely made up) vocalizations appear 
universal (Hoemann, Crittenden, Ruark, Gendron, & Barrett, in press; also see Gendron et al., 
2015).  
Emotion Words, Emotion Concepts and Emotion Perception 
Developmental evidence is also consistent with the hypothesis that emotion words and 
associated conceptual knowledge play a powerful, and perhaps even necessary, role in emotion 
perception.  A careful line of research provides robust, replicable evidence that children 
implicitly learn the affective meaning of facial movements in infancy, but only learn to explicitly 
infer an emotional meaning for facial configurations when they acquire the relevant emotion 
 concept (see Box 10).  These studies also suggest that emotion words play an important role in 
the development of emotion perception during early and middle childhood. For example, 
children between the ages of three and ten find it easier to match an expressive stereotype to an 
emotion word than to another example of the same stereotype (i.e., children find it easier to 
match the word “angry” to a scowling face than to perceptually match two scowling faces; see 
Widen, 2016). In a story-telling task, three and four-year-old children find it harder to state the 
cause of an expressive stereotype (e.g., a scowling face) than for an emotion word (e.g., angry) 
or a corresponding behavior (e.g., a scream) (Widen & Russell, 2004). This label superiority 
effect is robust and is observed in a variety of experiments (Balconi & Carrera, 2007; Camras & 
Allison, 1985; Reichenbach & Masters, 1983; Russell & Widen, 2002a, 2002b; Widen & 
Russell, 2002, 2004, 2010a, 2010b). Children between the ages of four and ten years of age find 
it more difficult to freely label an expression stereotype like those in Figure 4 than brief stories 
describing anger, fear, surprise, disgust, compassion, embarrassment, shame and contempt 
(where the stories do not contain any emotion label; Widen & Russell, 2010a); for example, 
children are more likely to freely offer the word “disgusted” (or a synonym) to label a story 
describing disgust than the stereotyped disgust expression (e.g., see also Camras & Allison, 
1985 N. Eisenberg, murphy, shepherd, 1997; for a review see Widen & Russell, 2013a). This 
phenomenon has been called a face inferiority effect. It suggests that the ability to infer 
emotions emerges later for facial movements than for stories, an effect that could result from a 
number of factors. 
Figure S8-1 may reflect more about children’s’ ability to incorporate facial movements 
into their emotion concepts, rather than their acquisition of those concepts. This interpretation is 
suggested by the developmental trajectory of the human visual system during these same years 
(Mondloch et al., 2003). Adults process the configurations in Figure 4 configurally (Martinez, 
2017a; Neth & Martinez, 2009), meaning that they perceive second-order dependencies in image 
 features (first-order dependencies involve the ordering of features (e.g., eyes on top of the nose 
on top of the mouth); second-order dependencies involve the relative distances between these 
features). There is some debate over when children become proficient in the visual interpretation 
of configural features (some evidence suggests at birth (Turati et al., 2010) whereas other 
evidence suggests around eight years of age (Mondloch et al., 2003; Le Grand et al., 2004; 
Maurer et al., 2002; Sinha et al., 2006)).16 This may help to explain, at least in part, why children 
increasingly improve in their ability to match words to faces as they age. It may also help explain 
why toddlers (and even older children) have difficulty perceptually matching photos of different 
people who are posing the proposed expressive configurations for the same emotion category 
(e.g., different people scowling, different people frowning, etc.; Widen, 2016).17 
 Despite these ambiguities, it is possible that infants begin to learn emotion concepts and 
infer emotional meaning in facial movements earlier than they can explicitly label those 
movements with emotion words. One (as yet untested) hypothesis proposes that early in their 
development, infants hear emotion words being used by their parents and caregivers, and these 
emotion words serve to scaffold the ability of infants to begin to form emotion categories and 
learn emotion concepts (this idea is thought to operate more generally for other abstract 
categories and concepts; see Barrett, 2017a; Barrett et al., 2007; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). 
 Words can initiate and scaffold the formation of concepts and categories (Balaban & 
Waxman, 1997; Waxman & Markow, 1995), particularly when the instances of a concept vary in 
how they look, sound and feel (as is the case with emotion concepts). These are called abstract 
or artifact categories. A growing body of research shows that infants and toddlers use words as 
                                                 
16 Experience with faces allows children to more quickly learn how to interpret the meaning of facial movements 
(Oakes & Ellis, 2013); scientists speculate that this experience allows children to differentiate facial information into 
categories that are functional in their social environments. 
17 It has been suggested that children have a difficult time perceptually matching faces because they are limited in 
their ability to process faces configurally (Pascalis et al., 2002). Configural processing is necessary to gain expertise 
in face recognition (Maurer et al., 2002) and plays an important role in the visual perception of emotion (Neth & 
Martinez, 2009). 
 a powerful tool for learning artifact or nominal kind categories (i.e., objects are treated as similar 
for performing some function when they are perceptually dissimilar; e.g., Fulkerson & Waxman, 
2007; Landau & Shipley, 2001; Plunkett et al. 2008; Addyman & Mareschal, 2010; Althaus & 
Westerman, 2016; Baldwin & Markman, 1989; Dewar & Xu, 2007, 2009; Welder & Graham, 
2006). It has been proposed that emotion words help children form emotion categories and learn 
emotion concepts precisely because emotion concepts are abstract concepts (Barrett, 2017; 
Barrett et al., 2007; Lindquist & Gendron, 2013). 
If variation is the norm when it comes to emotion categories, then emotion categories are 
abstract categories: people can tremble, jump, freeze, scream, gasp, hide, attack, and even laugh 
in the face of fear; the same appears to be true for anger. Physiological changes such as heart 
rate, breathing rate or blood pressure increase, decrease, or stay the same across instances of all 
emotion categories that have been studied (see Box 9). The variation is not random – it is 
situated -- and it is beyond what can be accounted for by common beliefs about emotion (see 
Box 2). The fact that the instances of an emotion category, like fear, can vary considerably in 
their facial movements, their physical changes, and their behaviors implies that when it comes to 
learning emotion concepts, children are faced with the task of making inferences about deeper 
commonalities across perceptually variable instances (i.e., they must learn a nominal kind 
category). That is, they must learn that instances of fear belong to the same category because 
they serve the same purpose, even if those instances look, sound, and feel different.  
Evidence from Congenitally Deaf Children 
 
Another opportunity to study the role of emotion words and their associated concepts in 
emotion perception comes from observing children who are born deaf. Congenitally deaf 
children are often born to hearing parents who do not know sign language and who may 
subsequently struggle to learn it, reducing crucial opportunities to communicate with their 
infants early in life. Communication with parents and caregivers is the basis of emotion concept 
 learning (Harris, de Rosnay, & Pons, 2016) and language learning (Kuhl, 2014) more generally, 
suggesting that congenitally deaf children who are born to non-signing, hearing parents might be 
slower to learn mental words and concepts. This may offer a window to observe the effects of 
early exposure to language, or its delay, on emotion perception competency.  Numerous studies 
now show that congenitally deaf children who are born to non-signing, hearing parents have no 
opportunities to engage in or hear conversations about emotion or benefit from emotion labeling. 
These children are, in fact, slower to learn mental words and concepts because of this lack of 
access (e.g., Levrez et al., 2012; Remmel & Peters, 2008; Russell et al., 1998; Schick et al., 
2007; Steeds, Rowe, & Dowker, 1997). A variety of studies do, in fact, suggest that deaf children 
have a difficult time inferring emotions from scowls, frowns, smiles and so on, when compared 
to hearing children or children who are raised by parents who are fluent in sign language (for a 
review of evidence, see Sidera et al., 2017).  This difficulty extends to inferring mental causes 
for physical movements, more generally (e.g., Ludlow et al., 2012). 
Some scientists working in this area hypothesize that deaf children’s difficulty inferring 
emotion from facial movements is an example of their larger difficulties inferring mental events 
in general, primarily due to a delay in their ability to learn language (e.g., Dyck & Denver, 2003; 
Ludlow et al., 2010; Schick et al., 2007; Spencer & Marschark, 2010; Walker-Andrews & 
Lennon, 1991). Hearing children who are delayed in learning language also have difficulties 
inferring emotion from facial movements (Nelson et al., 2011).  Taken together, then, this 
research is consistent with the hypothesis that emotion perception competency emerges in the 
context of word and concept learning. 
Summary 
Taken together, these findings suggest that emotion words are not psychologically inert – 
they may shape how emotion is inferred in facial movements and encourage participants to 
assign emotional meaning to facial configurations differently than they would if the words were 
 not present. Since most of the studies that support the common view of emotion perception are 
choice-from-array tasks that include emotion words, the potency of those words provides an 
alternative explanation for the hundreds of studies that seem to strongly support the hypothesis 
that people perceive specific emotions in specific facial configurations with reliability. 
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 Box 15: The Habituation Task Used in Studies of Emotion Perception in Infants 
The most popular experimental design that is used to study emotion perception in 
preverbal infants is called the habituation task. In a standard habituation task, an infant is 
presented with a stimulus that experimenters believe represents an emotion category (say, a 
scowling face to represent anger) and the infant will look at it. As subsequent stimuli are 
presented (say, a series of scowling faces), the infant is assumed to identify or categorize each 
face according to its emotional meaning. If the infant categorizes the stimuli as belonging to the 
same emotion category, it will look for a shorter amount of time (because the infant is presumed 
to become bored). Once the infant's looking time drops below a certain threshold, experimenters 
assume that the child is habituated to the emotion category (i.e., the infant has become 
uninterested in looking at “scowling faces”). Then, a new stimulus is presented, and looking time 
is again recorded (e.g., after a viewing a series of scowling faces, the infant is then shown a 
smiling face). If the infant looks for a longer time, scientists infer that she has categorized the 
stimulus as belonging to an emotion category that is different from before (i.e., the infant is 
assumed to be interested in novelty; this novelty is supposed to reflect a category difference in 
the context of the experiment).  
The habituation task obviously requires that the experimenter infer what looking times 
mean. Such inferences call for having strong alternative hypotheses that are, in practice, rarely 
considered. For example, the proposed expressive forms in Figure 4 differ in their familiarity 
(e.g., most infants are more familiar with smiling faces than with scowls or frowns). This makes 
it difficult to know which features of a face are holding an infant’s attention (familiarity or 
novelty), and can lead to potentially incorrect inferences. For example, several studies claim that 
infants are somehow born prepared to detect fearful faces. But the proposed expression for fear is 
less familiar than “happy” faces; infants may look longer at them because they are attempting to 
learn novel stimuli (e.g., Bayet et al., 2017; see also Peltola et al., 2008, 2009).  
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 Box 16: Information Theory as Applied to Emotion Communication 
An information theory approach to understanding emotional communication asks: what is 
the information that one person’s facial movements (the sender) convey to another person (the 
perceiver) in a particular context and how does that information help achieve synchrony between 
the sender and perceiver. The questions are cast in terms of how the sender and perceiver share 
information. The sender is communicating some information with his facial movements 
(sometimes emotional, sometimes not), and the perceiver uses that information to reduce 
uncertainty about what the sender is going to do next (in Western cultures, this typically means 
making a mental inference that allows the perceiver to predict the sender’s actions). For recent 
examples of experiments that use information theory as a scientific tool, see Jack & Schyns, 
(2017). 
This approach begins with the assumption that one person, the sender, is in some state of 
mind, makes some facial movements, and performs some action (speaks, moves his body, etc.) in 
a particular situation. The perceiver detects these movements and makes a prediction about what 
the sender will do next, often by making an inference about the sender’s state of mind. 
Communication of information between the sender and the perceiver is understood as mutual 
information, which is a symmetric measure of the information shared between two variables, X 
and Y. Specifically, mutual information is a measure of how much knowing value of one 
variable, X, tell us, reduces the uncertainty, about the value of the other variable, Y, and vice 
versa.  
Formally, mutual Information is a symmetric measure of the dependency between two 
random variables that provides a nonparametric way to assess how much knowing some random 
variable, Y, reduces the uncertainty about another random variable, X. Mutual information is 
based on Shannon’s notion of information which is measured by entropy, H(X), a measure of the 
uncertainty of a random variable. Mutual Information, I(X;Y), is the reduction in uncertainty that 
 results from knowing Y, I(X;Y) = H(X)-H(X|Y) (see Cover & Thomas 2006). If X and Y are 
independent events, knowing Y provides no information about X and the entropy H(X) is equal 
to the entropy H(X,Y) and I(X;Y) is zero. On the other hand, if knowing Y fully determines X 
and Y fully determines X, then the mutual information reduces to the entropy of X (or Y).  
When asking whether facial movements express an instance of a certain emotion category 
emotions, where X is the sender’s state of mind and Y is his facial movements, the forward 
inference is as follows: How much does X, his state of mind, reduce uncertainty about Y, his 
facial movements, perhaps measured with facial EMG? In the reverse inference, X is the 
sender’s facial movements and Y is his state of mind: How much does X, his facial movements, 
again measured with facial EMG, reduce uncertainty about his state of mind, Y?) 
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